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Editors’ Introduction
In keeping with GSP’s ambition to promote innovative scholarship, a diversity of
source material, and ﬂedgling approaches to the study of genocide and mass
atrocities, this issue features a collection of articles that address several aspects
related to genocide and the legacy of genocidal processes.
Murphy examines the place of the arts in the prevention of genocide. Woolford,
June, and Um broaden our understanding of the Cambodian genocide by revealing
the “symbiogenetic destruction” experienced under the Khmer Rouge. Turning to
the case of Rwanda, Fox, Nyseth Brehm, and Gasana Gasasira examine the rescuereligion nexus and, speciﬁcally, how religion’s social dimensions are linked to
rescue during genocide. And ﬁnally, Koh not only reminds us of the importance of
addressing historical collective trauma but also that the legacy of this trauma can
be long-lasting and profound, as in the case of First Nations people and other
Indigenous and Aboriginal peoples around the world.
For years, we have received articles with extremely interesting and compelling
content that examine events about which little is known, due to the lack of source
availability. Often, the authors are not established researchers, are unfamiliar with
the literature, and draw on sources, including primary data, that are difﬁcult to
verify. Therefore, it has never been possible to publish such contributions as peer
reviewed articles. Concurrently, it is clear genocide scholars have concentrated
their research efforts on a narrow set of cases; here, access to materials and research
participants is often facilitated and controlled by institutions—sometimes with the
help of translators. With that said, however, international researchers can also lack
the relevant linguistic and cultural skills, which can increase the risk of data
misinterpretation.
On the one hand, access to other cases, such as the persecution of various groups in
the People’s Republic of China, is severely limited; and on the other, state organs
exert extreme control over and pressure on those affected and their families. At the
same time, there is often a lack of contacts and the necessary language skills.
Compounding this challenge is that there is virtually no access to state documents
and sources.
Consequently, there is a dramatic lack of academic publications on, for example,
China's genocidal policies. GSP has published exactly one article on this topic in
the last seven years since CG became Editor-in-Chief.1 Fortunately, there are a
number of individuals and institutions that examine such cases and provide
information about their dynamics in newspapers, blogs, or in the form of reports.
With regards to violence in the Uyghur territories, for example, a report has been
available since March 2021.2

1

Maria Cheung, Torsten Trey, David Matas, and Richard An, “Cold Genocide: Falun Gong in China,”
Genocide Studies and Prevention 12, no. 1 (2018), 38–62, accessed May 18, 2021, https://doi.org/
10.5038/1911-9933.12.1.1513. As of May 18, 2021, this article has been downloaded exactly 6,846
times since its publication in 2018, making it one of GSP’s most popular papers amongst readers.

2

The Newlines Institute for Strategy and Polics and Raoul Wallenberg Centre for Human Rights, ed.,
The Uyghur Genocide: An Examination of China’s Breaches of the 1948 Genocide Convention (March
2021), accessed May 18, 2021, https://newlinesinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/ChinasBreaches-of-the-GC3.pdf.

Christian Gudehus, Fiza Lee-Winter, Laura Collins, Daniel Bultmann, JoAnn DiGeorgio-Lutz, Georgina
Holmes, Roland Moerland, Diana I. Popescu, Sabah Carrim, Bablu Chakma, and Emma Thorpe. “Editors’
Introduction.” Genocide Studies and Prevention 15, no. 1, 1–4. https://doi.org/
10.5038/1911-9933.15.1.1836.
© 2021 Genocide Studies and Prevention.
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The GSP editorial team believes it is urgent that such cases, and others that are
under-researched, are given space in scientiﬁc publications in order to provide
information to the community. This goes hand in hand with the use of “new” and
only partially veriﬁable sources, such as communications in messaging services.
GSP has created the new Dossier section for these types of texts. The articles
published under this new section are not double-blind peer reviewed and contain
information that is only conditionally veriﬁable. The ﬁrst dossier by Rukiye
Turdush and Magnus Fiskesjö focuses on the Chinese government’s systematic
violence against Uyghur Women.
Together with this new Dossier section—along with the recently formed Arts &
Literature section—the GSP editorial team wants to create a space dedicated to
unconventional, unﬁnished, and politically risky contributions with the hope that
more authors will come forward with similar types of submissions in the coming
years.

Christian Gudehus
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Arts & Literature:
The Many Faces of Hope
Fiza Lee-Winter
Institut für Entwicklungsforschung & Entwicklungspolitik (IEE)
Ruhr-Universität Bochum
Bochum, Germany

About the Art Work
This essay follows the central theme—hope—a term and emotion which is arguably a coping
mechanism against all hardship and suffering. It is most apparent in stories belonging to the
many voices who have managed to ﬁnd new lives in a third-country.
This piece is the result of a combination of formal and informal interviews conducted with
refugees, ﬁeld notes, conversations—individually and in group settings—and consolidated
personal stories from refugees who have undergone the US resettlement program. This essay
has been written with the aim of inspiring others—giving hope, in its many faces.
Characters created here are inspired by real-life persons who have had very different
experiences in their journey towards resettlement—and yet, bound by the central theme, hope,
which manifests itself in different ways. In the ﬁrst narrative, a young boy stays behind in
Kenya while his mother resettles to the United States. He longs for his mother’s care, but that
care is many years separated between when he can rejoin her. In the second one, a man
emphasizes hope for his children. He consistently stresses his thankfulness for his family’s
survival, and the key to a better future now lies in the future generation. And ﬁnally, the last
narrative in the collection underscores the difﬁculty, and resilience, in ﬁnding hope during
prolonged displacement spanning across three continents.
Acknowledgements
The author would like to acknowledge Roseline Mugaruka (Home Away from Home) and
Idriss Siyat (From Garissa to Greeley) for sharing their personal stories in great detail, as well as
assisting with character and place development. The author would also like to acknowledge
Collin Cannon, especially for his extensive editorial contributions and for conceptually codeveloping this piece, conﬁrming that hope is necessary to be held on to, especially in the most
trying of times.
About the Author
Fiza Lee-Winter is a PhD Candidate at the Institute of Development Research and Development
Policy (IEE) at the Ruhr-Universität Bochum (RUB) in Germany where she is conducting her
research project on the compatibilities of a human rights based approach (HRBA) to refugee
protection with Asian regionalism, using the Rohingya Refugee Crisis as a case study. Her
research interests include international human rights law, transnational governance, refugee
and forced migration studies. She is also a member of the Institute for International Law of
Peace & Armed Conﬂict (IFHV) at the RUB, and an associate member of the SYLFF-Mikrokolleg
on Forced Migration. Fiza has obtained her Master of Arts in Human Rights & Democratization
from EIUC/Global Campus of Human Rights and RUB, and a Bachelor of Arts in Criminal
Justice from the University of Northern Colorado. Her project is fully funded and supported by
the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung in Germany since 2019.

Fiza Lee-Winter. “Arts & Literature: The Many Faces of Hope.” Genocide Studies and Prevention 15, no. 1, 5–12. https://
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The Many Faces of Hope:
From Garissa to Greeley
As a child, I grew up for many years away from my mother. Her distance pained me. It pained
the whole family, including herself most of all. It had always been my hope to reunite with my
mother and at last feel like a kid again in her arms. Life had separated us. She had ﬂown to a
foreign soil eight thousand miles away from Kenya, to the United States—a place I had only
ever heard about before. But her journey to America was a dream that came to reality and a
light to our family’s darkness.
I was born and raised in Garissa, Kenya, a small, semi-arid town in the east of my country
toward the Somali border. Dadaab, the world’s largest refugee camp, was only sixty-seven miles
from us, and Nairobi, the capital city, farther still at 228 miles away. Al-Shabaab, forming a few
years prior in Somalia, was just beginning to be seen for the threat that it posed during my
childhood.
Life in Garissa was tough. My father worked as a middleman in the livestock market, trying to
convince buyers to buy the animals there and only earning himself a meager daily wage hardly
enough to keep the family together. As a man, society, religion, and culture pressured him to
provide for his family by any means necessary. He lived by that commitment. He never wanted
to let himself down and he worked around the clock to make ends meet and to provide for us.
My mother too, worked. She was a vegetable vendor in the local market—a market that’s
famously known as “Suuq-mugdi” which literally means the “black market.” This was all that
was available to her. This too earned her what would not be above basic consumption. But this
was life: they both strived hard in the midst of abject poverty to make ends meet. They did this
for their children, like any parents would.
My siblings and I were educated in private schools where we hardly ever attended due to a
constant lack of fees. I remember spending days in a row at home for not having enough school
dues or basic supplies. We switched to public schools eventually, due to ﬁnancial hardship. My
parents wanted the best for us and they worked for it, but that life was out of reach. Life was
hitting them hard and unforgivingly; they could not keep their heads above water.
One day, there was a breakthrough: my mother had been chosen for resettlement to the United
States. It was 2006, I was eight years old, and I found out that my mother would be leaving to a
distant land. Alone. Without the rest of us. I vividly recall that chilly morning when my dad
called in the Islamic school we were attending (what is known as Dugsi in my native language
and what people from other cultures call a Madrasa) to excuse us in order to bid farewell to our
mother. Farewell? My siblings and I had no context for what resettlement meant. To us, all that
it meant was that our mother was leaving abruptly. Here one day, gone the next. My siblings
and I walked home from the Dugsi only to ﬁnd my mom fully dressed with two suitcases next
to her. Our neighbors had gathered under the shade of the big tree by our house.
Seeing her ready to leave, I was confused. I was worried. Had a ﬁght erupted between my
parents? Was my mom leaving us? Where did this come from? It was not until she was leaving
that someone explained to me what was happening: she was leaving for the United States. To
America, that distant land from the stories and the news reports.
My worries melted. My anxiety about her leaving became anticipation of when I would get to
be next. My mom and I exchanged hugs and ﬁnal kisses, wiping away each other’s tears. She
whispered into my ear, “Don’t cry, my son. I will bring the family from grass to grace and I
promise that you will no longer do your homework with a torch. God willing, you will not be
living much longer in a house that leaks when it rains.” She stepped back and said to the family,

© 2021
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“I will work for this family and keep food on this table. I promise to visit you regularly.” I
managed a smile on my face and gave her a tight hug once again. I did not know when that
next visit would be, but I believed in this new hope. I felt that change had come.
The ﬁrst night my mother was gone from home felt different. My dad had taken her to Nairobi
where she would depart for the United States. My grandmother looked after us that night.
***
My mother started a fresh life in the United States as a refugee. She made a living and
contributed to her community, becoming another stitch in the broader fabric of American life—
like so many refugees before her, bringing her own unique history and culture to this distant
melting pot. She was still a mother of ﬁve and the wife to a husband, but they were eight
thousand miles away. She worked in their name. She worked for their future. It paid off.
After a few years of working, my mother managed to build a two-room house for the family.
My mother ﬂew back to Kenya in 2010, four long years after she had left, to see the home she
hoped to come back to one day. She came back to Kenya again in 2013, this time promising to
begin the petitioning process to bring us all to the United States for good.
A lot had changed for the family in the period between when my mother left and when we
could ﬁnally join her. Al-Shabaab had taken Mogadishu. The United Nations had assembled a
peacekeeping force to retake Somalia. The United States’ War on Terror began targeting AlShabaab in our region. Seventy-four had been killed in Kampala. Kenya had invaded Southern
Somalia to secure Kismayo. Seventy-seven are killed in a Nairobi mall. Finally, one hundred and
forty eight were killed and seven hundred held hostage in a ﬁfteen-hour siege in our very town
of Garissa, at the local university, in an attack by Al-Shabaab. I still remember that day. I still
remember the sounds of the gunshots during the morning prayer.
But my mother’s work had paid off: it was our turn to come to the United States. It was our turn
to wind through the immigration bureaucracy and hope to be reunited. It was time to be
together again: to be in my mother’s arms as the little boy I was when she had left me. July 23,
2017 is the day I ﬂew to America, and that day will remain in my mind like a printed paper.
That date is etched into my identity now.
My family was received by my mother and her friends in Denver, Colorado. We loaded our
belongings into a car and drove to Greeley, our new home, eight thousand miles away from our
old home. Everything was organized and so calm. It was quiet. The cloudless sky, the green
grass, the mountains on the horizon, the warm weather. “This is America,” I told myself. In
Greeley, I joined a nearby high school where I went on to earn my high school diploma. As a
college student at one of the public universities in Colorado, I am now studying political science
and legal studies and I hope to practice law one day.
In my spare time, I work as a Community Navigator for an immigrant rights organization,
helping refugees from East Africa ﬁnd a home, earn a living, and petition for their families to
join them here. I work like my mother worked: so that others’ hopes can become real. I work so
that other little boys will not be away from their mother for so long. God willing, I will make
that difference for families in the same way that difference was made for my mother.

© 2021
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The Many Faces of Hope:
Our Children, Our Future1
Our new home in Greeley, Colorado is simple. Of course, we are far from the rest of our
remaining family members (those who are still alive) but it is certainly much safer than
anywhere we have sought refuge; be it in Cox’s Bazar in Bangladesh, or even in Pulau Pinang in
Malaysia.
It was another normal day—I was driving my wife to her English lesson at the refugee center.
The sun was shining quite brightly for 10 am, so much so that I almost missed the red light. I
applied the brakes...a little harder than I normally would.
“Abang,2 hati-hati! [Dear, be careful]” said my wife. I nodded.
The kids were at home. It was the beginning of their summer holidays. I was happy for them.
Relieved for them.
When the light turned green, I hit the gas pedal, exerting force on my right shoulder as we
made the turn. I cried out in pain.
I managed to get off from work for 4 weeks—a severe shoulder sprain, the doctor said. I work at
the meat-packers nearby; it is hard manual labor, but it is the only thing I can get.
We ﬁnally pulled in to the refugee center. I drove into a parking slot right near the entrance—
the parking lot was big. I stopped the car, switched off the engine and turned to my wife who
was about to get off.
“Awak datang balik ke, awak tunggu saya? [Will you come and get me? Or will you wait in the
parking lot?]” she asked.
“Saya datang balik. See you agak-agak satu jam, [I will come back for you. See you in an hour
or so,]” I replied, and smiled at her.
My wife is a very strong woman. She gave birth to our ﬁrst son on the boat to Malaysia. We
were very lucky that there were no complications; lucky to have made it; lucky to still be alive.
From Bangladesh, we had managed to catch a boat to Malaysia. We made a short stop-over
somewhere in Thailand. I remember some people had to get off from our boat—I remember
their scared faces. We stayed on and the boat sailed to Malaysia. I still remember the waves;
they were really strong. It felt like we were on a swing, being rocked back and forth—only that
it was not gentle. I don’t know how many days had passed, but I recall us ﬁnally reaching
Malaysia.
A bead of sweat trickled down my left temple. It is warm, I thought. I looked at my watch—
10.10 a.m.—What was it that he asked me yesterday? I thought hard, trying to remember what
yesterday’s conversation was about with our friend.

1

The Rohingya couple left Bangladesh and lived in Malaysia for more than ﬁve years in the informal sector where they
had to assimilate with the locals to avoid arbitrary detention.

2

“Abang” in Malay means brother but is used as a term of endearment as well, used by wives to address their
husbands. In this case, the word means “dear” or “darling”—it is rare for Malay couples to call each other by their
ﬁrst name.
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Ah yes! He asked if I didn’t want to ﬁnd a better job… Our friend, Amir came from a different
life—but he has compassion. He understands.
I told Amir about my shoulder sprain and the hard work at the factory.
“That must really hurt!”
“Yes, it does. It started with my lower back. Then, my neck. And ﬁnally my shoulder—it feels...
stuck.”
“I’m so sorry to hear that. Why don’t you try to ﬁnd another job? A better one?”
“It’s OK. It’s part of life. I have suffered more. A new or better job?... Not so simple. My English
is not good. Plus, I have very limited skills.”
“But you can attend some skills-building classes…?”
“These classes take time. In the meantime, we need to survive too. It’s ok. I will push on—for
the sake of my kids. You know, Amir, life is not so simple. For me, my life is over. But this is the
time for my children. We are lucky to have resettled here, in the US. My boys speak very good
English. They are in school. They learn English here...and other important subjects too. Plus,
they now have a better chance than me. So, let them take this chance.”
“I understand. Although, you must be able to support them. With this job...are you?”
“It’s not an easy job. But I will be strong. My life is over. I don’t need a high-paying job for
myself. As long as we have enough for food and a roof above our heads, this is enough. It is
their turn to shine. This is my hope for them. They also know they are very lucky to be alive, to
be here.”
***
I took a deep breath, closed my eyes and held back the tears. Despite that, a tear spilled from
my right eye and rolled down my cheek. ‘Yes,’ I thought, ‘my life is over...and my children’s
have ﬁnally begun.’ When I opened my eyes, I saw my wife coming out of the refugee center.
As she walked towards the car, she waved and called out, “Eh, Abang, kata nak balik ke rumah
dulu? [Hi dear, I thought you said you were going home ﬁrst?].”
I smiled at her as she came closer, and said, “Takdelah, saya lagi menikmati matahari. Syukur
sangat kami disini [No, I was enjoying the sun. I feel extremely blessed that we are here].”
As my wife entered the car and slid into her seat, she looked at me intently and gently replied,
“Anak-anak kita—ini saat mereka. Waktu kita sudah habis; tapi, mereka...ada peluang! [Our
children—this is their time. Our time is over; but they...they have a chance!]”

© 2021
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The Many Faces of Hope:
Home Away from Home
My hometown, Uvira, was nothing special. It was a small town, maybe small enough to be a
village, but it was a beautiful village, nestled between mountains and Lake Tanganyika.
Burundi was on the other side of the lake, just ten miles over the water, and Rwanda was just a
little north of our village along the main road. Every morning, I heard people start their day
early in the morning when it was still dark. I remember the sound of ba mamans (the village
women) going to the mountain where they farmed Miyogo (cassava roots) and Miyindi (corn).
Sometimes my mom would go, and she would bring vegetables home to us. I never went to the
mountain because I heard it was far; moms would say that it’s not good for kids to make the
journey alone, and that they must go in groups to stay safe. Luckily for me, my mom preferred
ma vieties (selling clothes) in the maendeleo (market) near the lake. On their way to the lake, other
vendors would pass by and sell different merchandise to us in the village. It was nice because
they gave tasters for free, and I would always taste saucissons (sausages).
I loved playing with dirt, making a mess of everything. I loved running around free and
innocent—we all did, that is, all the kids around my age. Every afternoon, after lunch and nap
time, those who lived near me went out to play with each other. At ﬁve years old, I was too
young to start school with the big kids, and too big to be with maman all the time. I was right in
the middle, free.
One afternoon, my sister and I were playing at another’s house when my brother showed up
unexpectedly. He was scared and out of breath. He wore an expression I had never seen on
anyone before. Without giving an explanation, he told my sister and me we had to leave. We
did as we were told and grabbed what we had brought with us and took off after him, running
our fastest to keep up. Were we going home?
There was no time for questions, but I knew something had happened. I knew things were
different that day.
In fact, the whole week felt different when I thought about it. I remembered my papa spending
most days listening to the tiny radio with intense focus, hanging onto every word of the news
reports coming in. Usually, when he’d be listening to the radio, one or more of the neighbors
would sit next to him and join in. That week, more people were gathered around the radio. All
of them seemed worried about something I didn’t understand. I remembered my papa listening
so closely as if he was expecting the radio to give him permission to do something. He tapped
his ﬁngers on it every time he didn’t hear something correctly, moving around in the yard for a
better signal. My maman spent more time in church that week too. She used to take me, but
ever since giving birth to a baby, she would take her instead. Being ﬁve, I didn’t mind it at all.
This afternoon felt strange; my mom had gone away to church, my dad worked at night so he
had left for work, and it was just my brother, sister, and me left alone. The neighbors were all
packing, everyone was running around, moms were calling for their kids, grownups were
walking a bit faster than normal. It seemed like the entire world was spinning more quickly
than usual around me. My brother told me and my sister to get in the house and wait for
maman and everyone else to come home, so we could ﬂee together. Then he went back into the
streets.
But we could not wait at home forever. We waited as long as we could before my older brother
came back into the house, barely breathing, pushing us to move once again. He threw me on his
back, with my sister and brother running after us as we left our house into the streets. That was
the last time I saw my home for a very long time.
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As we ran down the one main road in town, people were running in every direction. My
brother said it was important not to fall down, that’s why he had to carry me. He kept saying
how we needed to be out of Uvira before they came back for him. Some people were running
toward Burundi like us, some were running toward Baraka—no one knew where safety was
going to be found. Men with big guns were walking in the main street and we were all doing
everything we could to not upset them, not make eye contact and not even get noticed. Some
men with big guns were wearing uniforms while others weren’t; it was impossible to tell who
was who or what those men were there for. Sometimes they’d call on other boys in the middle
of the street, tear them from their families to carry their luggage and their guns.
Sonidda, my older brother, said they would recognize him if they saw him; they had taken him
once before. We had to plan a new route, away from the main road. We headed to the outskirts
of town, toward the lake for cover. Walking down next to the lake, people were still running in
different directions, but there were no men with guns. We walked a bit slower as my brother
had put me down so that I could walk alone. My sister helped a family carry their baby girl, and
my other brother carried our bags.
We walked for three days.
***
We lived in Rwanda for a long time. I even started school there. Every so often, my brother
made us all get dressed in our best clothes to go meet the people at the UN ofﬁce. The
appointments were non-negotiable: whenever you had an appointment, you had to show up on
time or risk losing your case. The ofﬁce was far from us; we took three buses to get there when
we could, but often we had no choice but to walk. It was nice to walk there sometimes because
we could see where the president of Rwanda lived, there in Kigali. There were always men with
big guns around that building, and no one walked in this area; everyone was in their cars,
everyone looked happy, like they had arrived at their ﬁnal destination. I had never felt that. We
had lived in Kigali as if we would have to move at any given time, while the people there
looked relaxed; they looked like they had unpacked for good. I always wondered if the men
with guns did not scare them. I never understood this. I was always waiting to go back home, to
see maman and papa again, to play in the dirt with my friends.
It was always a muzungu (white man) asking us questions at the UN ofﬁce. They were the same
questions every time; I even memorized the answers. My brother said it was rude to answer
questions unless I was asked directly, but the man always asked the same questions and I
always gave the same answers. He didn’t really want to know about my life, the life I had then,
the one with my new friends, and my new school and my new church. He wanted to know
about the life I wanted but couldn’t have. The life where I left my parents, the life where my
brother was taken, beaten, and forced to eat meat otherwise they’d kill him; the life where we
had to move three different times because strange men were always looking for my brother. The
life we are running away from; the life that brings tears to all of us when we speak of it, and he
watched us cry.
He talked of a different life, a new life, a life where he promised safety for all of us. Every time
we went to the UN ofﬁce, we were promised this life. It was promised so many times that I
started to think he was just saying it to us to give us hope. It worked, I guess; I believed him. He
gave us hope—hope that one day we would have a life where I would go to school every day,
where I would live in a house like that of the president's neighbors, and drive the cars they
drove and eat the food they ate.
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I hoped for this life. I waited for this life. We waited for ten years for this life, getting by on just
the hope that these muzungus fed to us with each visit. But then it actually happened and hope
became my reality.
***
I have been living in the United States for ten years now and I have been naturalized as a
citizen. When I ﬁrst arrived, it was difﬁcult to see this new place as my home. I was separated
from my siblings again and was put into foster care. It seemed like everyone was interested in
knowing where I was from, where home was for me. People would ask, and to me, home was
still Uvira. Home was still the memory of playing with my friends in the dirt, with adults from
the village watching over us, talking, teasing each other. I did not know how to explain that to
these Americans I was meeting who had no knowledge of the Congo. It was difﬁcult, too,
coming to a country that spoke English when I couldn’t speak any back.
Foster care looks different for everyone, but for me, meeting my new family was the best thing
that could happen. My foster family showed me a love I hadn’t felt since I was a child: they
loved me unconditionally, and continue to do so.
My foster father is a funny man; he taught me everything I know today. He even taught me how
and why it’s important to ﬁll up gas to exactly $10. He’d be very concerned if I didn’t get it
right. I know now, of course, that putting gas in the car is not that stressful. He taught me how
to be successful in this new life, things I needed to know and things I needed to know just in
case. My dad helped me understand a world outside my own, a world where I could be anyone
I wanted to be; where the only one who was allowed to have expectations of myself was myself.
He showed me a world where he and the rest of the family would always be there for me—
where nothing would ever separate us.
Thanks to my foster family and the community I have built over the years, I am making my
own path for myself, taking risks and following my own hopes and dreams. Today, I am
pursuing a master’s degree in human rights law. I am studying to make this world a better
place, a safer place, a place where the dreams of little girls in the Congo become real.
I am at peace now; I know where home is. This new life of mine, this new family that is here for
me for the rest of my life. I know they’re not going anywhere.
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Feeding Her Child a Green Slipper Instead of a Cucumber
I ﬁrst observed the conﬁdent, sad, yet hopeful face of Nabat Fayiaq Rahman through the black
screen of the TV. She was wearing a traditional black Kurdish outﬁt that matched the stage
curtains designed for the anniversary of the Anfal genocide, marked on April 14 of every year.
The Kurdish Anfal genocide in Iraq was perpetrated by Saddam Hussein’s regime in the 1980s.
Human Rights Watch (1994) estimates that 182,000 Kurds were buried alive in mass graves,
many of which were found after Hussein was overthrown. More than 2.5 million people were
displaced, 4500 villages destroyed, and 250 towns and villages exposed to chemical weapons.
Nabat was from one of the destroyed villages, in a district called Qadir Karam in the Kirkuk
province. Her red eyes, which indicated she’d been crying throughout the event, did not match
her angry voice. “What did the government do for us?” she asked. “They did nothing. Once a
year, during the anniversary, they [the government] remember that the Anfal genocide
happened.”
Nabat’s voice disappeared into a chorus of female voices sorrowfully singing a heartening
lullaby, which until that moment had been meekly in the background of the program.

Lullaby, lullaby, lullaby.
The grief of the Kurds makes me lose my voice
To sing lullaby for all of you, each one thrice
Lullaby for my burning soul that doesn't rest day or night
Lullaby for my sons
Lullaby for my daughters
Lullaby for my husband, who was a leading Knight
Lullaby for my parents
Lullaby for my sisters
Lullaby for my brother, who was my posh
Lullaby for neighbours who turned to ash
Sleep, my loved ones
You may ﬁnd peace in the grave
Since the Earth is a slaughtering cave

The lullaby is a prominent piece of art in Kurdish society, and the only method through which
the female survivors of the Kurdish genocides can express their anguish since they don't have
access to psychiatric treatment. However, I am against treating the Kurdish genocides with only
lullabies and speeches. The Kurdish genocides require serious attention that should go beyond
singing lullabies and expressing emotions.
The lullaby multiplied in my ear. I don’t know if it was the lyric, or if my mind made up its own
lullaby because I’d been hearing them ever since I was a child. Historically, Kurdish culture is
known for many different types of lullabies: to send children to sleep, to mend lovers’ broken
hearts, to record oral history, to pass on classic stories of wisdom. But it has been a century since
the lullaby turned mainly into a dark lullaby of the dead, especially during the anniversary of
the Kurdish genocides.
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I wrote Nabat’s full name down and the name of the region where she lived, making a promise
that I’ll go all the way to Kurdistan, if only to see her.
The women who survived the Kurdish Anfal genocide are mostly isolated, and clad in black
outﬁts, both of which have been part of the villagers’ culture for over thirty years. Among them,
a few elderly survivors attend the genocide events mostly to perform lullabies and make
audiences weep. Nabat’s presence on TV was impressive. In the culturally conservative and
male-dominated society of the villages, survivors have chosen silence over speech, and some of
them refuse to tell their stories, even anonymously, all due to cultural and psychological
burdens.
Unlike Nabat, I’ve wiped away my tears, and managed to fake a smile while reminding myself
that here is an illiterate widow, a single mother of several children, victimized by one of the
most violent events in history, not only telling her story but also participating in a conference on
the Kurdish genocide in Iraq, criticizing and ﬁghting the government about the rights of the
Anfal genocide survivors.
By the summer of 2017, I was in Kurdistan, at Nabat’s home in BaniGull village. Habil Ahmad,
a General Manager of the Directorate of Anfal Monument in Chamchamal, arranged for me to
meet her and had helped me with transportation.
***
When we met, as expected, Nabat was fully clad in a traditional black outﬁt. She had been
donning it since 1988 in her untraditional way of attempting to make a difference. This time, her
red eyes and hopeless face expressed the unspeakable agonies of a heartbroken woman and a
mother of seven children who felt that no one understood her pain. My sister Nyan, who
accompanied me on this trip, took a few photos of her.
It is challenging to ask victims to relive the trauma they experienced. After I expressed this
concern, Nabat replied, “I want to tell not only the Kurds, but the entire world what happened
to us; and yet the problems we suffered during the Anfal cannot be put into words.”
Even so, she thought it worth trying, and recounted how she was captured in April 1988, along
with her husband, seven children (four sons and three daughters), four brothers-in-law, and
several cousins. The people of her village, she continued, were taken to concentration camps in
the south of Iraq.
Nabat was released after six months, “by a miracle,” as she calls it, but she lost two of her
children in those camps: a seven-year-old son and a three-year-old daughter.
What was the cause of their deaths?
“Hunger and disease,” she said. “We were put in a huge barn ﬁlled with animal excrement and
cockroaches. The barn was full of women and children with no food or drink. Once a day, we
received a piece of bread with a glass of water.”
She choked on her tears. Her eyes were ﬁxed on an abstract point faraway, and her arms were
locked across her chest while she moved her head back and forth. This went on for a while until
her gaze moved to the clock, and suddenly, as if she’d remembered something important, she
called out a female name. It was 12.20 p.m.
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A beautiful teenage girl, presumably Nabat’s daughter, entered the room. After greeting me, she
asked her mother if she needed anything. Nabat asked her to prepare lunch for me.
As a member of the community, I already knew about Kurdish etiquette and hospitality: It was
expected that I should eat in their home. But I didn’t want to be a burden so I quickly said that I
preferred a light meal; perhaps a tomato and cucumber salad, I added.
Silence ensued, and my thoughts wandered to the injustice Nabat had encountered. Despite her
anguish, she looked like she couldn’t be older than ﬁfty. If thirty years ago as she said, she was a
mother of seven children, it meant she had got married when she was still a child. Yes, I
thought, she was one of the many whose childhood had been stolen from her. When she should
have been enjoying the beauty of youth, she was forced to be a mother, a wife, and later had to
carry the pain of genocide; of losing her loved ones; of being a widow, alone, and having to look
after ﬁve children in a male-dominated society.
I didn’t bother conﬁrming her age. “In the end, it's not the years in your life that count; it's the
life in your years,” said Abraham Lincoln.
***
Between Nabat and me, where we were seated, stood was a traditional ivory Kurdish pillow
with brown ﬂowers and sage leaves. Lost in our silence, I watched her, while she made repeated
movements with her index ﬁnger, as if pushing the fallen leaf toward the twig of the ﬂower. She
was remapping her lost world, I thought. How I wish we could rejoin the broken branch to the
family tree just by the art of ﬁnger-pointing.

Image 1. Kaziwa Salih & Nabat Fayiaq Rahman, image courtesy of the author.

I looked in Nyan’s direction. She seemed engrossed in taking photos. I wish she too had noticed
Nabat’s reaction to the design on the pillow, and processed it in the same way I did.
It didn’t take long for the tomato and cucumber salad to be placed before me. “You have to eat
with me,” I told Nabat.
“No, I don’t eat anything that has cucumber.”
“Why? Do you have an allergy?”
© 2021
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“I wish,” she said, and sighed.
I realized then that the salad hadn’t been as effortless to make, as I’d thought. I was overcome
with guilt.
Nabat has not eaten a cucumber for more than 30 years. Cucumbers remind her of an incident
in the concentration camp of Negrosalman, where her ﬁve-year-old Sharooh was very sick and
had a fever and diarrhea like most of the children and elderly people on the premises. Sharooh,
she said, was crying continuously and asking for ice and cucumber. “Imagine that. We couldn’t
even get water,” added Nabat.
Then she grew silent, and tears ran down her cheeks. I gave her the glass of water I was
holding. She took gulps of it and continued, “There was a soldier in front of the camp’s door. He
had a tub of cucumbers in front of him; he and his soldier friends were eating from it. I told him
that my child was taking her last breath and asking for a cucumber. That maybe she smelled it
because he was eating it close to our door.” I urged him to give me one, she added.
“He didn’t answer at ﬁrst. Then I again urged him to help, told him that my child would die
soon. Not for me or her, just for God’s sake, give me a small cucumber, don’t ignore her last
desire.”
Nabat’s sobbing grew louder.
Nobody, I thought, seemed to realize that the origin of all these brutalities lay in the lack of
empathy for ‘the other,’ our estrangement from those we deemed different from who we are. In
fact, I was reminded then of one of the golden rules taught to us in conducting research: that we
are not expected to get emotionally involved with our interviewees.
Nabat said, “The soldier threw a few cucumbers down in front of himself and started smashing
them into the ground with his big combat boots.” She looked down and shook her head. “I
thought my daughter was going to die, and I had to do something to give her a little hope
before she left this world. I found a green slipper and put it in her hand. My child believed it
was a cucumber, and started biting into it. After a while, she died.” Nabat continued to sob and
after a long inhale and exhale, added, “Only 40 days afterward, my son Diary also died after he
got sick.”
I was deeply moved. What a strong woman, I thought. Without disrupting the mood and ﬂow
of our conversation, I told her, “Now I know why, among hundreds, I was drawn to talk to you:
because you’re a strong woman and a great mother. You are truly an achiever.”
"Not anymore,” she replied. “I’m overwhelmed with sorrow.”
Like many other survivors of the Anfal genocide, Nabat conﬁrmed that they didn’t have
enough tools to dig graves for the people who died in the camps. They were merely buried
under thin layers of soil. Sometimes at night, they heard the wild dogs from the desert
uncovering and eating the corpses.
I wanted to ask about her husband, but at that moment she was again staring vacantly outside.
Then her gaze moved to a pencil drawing of a young man that was afﬁxed on the wall nearby.
“Is he your son?” I asked.
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Image 1. Nabat’s husband, image courtesy of the author.

“No, it’s a picture of my husband.”
“How long before the Anfal was that photo taken?”
“Only a few years before the Anfal. This photo was on his eh, ahm… identity.” She didn’t
remember the term “identity card.” She added, “A relative redrew it. That is all we have of
him.”
Obviously, he would have been a young parent like Nabat. He too didn’t experience a proper,
fulﬁlling childhood, and he would have died by being buried alive, or after being shot or killed
through torture or hunger, and later fed to the Negrosalman wild dogs—Like so many others.
No one would know.
It was known that before destroying their houses, perpetrators would loot the victims' property,
including jewellery, livestock, and pets. That was why surviving victims often remained
without a history or memories, nor even with something as banal as family photos. If and when
they returned, they owned nothing and had nowhere to go. Consequently, the remaining
children could not go to school because they lacked the ﬁnancial means.
“Your husband’s history is lost, just like the history of his people,” I remarked.
“The history of all of us,” Nabat said, “and the real frustration is losing your loved ones; not
even having a real photo of them to look at.”
I paused for a while, mulling over whether I should tell her about my experiences of the Anfal.
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Finally, I said: “I know what it’s like to be without a family history.” I felt guilt, remorse,
embarrassment. “The Ba’ath imprisoned my father almost every year. Most of the time, my
mother would take the children—my siblings and I—to one of the villages so she could protect
us from being put in prison. Often when we would be back, belongings from our home would
be looted or conﬁscated. I don’t have anything from my childhood. No one in my family has
any signs or evidence of our history.”
A wound ﬂung on one’s memory lasts longer than any other type of wound. Indeed, things do
come to an end but memories last forever. I recalled my second year in elementary school: A few
classmates decided to share their childhood photos with one another. Some of them were my
best friends, and had assumed I’d be part of this activity.
But I didn’t have any photos, nor even a doll or a toy to remind me of my childhood.
It may sound simple, but it never is. Not when a child comes to a mother, an older woman, and
asks her to prove she was once a child, her child, or suddenly exclaims that she couldn’t possible
be the woman’s child, because if she was, then where are the toys, she emphasises, the
childhood photos and other memorabilia?
***
I didn’t need to be a scholar to know that rape was a tool of genocide and war. Since I started
working on the genocide of the Kurds, I’ve been interested in questions of sexual violence
against victimized women.
I’ve tried to broach the subject several times, and gain conﬁrmation that the women of the Anfal
were indeed rape and sexual assault victims; especially how they dealt with it in the aftermath,
but I’ve always been pushed away by male family members of victims, or by male directors of
genocide institutions.
It was important for me I thought, to ask Nabat whether she had witnessed these atrocities in
concentration camps. Or maybe it would be wiser to delay asking the question till the end, just
in case it affected her mood.
Questioning the victim, I’ve long concluded, isn’t half as difﬁcult as thinking about Kurdish
scholars’ and feminists’ positions regarding victimized women. It’s disappointing that Kurdish
scholars have written books on Kurdish women who’ve been victims of the Anfal genocide,
especially in gender studies, but they’ve never asked questions about rape, explaining why
victims have never been able to seek counselling.
Nabat didn’t like my question. It made her uncomfortable. She looked to her right, and her
upper-right lip twitched twice. Then, reluctantly, she said, “I don’t know. In the concentration
camps, we never talked about it. But sometimes, the soldiers would take the ladies who were
young and beautiful and return them a few hours later. They were sad and withered day by
day. We didn’t ask them—we all had enough on our plates—but we also knew that those
women were raped.”
It was the same answer that my aunt Rabia, my mother’s sister, gave me years ago. She was
released after almost two years because she was elderly. I also heard the same story from
another relative who was from Garmin.
The similarity of these accounts was undeniable, and clearly, it was a conﬁrmation of what I’d
thought all along.
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***
The cultural practice of wearing black to mourn the death of a loved one, has always tormented
me. In my book Feminism and Kurdish Society (2005), I explored the psychological consequences
of this dark culture. However, writing for the undereducated traumatized class of society is
worthless if activist groups don’t transmit and convert academic or theoretical ideas into a
practical, digestible form through counselling and hands-on workshops.
I asked Nabat: “Do you know the black outﬁt you wear, creates more of a psychological
burden?”
“What can I say. Inside, everything is black for me. I can’t wear colours. No one does. All the
Anfal survivors are still wearing black”.
I knew this would lead to nowhere.
Despite everything, Nabat managed to raise her ﬁve children to be healthy and strong. She is
now one of the bold voices of the survivors. To tell her story, she participates in local, national,
and international conferences “I’ve been to Europe a few times for conferences. Despite all the
difﬁculties I’m going through, I don’t mind going wherever I can to defend the rights of the
victims. Unfortunately, we [the Kurds] don’t respect anything,” Nabat said, shaking her head.
Suddenly, her lips locked tightly, as if she regretted what she had said. I knew what she meant:
no one understands each other better than people with similar experiences.
She mentioned that instead of attracting help and encouragement, she has sometimes been
accused of making money out of her horrifying experience. “But I don’t pay attention to people
without empathy.
“I congratulate you on your determination. Ignore what they’re saying, and don’t look back, go
forward.” I replied.
For the ﬁrst time, a smile lit up her face. I asked her about what she wanted to achieve and
where she wished to be heard.
Nabat said, “If the international community knew about our stories and our current conditions,
they wouldn’t accept it. They would punish the Iraqi government and the Kurdish individuals
who don’t care about our victimization. In essence, Nabat was asking the international
community to create an agency that could stop this kind of crime, hoping no one else would
experience what she had gone through; that her voice could help guarantee a safer future for
her children. “If we, as victims, don’t tell our stories, who is going to make our voice heard?”
I didn’t want to disappoint her further by revealing what I knew to be the true face of the
international community.
For the ﬁrst time, I was happy that Nabat Fayiaq Rahman was illiterate, and couldn’t read these
words. If she’d asked me in 2017 where I would publish her story, what should I have said?
Could I tell her the truth?
For instance:

- Nabat, for three years, the mainstream Canadian media have rejected publishing 700 words
of your story, with the excuse that it’s not current and not related to Canadian society.
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Rejection of your story, Nabat, indicates that even if members of your community hold
Canadian passports, they are not considered Canadians; in fact the pain of their genocide is
irrelevant to Canadian society.

- Nabat, I have contacted several feminist media outlets, and they called your story dark and
heavy on the readers’ hearts; they don’t want to lose readers because of your story. One of
them even asked me to write a weekly column, on one condition: to not tell your kind of
story, but the kinds of stories that can turn women’s issues into a lucrative business that
would enable them to use them on products and have a store on Amazon.

- Nabat, no problems occur in the world without the permission of the international
community. They knew your story before it happened.

- Or should I just tell her the international community against genocide consists only of a few
organizations and a number of genocide studies scholars? That even these scholars can’t
magnify her voice if her people and government won’t come forward—something that has
not happened in at least the last three decades.
Just like your people, Nabat, your voice is without a homeland. Carry on singing your sorrowful lullaby,
for it is the only true weapon; the only true balm you have before you lose your voice.
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Introduction
The aim of genocide is to intentionally destroy a group, in whole or in part, targeting the group
as a race, ethnicity, religion, and/or culture, and not speciﬁcally in terms of gender. Like in
many other cases, China’s genocide against the Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslims aims to
destroy the group, in whole or in part. However, the genocide’s process and implementation are
very different from other genocides. This article focuses on China’s implementation of
genocidal policies against Uyghur women, which stands out in several respects. Analyzing
gender-based cases of the Uyghur genocide is not intended simply to prioritize female victims
over male victims. Rather, it is done to better understand China’s crimes, and create practical
protocols to prevent genocide. Through an examination of ﬁrst-hand victim interviews,1 reports,
Chinese state media and western media, and probing Chinese philosophy as a source of the
ideology behind the genocide, the authors focus speciﬁcally on Uyghur women in order to
discuss the following questions: How do gendered policies targeting Uyghur women expose the
Chinese government’s genocidal intention in East Turkistan? As a root cause of this genocide,
how is Chinese colonialism reﬂected in the policies implemented against Uyghur women and,
particularly in the implementation processes that use the tools of punishment borrowed from
Legalism?
Policies against the Uyghur Women: Genocidal Intent
China’s gender-based policies, including policies to prevent births, state-sponsored forced
marriages, forced labor, and the policy of appointing male Han Chinese cadres to Uyghur
homes, as well as mass rape camps which we discuss in this article, expose China’s intent to
commit genocide as a direct outcome of its colonialism. All of these acts committed by China's
government today are self-evident, and the results are predictably destructive.
Behind these actions, we address the systematic character of the planning, policymaking, and repetitive implementation of these policies, which are all directed toward the same
ﬁnal outcome. The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) mentioned how
“existing plans would be strong evidence of the speciﬁc intent requirement for the crime
of genocide.”2 While the Chinese government’s plans do not explicitly advertise genocide but
are instead couched in the language of re-education, employment skill training, pair up relatives for
ethnic unity, family planning, development, and the like, their destructive effect is plainly evident.
It is achieved by planning, budgeting, and allocating resources and personnel to enforce and
carry out these plans. The Chinese government openly insists upon these policies as one hundred

1

All interviews conducted by the ﬁrst author were conﬁdential. To protect the interviewees’ identities, the author and
select interviewees have mutually agreed to use aliases (indicated with an asterisk *) and/or redact their last
names (indicated with an obelisk †). Where no special symbols appear, interviewees’ original names were retained.
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The Prosecutor v. Clément Kayishema and Obed Ruzindana, Trial Judgement, May 21, 1999, International Criminal Tribunal
for Rwanda (ICTR), ICTR-95-1-T, para. 276, accessed April 13, 2021, https://www.refworld.org/
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percent correct and plan to continue them.3 Before discussing the root causes of China’s genocidal
intent, we examine each policy aspect, laying out the evidence for how these policies are
repeatedly implemented and have devastating consequences.
Horriﬁc Outcome of the so-called Family Planning Policy: Draining Reproductivity
Perhaps most striking is how the Chinese government is violating the Genocide Convention’s
Article 2(d) through measures to prevent the children of Uyghur and other Turkic women from
being born. Women have been the target of these policies for many years. Newer policies not
only include previous measures such as sterilization and enforced abortions under the Chinese
family planning policy, but also mass rape and sexual torture in the new concentration camp
system built from 2017 onward; state-sponsored inter-racial forced marriages of Uyghur women
to Han Chinese men, as well as the state placing Han Chinese male cadres (Party and
government staff) in an innumerable Uyghur homes, violating the privacy of Uyghur women.
Forced labor camps and factories also segregate Uyghur women and men in different places,
thus serving the same purpose. All of these are acts of genocide which meet the Convention’s
deﬁnition under article 2(b) and 2(d).4
Direct measures imposed by the Chinese government to restrict the number of births in
the Uyghur population has a long history. It is thus not surprising that numerous new
eyewitness accounts of forced sterilization have surfaced, and a new birth control policy has
been imposed on Uyghur women.5 Currently, every married Uyghur woman who lives in East
Turkistan and who has had no child or only one child has directly experienced either forced
IUD insertion or sterilization.
Uyghur women who evade these rules and have more than two children, which is the
maximum number allowed, are punished heavily.6 Since 2017, this practice has intensiﬁed—
even though it was relaxed for the Han Chinese. According to the leaked Karakash List, having
illegal children is the most common reason for the detention of Uyghur women in Karakash
county.7

3

Chris Buckley, “Brushing Off Criticism, China’s Xi Calls Policies in Xinjiang ‘Totally Correct,’” The New York Times,
September 26, 2020, accessed September 26, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/26/world/asia/xi-jinpingchina-xinjiang.html.
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United Nations (UN), General Assembly Resolution 260, Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, December 9, 1948 (UN Doc. A/RES/260(III)).
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Uyghur Research Institute, Genocide in East Turkistan (Ankara: Uyghur Research Institute, February 2019), 34, accessed
May 19, 2020, https://www.uysi.org/en/?p=774; Gulchehra Hoja, “Female Detainees at Xinjiang Internment
Camps Face Sterilization, Sexual Abuse: Camp Survivor,” Radio Free Asia, October 30, 2019, accessed May 23, 2020,
https://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/abuse-10302019142433.html; Peter Stubley, “Muslim Women
‘Sterilised’ In China Detention Camps, Say Former Detainees,” The Independent, August 12, 2019, accessed May 23,
2020, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/uighur-muslim-china-sterilisation-women-internmentcamps-xinjiang-a9054641.html; Amie Ferris-Rotman, Aigerim Toleukhan, Emily Rauhala, and Anna Fiﬁeld, “China
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Torture,” The Independent, October 6, 2019, accessed May 23, 2019, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/
asia/china-uighur-muslim-women-abortions-sexual-abuse-genocide-a9144721.html.
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with my youngest child. The Chinese government arrested my husband and sentenced him to 10 years after I
escaped, just because we didn’t kill our babies. Despite my parents’ pleading the Chinese forces, they also took
away my 4 children that I left behind. No one knows their whereabouts. Just a few days ago, I recognized my
daughter Ayisha in a Douyin video that a Chinese worker posted from Hoten’s orphanage camp. She was three
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Uyghur women are made to undergo gynecological examinations and forced to take
birth control medication, have IUDs inserted, or be sterilized, both in the concentration camps
as well as outside the camps.8 Adrian Zenz’s research on Chinese documents and statistical data
on birth rates in 2019 reveals that 97 percent of women of child-bearing age in Kashgar and
Hotan city in southern East Turkistan could not or would not get pregnant and deliver a child.9
A further new report describes the extreme drop in East Turkistan birthrates as worse than the
declines during the Syrian civil war and the genocides in Rwanda and Cambodia.10
The mass sterilization of women is not limited to the southern part of East Turkistan.
Qelbinur Sidik, a resident of Ürümqi, located in the northern part of East Turkistan, shared her
experience of how she fell victim to the policy of so-called birth control measures with long
term effectiveness. She was forced to get an IUD in April 2017. However, her doctor (who was
also a friend) helped her secretly remove the device to save her life after her tubal ligation
became severely infected. In April 2019, during the enforced medical check-up for all Uyghur
women, she was forcibly sterilized along with many other Uyghur women in the Changliyuan
clinic in Ürümqi, even though she only has one child.11 Zumret Dawut, another camp survivor,
also testiﬁed that she had been forcibly sterilized along with ﬁve other women in her
neighborhood clinic in Ürümqi after her third child was born illegally.12 All female camp
survivors and witnesses said that every woman, including unmarried young women, in the
camps experienced either heavy bleeding or completely stop menstruating after being forcibly
medicated on a daily basis and injected once every two weeks with a mysterious liquid.13
Adrian Zenz’s analysis of family planning statistics between spring 2017 and autumn
2018 for 12 villages and the urban district in Kok Gumbez, in Kuqa county (Aksu Prefecture)
also showed that 73.5% of married Uyghur women of child-bearing age were forced to undergo
IUD insertions.14 According to Zenz’s research, natural population growth among Uyghurs in
East Turkistan declined dramatically in the two largest Uyghur prefectures, with growth rates
falling by 84% between 2015 and 2018. As he noted in his report, “for 2020, one Uyghur region
set an unprecedented near-zero birth target: a mere 1.05 per mill[ion] compare[d] to 19.66 per
mill[ion] in 2018.”15 Chinese state media acknowledged that the birth rate, mortality rate, and
natural population growth rate in East Turkistan dropped from 22.55%, 7.69%, and 14.86%
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respectively in 1978 to 10.69%, 4.56%, and 6.13% respectively in 2018.16 Notably, both the
Uyghur population’s fertility rate and natural growth rate declined signiﬁcantly in 2018.17
Despite the well-known consequence of draining Uyghur population, the Chinese
government has persisted in applying these birth control policies against Uyghur women.
State Sponsored Interracial Marriage Policy Against the Uyghur Women
The genocidal reduction of the Uyghur population has also intensiﬁed through China’s
interracial marriage policy. According to China’s ﬁfth hukou (household) census statistics in East
Turkistan, in 2000, interracial marriages between Han Chinese and Uyghurs made up only
1.05% of all marriages.18 China has not published any further interracial marriage statistics, but
based on social media news and Chinese government news and documents, we estimate that
interracial marriages between Uyghurs and Han Chinese have increased dramatically since
2017. Further, the majority of these marriages are between Han Chinese men and Uyghur
women, and are very rarely the other way around. Under the prevalent patriarchal system,
these women will become mothers of Han Chinese children, not Uyghur; so, as a policy, these
promoted marriages further accelerate the intended destruction of the Uyghur people “as such”
(as expressed in the Genocide Convention).
The Chinese government has used many incentives to promote these interracial
marriage policy objectives. In August 2014, China announced a reward of 10,000 yuan annually
for ﬁve years to newly married Han Chinese-Uyghur couples. They also announced a 3,000
yuan reward if the couples’ children enter vocational school, a 5,000 yuan reward if their
children enter university, and an extra 15 marks added to their children's university exam.19
In 2014, the Chinese government increased the reward encouraging Han Chinese men
to emigrate to East Turkistan and marry Muslim women to 3.33 hectares of land and a 70,000
yuan (estimated USD $10,847) bonus.20 Even with such incentives, interracial marriages are still
not common in East Turkistan. However, beginning in 2017, following China’s incarceration of
millions of Uyghurs in concentration camps (and especially Uyghur men), there was a dramatic
increase in the number of social media posts and Chinese state media news reports about
interracial marriages between Han Chinese men and Uyghur women. Based on social media
comments, Uyghur women and their entire families have been threatened with the heavy
punishment of concentration camp internment if they refuse to marry Han Chinese men.

16
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24, 2021, https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202101/1212073.shtml.

17

Ibid.

18

Li Shao Xia 李绍霞, “Xīnjiāng zú jì tōnghūn de diàochá yǔ fēnxī: 新疆族际通婚的调查与分析” [Investigation and
Analysis of Cross-Ethnic Intermarriage in Xinjiang], Creaders.net (blog), May 9, 2014, accessed May 23, 2020,
http://blog.creaders.net/u/3328/201405/181046.html.

19

Huang Anwei 黄安伟, “Xīnjiāng gǔlì mín hàn tōnghūn míhé mínzú máodùn: 新疆⿎励民汉通婚弥合民族⽭盾”
[Xinjiang Encourages Marriage between the Han and Uyghurs to Bridge Ethnic Conﬂicts], New York Times,
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Image 1. Screenshot 1, image courtesy of the author.

Image 2. Screenshot 2, image courtesy of the author.
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Image 3. Screenshot 3, image courtesy of the author.

Annotated screen shots show communications with a Uyghur female student in Beijing,
whose ﬁrst name is Menzire. The author’s translation is as follows:
Screen shot 1:
A: Salam, it is so hard for me to add you. I am writing from
school in inland China. My dad was taken. And my mom [was]
left at home. When I [came] back home for vacation, our
Chinese “relatives” came and kept asking me to marry his
brother.
R: What did you say?
Screen shot 2:
R: What did you say?
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A: I was scared. I told him that I needed to ﬁnish school. School
will ﬁnish this summer. What should I do?
R: Say no, he can’t do anything.
Screen shot 3:
A: What if they take my mom, too? They will say I [am]
harm[ing] the ethnic unity,..an ideological problem. They may
ask the whole family to go for re-education.
R: What if you tell them that you found a job and do not want
to return home?
A: Is there any international law that you can use to help me
without revealing my name?
R: We might need the help of a lot of girls testifying, to do that.
A: That is too dangerous, they will eat me alive if I do that.
Local Chinese work units and social security workers support Han Chinese men and
often attempt to convince Uyghur women to marry these men even if the women refuse to do
so of their own volition.21 It is not possible to determine the prevalence of such marriages as
China conceals national interracial marriage statistics. However, the question is, if these
interracial marriages are voluntary and not state-sponsored rape, then why has there been such
a dramatic increase in interracial marriage between Han Chinese men and Uyghur women since
2017 when between one to three million Uyghurs were forced into concentration camps? We
know that more men than women have been sent to these concentration camps, and many
women may have no choice but to marry Han Chinese men when there are no Uyghur men left
to marry.
The most convincing reason could be fear of being sent to one of these camps.
Hundreds of Uyghur women report having married Han Chinese men in TikTok videos, on the
Chinese social media platform WeChat, and on other apps, as well as in news reports seen on
Chinese government websites, all of which suggests this has become a shocking and
devastating new reality for the Uyghurs.22 In one of the Tik Tok videos, an Uyghur woman from
Yarkand said:
We do not love each other. I married a Chinese guy to get my
brother released from a concentration camp. My brother had
been arrested because he had failed to participate once in a
ﬂag-raising ceremony. He was released after I married the
Chinese guy but he had been mentally harmed and disabled.
And my husband married me to get government money. Now
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Darren Byler, “Uyghur Love in a Time of Interethnic Marriage,” SupChina, August 7, 2019, accessed May 24, 2020,
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we have a child, but he has a Chinese lover. He hates me and
always hits my head.23
In practice, as seen in both Uyghur and Chinese patrilineal culture, forcing women to
marry Han Chinese men means their future children will not belong to their mothers’ ethnic
group. This represents one more measure intended to prevent Uyghur children from being born
and reducing the Uyghur population as a result. Further, we believe the colonial ideology of the
Chinese government entails the belief that their domination of women means to not only
dominate the land but also the entire colonized people (more on this below). This could explain
why there are very few interracial marriages between Uyghur men and Han Chinese women,
and most Chinese government and social propaganda targets Uyghur women rather than men.
To disguise their state-sponsored forced marriage policy, the Chinese government also
established dating services around various East Turkistan cities. The sole function of these
services is to ﬁnd Uyghur women for Han Chinese men. All of these dating services are
intrinsically political, as they are linked directly to, and guided by the Chinese government. One
of their video advertisements in Kashgar city, published in Uyghur and translated below, is
another example of how the Chinese government treats Uyghur women as commodities—it
refers explicitly to government policy and includes an implicit threat:
Thank you to the party and the government! In order to
support our government’s policy of increase Uyghur and Han
Chinese marriage, we need 100 Uyghur women urgently! It is
important for the ethnic unity between the Uyghur and the
Han Chinese! Please call us and get counseling. Anyone is
welcome to introduce friends and family members. Contact
number: 17699989766.24
As a result, the privilege and advantage of freely obtaining Uyghur women, as a wife
and as a commodity, give Han Chinese men an ideologically framed image through which to
view Uyghur women and, particularly how to use and value them.
Several other videos found by Uyghur activists on Chinese social media show how
Chinese men try to attract Han Chinese settlers to the region. These videos contain phrases such
as: “Do you want Uyghur beauties? Come, I’ll arrange it for you tonight,” and “Do you want to
marry Uyghur girls? They can eat pork. They could not eat it before, but they can eat it now.
Don’t worry about [the] cultural differences.”25 These videos include both governmentsponsored propaganda videos as well as videos distributed by Han Chinese individuals. This is
often accompanied by a stream of insults, used as a tool to humiliate, destroy, and assert power
over the Uyghurs.
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Slavery of Uyghur Women in China’s Forced Labor Camps
Since 2006, the Chinese government has forced every Uyghur household to send one person to
perform factory work in inland China, as shengyu laodong (excess labor force).26 This policy has
been intensiﬁed since 2017, under the guise of a new so-called “poverty alleviation” policy.
Three important characteristics are concealed within this policy:
• Mainly young Uyghur women are recruited for factory work
outside of East Turkistan and are thus separated from the
male population of their own people.
• All the workers are forcibly sent away to inland China, with
those married separated from their husbands and children.
• They live under massive surveillance with no freedom of
movement or the right to return to their homeland.
China’s government published a White Paper in September 2020 claiming that every
year from 2014 to 2019, the average annual relocation of surplus rural labor amounted to more
than 2.76 million people, of whom nearly 1.68 million—or over 60 percent—were in southern
East Turkistan, which is mainly populated with Uyghurs.27 This indicates that 6.72 million
Uyghurs were relocated or sent to forced labor during these four years. Even though the White
Paper did not mention the gender of these workers, claiming that they were voluntary and not
forced, several sources—including witness testimonies, Uyghur sources, and western media
investigative reports—proved that these workers are mostly women. The proportion of male
Uyghurs in prison and detention, in contrast, constitutes an overwhelming majority. Based on
local Chinese government data from 2017 and 2018 analyzed by Adrian Zenz, the share of all
male adults in concentration camps in the document sample was 9.2 times higher than arrested
female adults,28 which could explain why the number of Uyghur women is much higher in
forced labor.
The Uyghur women sent to factories across inland China could well be providing
services to global companies such as Volkswagen, Dell, General Motors, Cisco, Calvin Klein,
among others. According to a March 2020 Australian Strategic Policy Institute report, at least
80,000 Uyghurs, mostly women, have been transferred;29 the women are either sent directly
from Uyghur cities and villages, or by way of the concentration camps. They are not allowed to
return home when they get sick even if they have ﬁnished their job contract.30 One factory
manager in Shandong Province told Bitter Winter magazine that Uyghurs must work for one
year before they are eligible to go home to visit relatives. Even if family members die, they
cannot go home without permission. For those who have worked for more than one year and
were fortunate enough to be granted permission to go home to visit relatives, if do not come

26
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back within the stipulated time, they are forcibly returned and punished. If they do not come
back, they will be put in an education transformation camp, or prison.31
“I was detained in a concentration camp for two years and it is one year now that I am
in a labor camp. It is ok if they don’t pay me, but I am happy if they allow me to see my
children once in a while. I can do everything they want, but my kids are in a boarding school
and I couldn’t see them when I came home,” explained Aydin, who ﬁnally received permission
to visit her own home for the ﬁrst time after three years. She revealed this information to her
friend overseas in a secret video conversation, in which she displayed the police tracking
bracelet on her arm. For her safety, we decided to publish the photo of the bracelet, but not the
video.

Image 4. Tracking bracelet used to control forced labor workers, image courtesy of the
author.

Many educated women are also sent to low-skill slave labor camps and separated from
their children and homes. Dilnur Idris, an Uyghur nurse, on her release from a concentration
camp in May 2019, was sent to a slave labor textile factory to do unpaid low-skill heavy work.
She sent a brave message to her sister Gulnur Idris in Melbourne, saying: “I may never have a
chance to get out, or contact you again. Please stand up for me!”32
A young ethnic Kazakh man, Yelisin Erkin, who did administration work in Ghulja
City’s Chapchal forced labor camp in East Turkistan in 2015 testiﬁed about how the women
were forced to work in these camps.
70 percent of the workers are women between 16–45 years old
working in the factory designated as a forced labor camp in
Chapsal County. These women are never allowed to go home
and see their children, husbands, or other family members
unless they have emergency issues, and get permission from
31

Ibid.

32

ABC News In-Depth, “How China is Creating the World’s Largest Prison: Four Corners,” YouTube video, 00:36:39–
00:38:30, uploaded on July 16, 2019, accessed May 15, 2021, https://m.youtube.com/watch?feature=youtu.be&v=taxd1Ht_J8.

© 2021

Genocide Studies and Prevention 15, no. 1 https://doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.15.1.1834.

32

Turdush and Fiskesjö

the factory owner. Monthly salaries range between $5.88 to
$61.90—barely enough for their hygiene expenses—despite
being forced to work 14 hours every day.33
An unpublished video secretly taken in the White Rose factory in Tianjin 13 years ago
and preserved by the author also revealed similar evidence. This video explains how Uyghur
women aged 16–24 are forced to go to inland China for unpaid factory work. “If we refuse, we
have to pay a ﬁne of 3000-5000 yuan, and they will destroy our houses with a bulldozer,” said
the women in the video.34
A group of young Uyghur women who had been forced to come to work at a telephone
company in Hubei province in central China in the ﬁrst quarter of 2019 said the following to her
cousin in Europe over the telephone in 2021. She disappeared the next day and her cousin not
been able to contact her again.
They said we could go back home when they bring new
workers. When I arrived, they chose some women from among
the previous workers, and the government decided these
women could return home. After these women left, we never
heard about them. We don’t know where they [have] sent
them. Please help me! They have selected several of us today. I
am amongst them. I was separated from my baby daughter
three years ago. I don’t know where she is right now. I don’t
know where they will take us tomorrow. Please help!35
Not Only Mass Gang Rapes but Sexual Torture
Similar to the genocides in Bosnia, Rwanda, and Darfur, Uyghur and other Turkic women have
been targeted through mass rape as a tool of genocide, which Chinese state policy facilitates
through the newly built women’s concentration and forced labor camps. A recent camp
survivor, Tursunay Ziyawudun, 39, described what happened to her as follows:
I was bleeding heavily after they kicked my stomach so badly
in the interrogation room. I didn’t know what these dimly redlit rooms were for when I passed by, going all the way to the
interrogation room. I learned later it was the rooms prepared
for the rape and torture of detainees.36
She, herself, was gang-raped, sexually tortured, and mutilated when she was taken to
those dark rooms.
There were 12 women in my cell, each one of them, mostly
young girls and aged under 40, randomly taken out at night.
When they came back, they looked as if their spirit had
vanished. I didn’t imagine sexual torture and rape until they
took me there. I thought those women who were taken out at
night were taken for interrogation and physically tortured.37
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Yelisin Erkin (eye-witness, currently awaiting political asylum in Ukraine), phone interview with author, January 25,
2021.
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Quote was from a private video, provided by East Turkistan Information Center. This video is not published publicly
to protect the identities of the forced labor workers in the video.
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Ibrahim*† (Second-hand witness), interview with author, March 28, 2021.
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Another camp survivor, Gulbahar Jelilova, told the author: “The young Chinese guy
sexually assaulted me in the interrogation room. I begged him: ‘Don’t you have a mother?’ He
banged my head to the table and said: ‘Don’t you dare compare yourself to my mom! You are
not human to me! You cannot compare yourself to any human!’”38 Both Gulbahar Jelilova and
camp survivor, Zumret Dawut, conﬁrmed the use of gang rape in concentration camps.39
Tursunay Ziyawudun added:
Each time, the same tall Chinese man with a blue suit and
shining shoes came with his other followers with military
camouﬂage uniforms. They talked to each other. From their
accents, I learned they are Han Chinese. (…) I heard one of
these Chinese men say: ‘She is going to die. She is bleeding too
much!’ when they inserted an electric baton in my private parts
and tortured me, like pulling all of my organs one by one,
chopping my body into a thousand pieces. Another one said:
‘So what?!’ The third man said: ‘No difference! Just destroy her
womb!’ I didn’t get it why they hate women’s wombs.40
The masked men who raped and sexually tortured her were likely Chinese government
ofﬁcials and soldiers who represent the Chinese state.
Like many other detainees, Tursunay did not know what her crime was when she was
arrested. “When they brought me to the concentration camps from the detention center, they
gave me a list of papers and forced me to choose one of the crimes they listed,” she said. She
shared what she remembered from the list as follows:
wearing a long dress;
wearing a hijab [head scarf/head covering];
shaved body hair;
praying;
having a Muslim name;
traveled abroad;
participated in a religious nikah [Muslim wedding]
ceremony
8. having a traditional handheld vessel at home that contains
water to assist in bathroom hygiene;
9. having a religious friend;
10. your father is an Imam [Islamic religious leader];
11. participated in a party and there was a religious person at
the party;
12. contacted someone overseas by phone;
13. having an illegal child outside of the government plan.41
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

“They had a long list; I don’t remember all,” she said. “I chose the one that said
‘traveled abroad,’ because my husband was a Kazakhstan national and I went to Kazakhstan
before. Many people do not even ﬁt into the list; they didn’t have any fault[s], but they have to
choose.”42
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Tursunay had surgery in the United States after being released due to the activism of
her Kazakh husband and diplomatic pressure on China from Kazakhstan. Doctors removed her
badly injured uterus due to severe medical risks. She cannot be a mother anymore, but she said
the surgery helped her since she feels like she removed something scary and dirty from her life.
“They will make you hate to be a women,” she said. “I feel a little better and feel safe after
doctors removed my womb in the US, because it is something that reminds me, every second, of
those horrible and disgusting days.”43
The ICTR noted that “[r]ape and sexual violence also constitute genocide in the same
way as any other act, as long as they were committed with intent to destroy a particular group
targeted as such.”44 The tribunal also concluded rape and sexual violence were one of the worst
ways of inﬂicting physical and mental harm on women.45 Clearly, the Chinese government’s
actions constitute a serious violation of Article 2(b) of the Genocide Convention.
In many cases, systematic mass rape in China’s concentration camps is intentional,
conducted from the top-down, and centrally directed as part of the genocide plan to destroy the
Uyghur people and nation. China’s intention to destroy the whole Uyghur people and nation by
destroying Uyghur women and their dignity is evident through the horriﬁc torture and
systematic mass rape in Chinese concentration camps, as conﬁrmed by several victims and
eyewitnesses.46
‘Pair Up and Become Family’ Policy: Invaders in the Uyghur family
The Chinese government’s policy of speciﬁcally targeting Uyghur and other ethnic Muslims in
East Turkistan is done through several means, including with experimental AI technology,
observing each person’s movements with digital spying techniques such as face and voice
recognition cameras and phone spyware, collecting blood types and DNA samples from entire
segments of the Uyghur population, as well as sending more than one million Han Chinese
male cadres into Uyghur homes, as human spies, to sleep over for one or two weeks every
month, monitoring household members for possible infractions. All of these tactics induce
responses ranging from anxiety to outright terror, severely damaging the Uyghurs’ mental
health.47 Uyghur women have been particularly targeted as a vulnerable victim of this policy.
In many Uyghur families, Han Chinese men dominate the Uyghur women they are
paired up with them while male Uyghur household members have been detained elsewhere.
Many instances of sexual harassment and rape have been reported during these male Han
Chinese sleepovers with Uyghur Muslim families.48 Zumret Dawut, who was ﬁnally able to
escape to the United States, stated:
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Government workers appoint those Han Chinese to sleep over
in every Uyghur household, under the program of ‘Pair Up
and Become Family.’ They do not care if there are any men in
the household or not, an extra bed or not. They do not allow us
to ask any personal information about those Chinese guests.
We do not know what kind of people they are or their medical
or social or criminal history.49
Qelbinur Sidik, who recently found refuge in the Netherlands, said: “I was threatened,
intimidated, and attacked with verbal sexual harassment in front of my husband many times in
my own home by the Han Chinese sleepover men. Even though I am free right now, I
constantly suffer from nightmares, and anger issues.”50
Zumret Dawut also described how a 20-year-old single Han Chinese male “relative” of
her 12-year-old daughter, matched by the Chinese government, became a huge problem for her
before she was eventually able to leave for Pakistan with her family. “Bring your daughter to
sleepover in my home. Make sure she takes a shower before she comes,” she remembered her
daughter’s male “relatives” asking every weekend. “I found excuses to delay the time and left
the country with my daughter, but the rest of the Uyghur mothers have no chance to escape like
me.”51

Image 5. The Chinese government appointed Han Chinese male “relative” for Zumret
Dawut's 12-year-old daughter, image courtesy of the author.
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The colonial ideology behind the Pair Up and Become Family policy created an
opportunity for Han Chinese settlers to dominate Uyghur women as colonial property. There
are many cases of Han Chinese men raping and assaulting Uyghur women, which the ﬁrst
author learned about from unofﬁcial Uyghur sources about Han Chinese men. However, we
could not include these cases here since it is very difﬁcult to verify each one, and many of the
victims are still in East Turkistan.
China’s Genocidal Policy Ideas: Where did they Originate?
Where do these genocidal policy ideas and the motivating intention come from? As Maureen
Hiebert noted in her book Constructing Genocide and Mass Violence, the “idea of destroying the
group starts with a cluster of social and political attitudes, belief, values and practices.”52 This is
also very true in the case of China’s genocide.
The General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, Xi Jinping, is singularly
preoccupied with the “rejuvenation of the Great Chinese Nation,” and noted in his report to his
party’s 19th national congress that: “We should do more to foster a Chinese spirit, Chinese
values, and Chinese strength, to provide moral guidance to our people.”53 This implies there is
no survival space for other ideological values. As a result, any Uyghurs or others in the East
Turkistan colony who do not succumb to the forced transformation into ethnic Han Chinese will
be considered a threat—an “ideological enemy,” and as “opponents” that must be eliminated.
The idea of the superiority of the Han Chinese belief system that can dominate, absorb, and
eliminate any other group is applied as a ﬁrst step, particularly with the conception of a
superior self vs. an inferior other which many Han Chinese settlers have cultivated towards the
Turkic peoples in the colony. Once the belief of an enemy is created and established, the intent to
eliminate soon follows. In this regard, brieﬂy addressing the colonial history of East Turkistan is
signiﬁcant in this article as women are the symbol of the land, country, honor, and dignity of the
Uyghur and other Turkic Muslims culture, who their Chinese colonizers subject to the most
direct and symbolic destruction.
Brief History of Colonization of East Turkistan
East Turkistan has natural boundaries as well as a constructed border formed by the Great Wall.
In the past, before the Mongol and Manchu invasions, Uyghurs established their own kingdoms
and states, such as the former Ediqut Uyghur state and the Qarahanli state.54 Today, the Chinese
government claims that East Turkistan was part of its former Han dynasty’s empire. However,
this claim is unfounded; the Han dynasty only captured the Turpan area—a minute portion of
the vast Tarim and Jungaria regions of East Turkistan—for a short period in 120 BCE. The Han
Chinese state was never able to rule East Turkistan until after 1949.55
In 1949, when the new Chinese nation state was established, it claimed the previously
colonized borderland territories of the Manchu empire, including East Turkistan, Mongolia, and
Tibet. Globally, this was a period of decolonization, and the people of East Turkistan had
already established the East Turkistan Republic after the Manchu empire collapsed.56
Undeterred, the newly established Chinese state claimed East Turkistan as Chinese state
territory, which was illegitimate and should be regarded as an invasion. Nonetheless, the newly
formed UN ofﬁcially recognized China’s territorial claim. Despite this victory, Chinese
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government ofﬁcials continued to grow uneasy; because the religion, culture, and ethnicity of
East Turkistan’s population are highly distinct from those of the Han Chinese, the assimilation
of Uyghur and other Turkish people would still be difﬁcult to accomplish. Beijing increasingly
felt that they had failed to assimilate Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslims. Further, since its
recent rise to power, China has aimed to expand, through central Asia and Europe, to
implement its New Silk Road project (or “One Belt, One Road,” OBOR) to create economic
connections between more than 65 countries. This has rendered East Turkistan even more geostrategically signiﬁcant as the region is pivotal in China’s ability and capacity to accomplish
such a project.57 The characteristics of both China’s military and civilian-settler colonialism of
East Turkistan have also determined China’s intention to destroy the Uyghurs and other Turkic
Muslims, as the Chinese government has come to view the local population as an obstacle.
China’s Ideological Tools of Genocide: Punishment in Legalism
China’s intention of genocide today stems from its recent colonialist efforts in East Turkistan. In
the implementation of the genocide, the state mobilizes the legalist concept of punishment ﬁrst
pioneered in Qin dynasty. Ancient Chinese Legalism was originally developed to harshly
control and exploit people under state rule, but it has now become one of the tools of genocide
in its application on China’s colonized region of East Turkistan. In the following sections, we
discuss how the ancient idea of punishment, as seen in legalist thinking, is applied to Uyghur
women as a tool of genocide in recently colonized East Turkistan.
The head of the Chinese state, Xi Jinping, was quoted in a leaked secret speech as
saying that there should be “absolutely no mercy” toward the Uyghurs.58 This clearly indicates
the intent to target the Uyghurs and other ethnic Muslims in East Turkistan, portraying them as
a deadly threat that must be eliminated if China is to build its new empire. This intention also
aligns with the classic Chinese philosophy of Legalism (Fa Jia) that emerged during the Warring
States period. The main ideas of Legalism focus on about power and position, as well as how to
ignore moral issues and dominate those ruled. The famous Chinese legalist thinker and ofﬁcial
Shang Yang argued: “If strength remains on the other side, one perishes; but if strength is
removed on the other side, one attains supremacy.”59
The Chinese government has always considered the people of East Turkistan as a threat
that needs to be destroyed. This follows from the zero-sum thinking in legalism, formulated to
help those in power to gain supremacy over any region. As one of the tools for enforcing
supremacy, Legalists advocated punishments applied even to people who were innocent, much
like China’s cruel and punitive policies being applied to Uyghurs and Turkic Muslims today.
Indeed, as detailed in the accounts of Tursunay Ziyawudun as well as others cited above, East
Turkistan women are punished despite having committed no real crime (other than their
identity as Uyghur women). The Book of Lord Shang described punishment as follows:
Therefore, if you govern by punishments, the people will fear;
being fearful, they will not commit villainies; there being no
villainies, people will be happy in what they enjoy. If, however,
you teach people by righteousness, they will be lax; if they are
lax, there will be disorder; if there is disorder, the people will
suffer from what they dislike.60
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The righteousness referred to here is, of course, the Confucian idea that has helped
underpin Chinese patriarchy, but which legalists saw as an obstacle to their ideology of total
power. Cruel punishment methods were encouraged by legalists, such as when Shang Yang
advocated heavier punishments in order to make it easier to control the people: “In applying
punishments, light offences should be punished heavily; if light offences do not appear, heavy
offences will not come. This is said to be abolishing penalties by means of penalties, and if
penalties are abolished, affairs will succeed.”61
As we have seen, China’s policies in East Turkistan today reject and grossly violate
human rights and are reinforced by legalist thought. The devastating policies of sterilization
and forced labor, as well as the state-sponsored forced marriages and sexual torture applied to
Uyghur women as legalist-styled punishments are evidently intended for genocidal purposes—
to destroy the Uyghur and other Turkic Muslim people. For example, in mass rape camps,
Uyghur women are sexually tortured after they are raped. Their body parts used for childbirth
become the enemy of the perpetrators, since they regard Uyghur women as the vehicle of
Uyghur population growth. As a result, attempts to eliminate the Uyghurs are being
implemented using the barbaric punishment methods disclosed in the testimonies.
Clearly, the Chinese government’s intention is not only to instill fear in people, as the
legalists advocated, but also to commit genocide through legalist-style punishments applied to
its colony of East Turkistan.
Umide, a 30-year-old Uyghur woman now living in the Netherlands, who traveled to
Ürümqi in 2018, and, Eldos, a Kazak Canadian who traveled to Ghulja in 2019, both learned that
the threatening and punishing of the male relatives of Uyghur women who refuse to marry Han
Chinese men or putting the entire family of the Uyghur woman in a concentration camp is a
common issue.62 Uyghur women are also punished for their lifestyles and tortured because of
so-called sins of relatives, which they never committed.63 These kinds of punishments are
referred to as the lianzuo or zuxing system, meaning shared responsibility and family penalty. This
originates from legalism, but it has resulted in some contemporary Chinese believing that it is
part of Chinese culture to put family above the individual and that an individual’s sin can be
the sin of the family, since an individual’s achievement is also considered to honor the family.64
Legalism stressed the related measure of the shiwu (ten-ﬁve) system of population
control, with groups of ﬁve or ten families that become mutually responsible for each other
(lianzuo).65 The Book of Lord Shang stressed these extended penalties of Legalism as follows:
If there are severe penalties that extend to the whole family,
people will not dare to try (to see how far they can go), and as
they dare not try, no punishments will be necessary. If
punishments are heavy and rigorously applied, then people
will not dare to try (to see how far they can go), with the result
that, in the state, there will be no people punished.66
The Book of Lord Shang further explained that the reason for making people responsible
for each other was also to have them spy on each other as follows:

61

Ibid., 133.

62

Umide*† (eye witness), phone interview with author, March 22, 2021; Eldos*† (eye witness), phone interview with
author, January 2, 2021.

63

Ziyawudun, interview, March 25, 2021. First mentioned in note 36.

64

Yao Lao, “Families that Hang Together,” China Daily, May 17, 2004, accessed March 22, 2021, https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/
english/doc/2004-05/17/content_331252.htm.

65

Daniel Haitas, “Shang Yang and Legalist Reform in The Ancient Chinese State of Qin,” Challenges of the Knowledge
Society 12 (2018), 524–531, accessed March 22, 2021, https://doaj.org/article/1675416918714f20b18ef6ce5890255f.

66

Shang Yang, The Book of Lord Shang, 143.

© 2021

Genocide Studies and Prevention 15, no. 1 https://doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.15.1.1834.

Dossier: Uyghur Women in China's Genocide

39

Now the people in groups of ﬁve are responsible for each
other ’s crimes, they spy on each other to discover
transgressions, they denounce each other and cause hostile
relations. By thus establishing enmity the people harm each
other, they injure friendly feelings, destroy benevolence and
kindness and damage scholarship and culture.67
This ancient method of punishing extended family members or relatives is currently
widely applied to the people of East Turkistan. Abdurishit Burhan, an Uyghur witness currently
living in Canada explained: “Each 10 families were made into one group and had to be
responsible for each other’s behavior, and spy on each other. People know what kind of torture
they will receive if they are going to be arrested. Sometimes I have seen people betray their
family member to save themselves.” Abdurishit added that the “mutual responsibility policy
started in 2013 in Kashgar.”68 This is exactly what legalism promoted:
In a condition of complete good government, husband and
wife and friends cannot abandon each other’s evil, cover up
wrong-doing and not cause harm to relatives, nor can the men
from the people mutually conceal each other from their
superiors and government servants.69
According to the Uyghur witness, Umide:
Each local unit in every neighborhood has Uyghur social
workers. They must report and arrest 30 persons in certain
periods, for so called re-education camps. They start to report
and arrest people that they have no relationship with. Later,
they will arrest their relatives. One of my friends works in a
local unit. They work under the strict surveillance of people’s
police. She said she cried and reported her cousin to ﬁll the
numbers. When there are no people left to arrest, they have to
report themselves. It is a very common and well-known issue.70
The tenets of Legalism have thus become a very useful tool for the implementation of
genocide in China’s colony of East Turkistan. Until now, most men and those who are educated,
young, and strong have already been eliminated in East Turkistan. This, too, is exactly what
Legalism advocated: “To remove the strong by means of a strong people brings weakness; to
remove the strong by means of a weak people brings strength.”71
The rest of the population—mostly women—are controlled through forced labor as the
Legalist argument also proposed, in the following way:
If compulsory labour service is rare, the people will feel safe; if
the people are safe, the ministers will gain no extra power; if
the ministers have no extra power, powerful and inﬂuential
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men will be extinguished; and if powerful and inﬂuential men
disappear, all credit will be due to the sovereign.72
Conclusion
The ICTR, dealing with another recent genocide, explained that “Genocide does not imply the
actual extermination of a group in its entirety, but is understood as such, once any one of the
acts mentioned in article II (2)(a) through II (2)(e) is committed with the speciﬁc intent to
destroy ‘in whole or in part’ a national, ethnic, racial or religious group.”73 The ICTR
commentary also explained that: “Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the
group” is prohibited under the Convention’s Article 2(d) and is exempliﬁed by the practice of
sterilization, forced birth control, and separation of sexes from the targeted group.74
It is clear that the Chinese government has violated the UN Genocide Convention by
way of its state policies which include conducting mass scale sterilization, separating the
genders by sending Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslim males to concentration and forced labor
camps, and by forcing Uyghur women to marry ethnic Han Chinese. All of these severe acts are
a direct outcome of Chinese colonialism in East Turkistan and violate not only Article 2(d), by
imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group, but also Article 2(b), “causing
serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;” Article 2(c) “deliberately inﬂicting on
the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in
part.”
As symbols of the land and the dignity and continuation of their people, Uyghur
women have become the symbolic and direct target of domination under China’s colonialism.
The ancient barbaric philosophy expressed in Legalism has also underpinned Chinese colonial
ideology and reinforced the genocide. Consequently, preventing the continuation of and
ultimately stopping the genocide in East Turkistan may require the decolonization of East
Turkistan—as the genocide of its people stems directly from China’s colonization of the region.
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“The most important thing is rice.”1
In recent years, genocide scholars have given greater attention to the dangers posed by climate
change for increasing the prevalence or intensity of genocide.2 Challenges related to forced
migration, resource scarcity, famine, and other threats of the Anthropocene are identiﬁed as
sources of present and future risk, especially for those committed to genocide prevention.3 We
applaud these efforts, but approach the connection between the natural and social aspects of
genocide from a different angle. Our research emanates out of a North American Indigenous
studies and new materialist rather than Euro-genocide studies framework; meaning, we see the
natural and the social (or cultural) as inseparable, deeply imbricated, phenomena. We argue that
those entities designated natural are often engaged in co-constitutive relations with the social
and cultural groups that are the focus of genocide studies. Simply put, groups become what
they are through interaction—or symbiogenesis—with their natural world(s). Rather than
forecast the prospects for increased genocidal destruction due to climate change, our project is
to re-evaluate cases from the genocide canon to illuminate the symbiogenetic destruction
apparent in these earlier events.4 In the present study, we examine testimony that centers on the
relationship between Khmer people and rice, including rice cultivation and consumption, as it
was impacted by the Khmer Rouge. In so doing, we highlight the cultural consequences of
social/natural death in the Cambodian genocide.
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Two important qualiﬁcations are necessary. First, though our research project is
inﬂuenced by Turtle Island (North American) Indigenous ontologies of relations between
human and more-than-human life, having been “civilized” by our previous work on settler
colonial genocide,5 we do not draw an equivalence between Indigenous ontologies of
symbiogenesis and those in other cultures. Instead, we seek to show what is distinct in each
culture’s particular association with their more-than-human co-constituents. As well, our goal is
to elevate and center the work of Indigenous Elders and scholars by allowing it to sensitize our
approach and to equip us with another source of critical reﬂexivity.6
Second, our claim is not that symbiogenetic destruction is genocide. Whether exploring
massacres of animal species such as cattle during the Rwandan genocide, the toxiﬁcation of
bodies of water such as Lake Winnipeg under Canadian settler colonialism, the loss of identitybearing territories such as Mount Ararat, or the transformation of rice farming through the
Cambodian genocide, our primary conclusion is not that the destruction of the natural world is
in and of itself an act of genocide. We are sympathetic to such arguments7 but we do not wish to
add symbiogenetic genocide to a growing list of genocide sub-types that includes terms such as
gendercide, urbicide, and ethnocide, among others.8 Instead, symbiogenetic destruction runs in
parallel with Claudia Card’s deployment of “social death”—what we refer to later in the paper
as social/natural death—in that it describes a key relational stake, or that which is at risk, in
genocidal processes. It draws attention to the group-producing relations with more-than-human
entities that are integral components of the ongoing formation of group life.
In this paper, we focus on the relations between Khmer people and rice. Both Khmer
and rice are dynamic rather than static categories. Each is itself a complex set of interactions.
Khmer culture is produced through the actions of people who identify as Khmer, who do not
always necessarily agree with what it means to be Khmer, thereby making Khmer-ness part of
an ongoing set of negotiations.9 This complexity goes beyond the level of the group, since each
individual group member is involved in a process of identity formation, locating themselves in
terms of what it means to be Khmer, but also refracting this identity through other intersecting
sources of belonging, such as family, religion, and politics. Likewise, each individual is also a
symbiogenetic composition of millions of microbiota that play roles in growth, digestion, and
moods.10 The groups we study are thus a multitude of associations comprised of further
associations; meaning, we always face the danger of reiﬁcation when seeking to contain their
ﬂuidity within our categorical terminology. When we speak of Khmer culture it should
therefore be noted that we are speaking of the ongoing process of making Khmer culture.
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Likewise, rice is not a single thing. For example, there are approximately 2,000 strains of
rice that are unique to Cambodia.11 Each strain is itself a mixture of protein, fat, ﬁber, and sand
ash. When milled, these properties are further transformed, as the white grain loses ﬁber,
protein, and minerals. Isolating rice from its own web of relations entails analytical decisionmaking. Each plant from every strain of rice exists within a network of water, animal species,
weather, and other factors. As Mak notes, a delicate and intricate balance sustains this network
in Cambodia: “Rice-based farming systems in Cambodia incorporate rain fed lowland rice, dry
season rice in some cases, animal production (cattle, pigs, chickens, and ducks), ﬁshing (or ﬁsh
culture) and other activities (such as palm sugar production, vegetable production, wild food
collection and trade). Because of the close interaction of these components, a change in any one
of them can alter the whole system.”12 For the sake of making a clear argument, we will focus
on the symbiogenetic destruction between Khmer and rice that occurred under the Khmer
Rouge (KR), and its ruling faction of the Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK), but, in truth,
we are speaking to a much more diverse set of relational disruptions.13
Genocide, Ecocide, and Symbiogenetic Destruction
Genocide studies takes group destruction as an essential wrong to be prevented.14 What
comprises the group is an ongoing topic of debate, with fault lines existing around the question
of which types of group are to be included for protection.15 The narrow framing of the United
Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (UNGC 1948), which
speciﬁes “national, ethnical, racial, or religious groups” as those protected, has been criticized
for ignoring political and class-based groups.16 More capacious readings of the UNGC have
since presented these four group types as examples of “stable and permanent” patterns of
group life rather than a complete set of groups potentially targeted by genocide.17
Beyond the issue of group types, genocide scholarship also diverges between what A.
Dirk Moses describes as “liberal” and “post-liberal” approaches, with the former focusing on
state-based, totalitarian forms of genocidal intent while the latter opens the door to
consideration of “relations of genocide” into which genocide is structurally embedded rather
11
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than necessarily explicitly expressed.18 Christopher Powell adds to Moses’s distinction that
liberal approaches tend to view groups essentially as associations of individuals, making these
individual lives the ultimate targets for protection.19 Whereas for post-liberals the group is an
entity valued in and of itself, in part because it is a carrier of culture, which is an accumulation
of knowledge and practices that bring meaning to group members’ lives. This post-liberal
approach has been enhanced by engagement with Indigenous understandings of collectivity.20
But it is also strongly inﬂuenced by Raphaël Lemkin’s scholarship and advocacy in which the
group is more than simply a gathering of individuals; it is a distinct cultural entity that through
its mere existence contributes to our global diversity and therefore collective wealth as a
species.21
Confounding contemporary studies of genocide though is the fact that the persistence
of human groups appears more and more impacted by their relations with the natural world.
The ecological damage suffered under the Anthropocene has introduced an epoch in which we
can no longer draw neat dividing lines between human cultures and their natures,22 if we ever
could.23 The human group is entwined with the natural world in a manner that makes their
symbiogenesis an important topic of research for those committed to advancing group
protection. This inﬂuence may spark a “post-humanist” approach to genocide, adding to
Moses’s typology.24 Our preference, however, is to call it a “post-anthropocentric” turn, since we
are not yet done with the human; rather, our goal is to better understand entanglements of the
human and the more-than-human within genocidal processes.
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Post-anthropocentrism pushes beyond the human as the measure of all worth.25
Genocide studies has difﬁculty avoiding anthropocentrism entirely, since the human group
remains our central unit of analysis. But what if we blur the boundaries of such groups so that
more-than-human co-constituents are allowed in? By centering human and more-than-human
relations within the genocide story, rather than isolating the experiences of human actors, we
seek to decenter the human subject to explore what new insights can be brought forward
through this displacement. In particular, our objective is to make room for a hybrid rather than
asymmetrical understanding of human and more-than-human relations so that the latter is not
simply held to be instrumental to the former. That is, we move beyond analyses in which a
human group’s relationship with land, plants, water, or animals is considered relevant only to
the extent that these natural entities serve the physical subsistence and reproduction of the
human group.26
Asymmetric genocide research is evident in early scholarship on this topic in which the
natural world factored into consideration primarily as an object of human conﬂict. Culturally
differentiated human groups were viewed to be in competition over resources, power, or other
desired goods.27 As well, it was noted that the natural world might be invoked in genocide
ideology to advance the demonization or dehumanization of the targeted group, treating them
as dogs, cockroaches, or beasts.28 More recently, scholars have begun to reﬂect on the impact of
ecocidal destruction and climate change on processes of genocide.29 Ecocide is offered as an
addition to the lexicon of destruction, and deﬁned as “the extensive damage to, destruction of
or loss of ecosystem(s) of a given territory, whether by human agency or by other causes, to
such an extent that peaceful enjoyment by the inhabitants of that territory has been or will be
severely diminished.”30 Martin Crook and Damien Short bring this terminology into genocide
research to describe the genocide-ecocide nexus as an interstitial space between genocide and
ecocide.31 We situate our current research project amidst this “in-between” space. But rather
than focus on how larger ecocidal and genocidal processes sustain and reinforce each other, our
work highlights the quotidian interactions through which humans form their groups with
more-than-human counterparts, as well as the ways these relationships are impacted by
genocide and/or ecocide.
The terms we rely upon to describe this process are symbiogenesis and symbiogenetic
destruction. Both are built from the word symbiosis, which is derived from the Greek sumbiōsis,
meaning “a living together.” In biology, symbiosis refers to two or more organisms sharing a
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close relationship. This does not need to be an equally beneﬁcial relationship.32 Mutualism, in
symbiosis, describes the ways in which two species interact in relationship with one another
toward their mutual beneﬁt.33 It contrasts with inter-species forms of competition, such as
invasive species, or parasitism, where one entity beneﬁts while the other is harmed.34
More recent discussion of symbiogenesis or sympoiesis—the process whereby complex
systems are produced through inter-species relations—moves beyond the potential
instrumentality of symbiosis.35 It is a terminology developed in contrast to Darwinian,
Hobbesian, and Malthusian notions of competition and survival. Peter Kropotkin, in Mutual
Aid: A Factor of Evolution, used the language of symbiosis to demonstrate a natural tendency
toward cooperation as a counterpoint to the naturalization of competition in laissez faire
capitalism.36 Following this approach, symbiogenesis has found purchase in the work of Lynn
Margulis,37 as well as in feminist studies of science that seek to dissolve the boundaries between
the social and the biological.38 With respect to the latter, Donna Haraway explains
symbiogenesis through the example of Churro sheep in Dinetah (Diné or Navajo, territory).39
Sheep and Diné co-exist in kin-like relations through which patterns of Diné pastoralism,
gender relations, and clan organization are made possible. The forced cull of these animals by
the US government in the 1930s was thus experienced as a world-destroying assault on the Diné
way of being, which impacted not only the physical sustenance of the group, but threw cultural
relations, particularly gender relations, into disarray.40
Symbiogenetic destruction is therefore the destruction of symbiogenesis. It is not
intended to replace expressions such as ecocide or the genocide-ecocide nexus. Instead, it
sensitizes genocide studies to the relations that proposed laws against ecocide intend to protect.
It acknowledges that the groups protected by genocide are symbiogenetically formed through
their connections to more-than-human entities, and that genocide impacts these connections in
multiple ways that are detrimental to human groups and their more-than-human counterparts.
Through this notion, one can better understand how inter-species mingling, which is important
to how groups deﬁne themselves in cultural and symbolic terms, is placed in danger during
genocidal processes.
Becoming Groups Together: Symbiogenesis and the Things that make Us
In his seminal essay, We Have Never Been Modern, Bruno Latour recasts the culture/nature divide
as a result of a modern constitution—one whereby we, as self-styled moderns, agreed to treat
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culture and nature separately, despite their numerous entanglements in our everyday lives.41
For Latour, this constitution requires an act of puriﬁcation that allows us to ignore the ways that
our cultures overlap and engage with our natures, exempliﬁed by the amalgams of culture and
nature in climate change and disease spread. In the ﬁeld of genocide studies, since Raphaël
Lemkin ﬁrst coined the genocide concept,42 several scholars have seen culture as a foundational
component of group life.43 However, the intersection between natures and cultures has received
less attention, though recent contributions to the environmental history of the Holocaust
promise more consideration of multispecies intersections.44
Latour’s innovation was not new to Indigenous scholars. As Kelsey Dale John remarks,
such perspectives only appear new because of the attempted erasure of Indigenous knowledges
and their exclusion from academia.45 Indigenous scholars such as Leanne Betasmoke Simpson,
John Borrows, Eve Tuck, and Glen Coulthard, among several others, have long emphasized
how Indigenous peoples, languages, territories, water sources, plant life, the spirit world, kin
species, and additional more-than-human actors are integral components of an intricate web of
relations.46 Latour’s contribution thus might be better speciﬁed as one noting that nonIndigenous cultures are less separate from their more-than-human counterparts than they often
imagine, even if the entanglements are perhaps not as cosmologically central as they are for
Indigenous peoples.
If our cultural selves are formed through interactions beyond those with our fellow
humans, what consequences does this have for the notion of the group that is central to
genocide studies? The group is a word Latour argues is empty of content; it suggests a ﬁxity,
something that is complete, rather than something that is being formed. He prefers the term
“associations,” capturing what other scholars describe as the process of becoming through
which a collective continuously forms itself.47 Associations emerge through relations that
include alliances, attachments, and other forms of multispecies mingling.48 As Donna Haraway
notes, processes of becoming are always ones of becoming with,49 and this includes interactions
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with more-than-human entities, whereby the latter contribute in diverse ways to the richness of
the assemblage that is being produced.50
We do not discard the notion of the group, given its familiarity within genocide studies.
But we understand groups as engaged in an ongoing process of becoming. As such, groups do
not stand outside of nature, simply drawing upon it for sustenance, protecting themselves
against its force, or mastering it for human betterment. Instead, they become the groups that
they are through their relationships with a dynamic and active natural world.51 Simply put, and
with reference to our primary case study, one can hardly imagine Khmer as a group without
rice. As we show below, the KR transformation of rice production altered many aspects of
Khmer life, such as relations to work, family, and food. And the assault upon these relations
negatively impacted collective vitality.
Building upon Claudia Card’s understanding of “social death,” a term she adapts from
Orlando Patterson, one can conceptualize this loss of vitality as a form of social/natural death.
For Card, social death is the fundamental harm of genocide.52 Though genocide also destroys
lives, at its root it kills the relationships through which collective identities are formed and from
which existential meaning is derived. But her argument stops short of acknowledging the full
diversity of relations that allow collective life to offer meaning to its constituents. The “cultural
heritage” and “intergenerational connections” that are lost in genocide are not restricted to the
human, but also include more-than-human relations that span across the life of the group.53
Symbiogenetic destruction is thus a form of social/natural death, since symbiogenesis is a
means by which humans and more-than-humans create collective vitality. It is the process of
storying ourselves and our world together with our companions, kin, and others.54 In this sense,
symbiogenesis does not naturalize nationalism in a manner that echoes Nazi propaganda of
“blood and soil;”55 instead, it recognizes that culture and nature are conjoined in practices of coimagination whereby the groups in which we ﬁnd meaning and belonging are shaped by the
more-than-human counterparts with whom we intersect.
When we speak of co-constitutive relations between humans and nature, we mean that
the cultures of both the human and the more-than-human are transformed into something new
when their lives meet. Vinciane Despret captures this symbiogenesis effectively when
discussing the study of dogs. She writes: “I think that, for example, the ethology of dogs or cats
is really helpful too because the question of nature and culture cannot really be raised, because
even if all dogs behave in a certain way, it might be culture, but ... it’s not a culture of the dogs.
It’s rather a culture of the history of dogs with humans that transformed both dogs and humans
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and created an artefact.”56 This is the history that interests us in the study of symbiogenetic
destruction—the cultures transformed by ongoing relations with a natural world counterpart,
and the consequences for the human group when these relations, which become part of the
group, are subject to genocidal processes. Despret refers to this elsewhere as the “miracle of
attunement” whereby humans and more-than-humans form affecting and effected relationships
with one another.57 The human becomes a human with the more-than-human. More concretely,
one could argue, the groups studied in genocide studies are also groups-with: in the present
example, we can speak of Khmer-with-rice.
A Note on Methodology
To capture elements of the relationship between Khmer and rice, as well as the destructive
consequences of KR rice production policy, we rely on oral historical testimony drawn from
multiple sources.58 We do not present the information drawn from these sources to render a
complete picture of the past but rather to illustrate a sample of Khmer practices of meaning
making about the past in which rice plays a primary role. The stories people tell about their past
and their relations with rice offer perspective on the ways Khmer imagine themselves as
members of families, communities, regions, and the nation. In this manner, the natural world is
a resource for meaning making, and thus an essential foundation to the group’s existence. As
McCormick notes: “Because stories are ongoing, revisable, and able to incorporate complexity,
narrative forms are ideal for thinking multispecies community in shared, overlapping
worlds.”59 Further, he adds: “Storied-places are sites of multispecies encounter. For a place to
become a home, there must be successful negotiation amongst its denizens. Storied-places, then,
are also multiple overlapping and entangled meaning-making practices that range beyond the
individual.”60 Following McCormick’s emphasis on story as a site for exploring the intersections
of the human and more-than-human, we examined transcribed memories as interpretations of
both the time before, during, and after the period of Democratic Kampuchea. We have reviewed
testimony taken both soon and many years after the fall of the KR, including testimony from
former cadre, victims, and others who do not ﬁt neatly in either category. In total, as part of our
broader research project, we examined over 110 transcripts, as well as a variety of other
representations of the KR past, including memoirs, histories, documentaries, and movies. The
frequency of rice in these narratives—as a source of labor, food, a family ritual, a community
ceremony, among other associations—shows its relational centrality in the Khmer lifeworld. In
different ways and different regions, Khmer people have shaped themselves alongside the ﬁelds
of rice that support their existence.
Rice/People
Rice has fed many cultures. Records of its production date back as far as 2,500 BCE. From its
origins in China, it traveled throughout Asia and into Europe and Africa. It is a versatile crop
that adapts to its environment. It is grown in both dry and wet regions. It adjusts to peoples,
providing a storable food that carries the ﬂavors of cultures while ﬁlling hungry stomachs. And
people adjust to it, shaping their daily activities, homes, and family lives to its cultivation and
consumption.
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Rice is a member of the Poaceae family. Each rice plant produces multiple groupings of
approximately 200 ﬂowers called tillers. Fertilized by wind-borne pollens, the thousands of
grains of rice take shape in the plant. Cambodia’s wet rice strains are harvested from ﬂooded
rice paddies. The paddy is drained prior to harvesting, before the farmers cut the plants, often
with a scythe or sickle, and let them dry. The dry plants are threshed against a slotted table that
is placed over a tarp so that the rice seeds fall to the tarp to be collected. Milling follows to
remove the husk, bran layer, and germ, resulting in white grains of rice.61
Khmer farmers have cultivated rice for more than 2,000 years. The era of the Khmer
Empire was a period when irrigation and labor were organized to increase production.
Nonetheless, small farm holdings cultivated by traditional methods, such as ox cart plows and
hand threshing, remained the dominant practices. In the aftermath of the Khmer Empire, rice
farming continued in this fashion. French colonialism (1863–1953) brought with it a push
toward modernization, as large plantations were introduced in some regions, as well as
inorganic fertilizers and machinery, all in an effort to build an export market, though many
Khmer continued with traditional farming methods.62 In the ﬁrst half of the twentieth century,
the colonized region produced from 50,000 to 200,000 tonnes of rice per year for export. By 1940,
Cambodia was the world’s third largest rice exporter. Those farmers who produced rice for
French export, however, found themselves poorly compensated for their work. They received
only 26 percent of the proﬁt, with the remainder going to intermediaries, transport, processing,
and government taxes.63
Rice means more than proﬁt for Khmer people. It is central to Cambodian subsistence
and the cultures of the region. The English phrase “to eat,” when translated into Khmer is pisa
bei, literally meaning “to eat rice.”64 Though practices of rice production have shifted from time
to time, rice has remained the staple of the Cambodian diet.
Rice is also spiritually salient to Cambodian life. The rice rituals of the Cambodian
agricultural cycle are of particular signiﬁcance. For example, the celebration of Pchuṃ Biṇḍ takes
place over two weeks at the end of the rainy season. To participate in the ceremony, Khmer who
live elsewhere return to their place of birth to provide nourishment in the form of balls of rice to
the lost souls released by the King of the Underworld. They do so to bestow merit upon and
bless their ancestors, who may have become lost souls because of a burden of wrongdoing
when living. But the ceremony is also an opportunity to participate in rituals of rebirth and
renewal, as offerings made to the Buddhist Monks at the temples are acts through which
participants themselves make merit. Rice is thus entwined in this ceremony that simultaneously
mourns the dead and creates community cohesion.65
Many Khmer worship local spirits (neak ta or ancient ones). Some of these reside in
natural spaces, such as mountains, ﬁelds, or mounds. Relationships are formed with neak ta
through food offerings generously given in hopes that these powerful beings will not become
angry and send sickness, ﬂoods, or other harms.66 In this manner, symbiogenesis with the
natural world is embedded into ritual practice. Courtney Work describes neak ta as “sovereigns
of the land,” who are “in and of the water and the land.”67 They are sometimes referred to as
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manuss moel min coeñ (people who we cannot see), among which are included the mcâs dẏk mcâs
ṭī (owners/masters of water and land). They are the true owners of the territory with whom
social relationships deﬁned by fear, gratitude, and respect are formed.68 These spirits help
regulate respectful use of the land and its bounty, as mis- or overuse might result in negative
consequences, such as misfortune or even death.69 Drastic changes to rice production thus
threaten a web of spiritual relations intended to foster respect for the land.
The cultural centrality of rice to Khmer society is broadly illustrated through Rithy
Panh’s ﬁlm Rice People (or Neak Sre, which refers to people who live in a rural area and farm rice
for a living), where the rice paddy is presented as a microcosm of Cambodian life. In Panh’s
ﬁlm, a young couple worries about the coming harvest and their lack of land. They have seven
daughters and for each the family will be expected to provide a dowry. Their fourteen acres of
land amounts to only two acres per daughter. When the mother is bit by a cobra in the ﬁeld, the
fragility of their existence is made clear. Soon after, the father is stabbed by a thorn as he tills the
muddy rice paddy, trying to get his rice planted in time. The thorn festers in his foot, leaving his
wife, now recovered from her bite, and his daughters to “wake up the paddies.” Before he dies
from his injury, the father has a fevered dream of his rice ﬁelds and house on ﬁre as KR cadre
march past. He searches among them for his family and is struck to the ground by blows from a
soldier. After his death, his wife tries to care for the rice paddies with the help of her older
daughters, resulting in her breakdown as her obsessive care of the rice eclipses that for her
children. The rice people, Khmer in Panh’s ﬁlm, live in the precarity of deep dependence on the
rice harvest.
Though many strands connect rice to the Cambodian genocide, we will focus on three in
this paper: Rice and labor, rice and family, and rice and hunger.
The Rice of the Khmer Rouge
Rice and rice production have been discussed in several studies of the Cambodian genocide.70
Many such studies focus on famine or the brutality of KR rice production policy. Our
contribution to this literature is to bring the cultural centrality of rice into the foreground, to
show how symbiogenetic relations between Khmer and rice were upset in Democratic
Kampuchea.
The post-Independence (1953) government of Norodom Sihanouk, who abdicated his
throne in 1955 to serve as Cambodian Prime Minister, retained many French land use policies.
During this time, rice yields continued to drive the Cambodian economy. Indeed, the rice
harvest reached record levels from 1963 to 1965 and, for a brief period, rice exports supported a
positive trade balance. But US engagement in the Vietnam War in 1965 brought US forces in the
region to 300,000 by mid-1966. As well, there simultaneously occurred increased conscription
into both Saigon’s forces and those of the National Liberation Front. All of these soldiers had to
be fed and Cambodian rice was smuggled across the border for this purpose. Moreover, Richard
Nixon’s “secret war” in Cambodia, which began with a May 1970 invasion, impacted the rice
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yield. Not only did the 2.7 million tons of bombs dropped on Cambodia result in lost lives and a
refugee crisis, but the countryside was also devastated and rice production seriously
compromised in acts some have referred to as ecocide.71
Peasant frustration grew because of land grabs, mounting debts, and other indignities,
drawing them toward rebellion in the late 1960s. Then, on March 18, 1970, Lon Nol, with
American backing, seized the government from the monarchy. For several cadre, it was this
coup that overthrew Prince Sihanouk that brought them to the KR,72 as Sihanouk rallied his
supporters to join.73 Between 1970 and 1973, the area of farmable rice land decreased by 77
percent, resulting in an 84 percent decrease to the rice yield, further exacerbating frustration.74
As well, US cross-border forays into Cambodia resulted in antipersonnel mines being hidden
across the countryside, presenting new risks to farmers and civilians in these regions.75 Overall,
the assault on Khmer, and on their primary source of subsistence, contributed to the growth of
the KR.
Rice shortages were widely felt. Price increases in rice were noted in Phnom Penh in the
early 1970s. The population of the city steadily increased as refugees from the KR advance ﬂed
to the city. With the KR victory, Phnom Penh was evacuated on April 17, 1975,76 and both longterm and recent-arrival city dwellers came under suspicion. They were viewed as living an easy
life on the backs of the peasant farmers. Their morality was in question because it was perceived
that they did not engage in productive work. They were accused of being supporters of the Lon
Nol regime. Strategically speaking, it was also the case that it did not serve the KR militarily to
have population centers potentially vulnerable to attack, since they foresaw warfare with a
weakened regime in Saigon, which would allow KR to claim contested territory from Vietnam
before Vietnamese communists could do likewise.77 The city dwellers thus became a new
workforce to improve the economic base of the new society.
Part of what Alexander Hinton refers to as the “ontological resonance” of the KR
message—the connection of socialist ideology to the lived experiences of Cambodians78—came
from the rice paddy. One cadre saw the KR as a natural ﬁt because of the allegiance he felt with
the poor who had their land, rice, and animals exploited by the capitalists.79 Another recounts
the wisdom shared with him personally by Pol Pot while his wife served as a cook for the
leader: “He told me to take root on soil near water. Do not ﬂy around for family economies.”80
The message was to rely on the soil rather than running from opportunity to opportunity like
seed blown on the wind. For another cadre, Pol Pot’s lessons about land were most memorable:
“What is most important is land. To have land to take roots. His [Pol Pot] guid[ance] was like
this, if we don’t have anything, that is ﬁne as long as we did not give up our land.”81 These
messages were provided despite the fact that Pol Pot never farmed rice. Though his father
owned nine hectares of rice paddy, Pol Pot, whose birth name was Saloth Sar, was educated in
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the royal monastery and in an elite Catholic school thanks to his family’s palace connections.82
Such messaging sought to strengthen connections between Khmer and the rice paddy, but CPK
rice production policy signiﬁcantly disrupted symbiogenetic relations, resulting in
reverberations that upset patterns of work, family, and food consumption.
Rice and Labor
To break free from capitalist contradictions and the trappings of bourgeois society, money was
initially banned and removed from circulation in Democratic Kampuchea. This did not mean
that there existed no unit of exchange nor did it mean that the CPK did not seek to accumulate
capital.83 In this regard, the CPK viewed rice as the new Cambodia’s most important export and
a means of exchange and accumulation. Rice would not only feed the revolutionary nation;
surplus rice would be shipped to markets in China, Africa, Singapore, and elsewhere in order to
secure capital that would pay for the weapons and infrastructure required to secure the
revolution.84 This meant that three tons of rice had to be produced per hectare, according to the
calculations of what was required for the CPK’s “Super Great Leap Forward.” This demanded
mass mobilization of the workforce, with the so-called “new people” forced from the cities to
engage in agricultural labor in the countryside alongside the “old” or “base” people. Immense
irrigation projects were also initiated to meet rice production goals, allowing monsoon
rainwater to circulate to feed second crops of rice in what would normally be dormant seasons.
The plan was for a nationwide system to distribute water to one square kilometer rice paddies
bordered by canals and dikes.85 Through this plan, water was enlisted in the production of
Democratic Kampuchea through the manufacture of a hydrosocial cycle of dams and canals
used to organize rice production and perpetrate mass violence.86
Rather than a project designed in accordance with orthodox communism, James Tyner
refers to the CPK vision of labor for purposes of creating exchange value as a variant of “state
capitalism.”87 For Tyner, it was the desire of the CPK to accumulate capital quickly that
compromised their Marxist values and magniﬁed the devastation. By dispossessing people of
their lands, engaging in forced removals, increasing agricultural production through intensive
human labor, and providing starvation-level subsistence, the structural conditions were set to
produce brutal results. Exploitation of labor and the commodiﬁcation of rice to generate surplus
value were integral to debilitating Khmer practices of rice production for family use, thereby
reconﬁguring the broader social relations sustaining Cambodian society and transforming
human nature by inspiring a political consciousness formed through hard labor.88 The Khmer
Rouge sought to effect a new symbiosis of humans and nature—one through which a socialist
society could be built, accompanied by new cultural and familial relations.
Ideological zeal rather than improved seed or machinery was the primary means by
which the CPK sought to increase production. Cooperatives often lacked animals to assist in
ploughing the ﬁelds and much work was done by hand and hoe. A romantic yet pragmatic
82

Kiernan, The Pol Pot Regime, 10.

83

For more detailed analysis of the complexities of CPK monetary policy, see James A. Tyner, “‘Currency is a Most
Poisonous Tool:’ State Capitalism, Nonmarket Socialism, and the Elimination of Money during the Cambodian
Genocide,” Genocide Studies and Prevention: An International Journal 14, no. 1 (2020), 143–158.

84

For example, as noted by the CPK leadership, their objective was “[t]o produce rice for food to raise the standard of
living of the people, and in order to export so as to obtain capital for the imports which we need.” See Chanthou
Boua, trans., “Document III: ‘The Party’s Four-Year Plan to Build Socialism in All Fields, 1977–1980’ (Party Centre,
July–August 1976),” in Pol Pot Plans the Future: Conﬁdential Leadership Documents from Democratic Kampuchea, 1976–
1977, ed. David P. Chandler et al. (New Haven: Monograph 33/Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, 1988), 51.

85

Bultmann, Irrigating a Socialist Utopia.

86

Stian Rice et al., “The Hydro-Logic of Genocide: Remaking Land, Water, and Bodies in Democratic Kampuchea, 1975–
1979,” Area 52, no. 2 (2020), 389–390.

87

Tyner, Rice Fields to Killing Fields, xiii; see also Tyner and Rice, Cambodia’s Political Economy of Violence, 84–94; Tyner,
Violence.

88

Tyner, Rice Fields to Killing Fields, xxi.

© 2021

Genocide Studies and Prevention 15, no. 1 https://doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.15.1.1805.

Symbiogenetic Destruction in the Cambodian Genocide

57

vision of manual labor performed by the entire population was advanced in terms that
connoted warfare: the farmers and army working together in the battleﬁeld, crushing and
winning their quotas.89 Such collective effort was meant to overcome the lack of adequate
livestock, farming tools, or rice seed. A 1976 quotation, likely authored by Pol Pot, found in the
Khmer Rouge journal, Tung Padevat, captures the CPK’s militaristic framing: “So we must
launch offensives for more light rice, and for more corn, more vegetables. One hectare, ten
hectares, a hundred hectares; we must go on planting. We strike continuously in all forms, we
strike non-stop, we strike on a large scale and on a small scale. If we strike like this, we will be
complete masters.”90 As Daniel Bultmann notes, the land was to be disciplined of all of its
individualistic and speciﬁc qualities; nature was to be “mastered”91 toward the establishment of
a socialist society. Such a view was much different than the respect for the rice paddy that was
symbolized through gifting to neak ta and practiced through daily family rituals of farming and
eating rice. As a matter of fact, within the period of twelve months, the KR completely abolished
religious belief of all kinds, including ritual practices.92
Rice farmers, too, were disciplined to try to make their work more efﬁcient. Pech Srey
Phal told of a hard rope that was used to time the transplanting of seedlings:
And when the militia men blew a whistle, then the rope would
be raised and we had to quickly transplant the seedlings in a
row. And if somebody transplanted and could not get up on
time when the rope was lifted—and I mean the rope—the rope
was a hard plastic rope or a kind of a metal rope. And if we
could not get up on time then it would hit our eyes. One day,
somebody who was transplanting nearby me got hit by the
rope, and the eyes bled, and that person fell onto the ground
damaging the seedlings. Then the militia men or the soldiers of
the Khmer rouge who were monitoring us came down into the
rice ﬁeld and beat that person up, blaming the person of
destroying the seedlings.93
Without the tools of modernization, rice farming was nonetheless mechanized through
the martial discipline imposed by KR cadre. In this instance, the people themselves become
mechanical in their interactions with seedlings and soil.
The destruction of seedlings mentioned above is also indicative of a larger process of
KR-led devastation whereby the variety of rice seed suffered because of the genocide. At the fall
of Democratic Kampuchea, many traditional rice seed varieties adapted to the harsh growing
conditions of Cambodia were eaten by starving people or rats. As well, CPK policies resulted in
farmers planting poorly adapted rice, with deep-water rice planting discouraged in some areas
in favor of early duration varieties. Irrigation interventions imposed by the CPK also impacted
deep-water rice varieties that were attuned to existing local conditions. All of these factors
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combined to compromise the availability of several well-established deep-water rice varieties,
leaving Cambodians bereft of the diversity of rice seed that had previously sustained them.94
Though rice production had previously experienced shifts, such as the attempt to
modernize the industry under French Colonialism, never before had such dramatic change been
implemented. This impacted the way Cambodians and rice were shaped to each other. Land,
water, and ﬁelds were re-engineered alongside a brutally enforced division of labor intended to
achieve the desired yields. And new cultural meanings of rice appeared—primarily as a unit of
exchange and object of conquest—disrupting its centrality to community, village, and family.
Rice and Family
To maximize rice production, the CPK undertook a massive reorganization of the family. In
1976, Angkar began to view the individual’s commitment to family as a potential barrier to
collectivism. So-called “family-ism” needed to be disciplined out of the population.95 This
notion was likely inﬂuenced by the Marxist critique of the patriarchal capitalist family, but it
also took unique and pragmatic form with respect to the CPK’s goals for rice production.96
Without the technological means to modernize farming and increase yields, they sought instead
to deploy human labor in a manner that would ensure the majority of Cambodians, from the
very young to the old, would contribute to the goal of three tons per hectare. Many family units,
especially those of the new people, were reconﬁgured, and a new division of labor was imposed
on the countryside. Arduous physical labor building dams, digging irrigation canals, and
clearing land was largely performed by mobile teams of unmarried youth and adults. Married
adults worked in their villages to produce on behalf of their cooperative. They were often
separated from each other, as well as from their children and aging parents, who also had roles
to play in ensuring their cooperative achieved its quotas.97 Children were typically permitted to
visit their parents once every two or three months,98 and women who were up to nine months
pregnant were often assigned to grind and husk the rice.99
To remove “family-ism” from this new labor force also entailed a transformation of the
family meal. As of 1976, many families could no longer eat together, sitting on the ﬂoor around
their shared plates. Meals were now collective. Cooperatives of approximately 100 people had
three to four kitchens where meals were prepared.100 The rice pot was a large metal cauldron.
For one survivor, the collective meal was the worst part of CPK rule: “Anyone can lead us as
long as they don’t make us eat in collective kitchens.”101 The families of the new people were
frequently stripped of their possessions by the CPK, which saw the holding of such possessions
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as acts of “privatism” or “individualism.” This included taking from these families the
implements of rice production, such as oxen, and rice consumption, such as bowls.102
In a process Michel Foucault terms “refamilization,”103 individuals were not simply cut
adrift; instead, they were blended into new communal units, an emergent revolutionary family,
with Angkar as the ultimate parent. As one cadre put it, “We cooperatively built a true family
here. What a revolutionary family!”104 To not accept this refamilization was to take a “strong
private stand,”105 one that could be criminalized. One cadre recalled being told, “favoring the
family means breaking the law.”106 Another remembered, “Kinship relationships between
human beings did not exist at this time. They were prohibited. Family members did not even
know where their relatives were living. So we did not have any means to communicate to tell
our family members about our health or our situation.”107 This refamilization failed, in part
because it sought to overwrite familial, community, and spiritual relations that had long served
to foster local solidarity and harmony.108 In the face of familial recalcitrance, or even because of
the perceived crimes of one family member, the KR sometimes sought to eliminate the entire
family line. Hinton connects such violence against the family to an extreme form of the
principle of disproportionate revenge, whereby a powerful person might seek to “destroy” the
“seed” of his enemy, meaning their family or clan.109 The connection drawn between destroying
the family line and destroying the seed is not insigniﬁcant.
Marriages were also often redesigned to ﬁt the revolutionary vision of Angkar. Though
arranged marriages were a common practice in Cambodia prior to the Democratic Kampuchea
period, these marriages were arranged through a set of rituals designed to build relationships
between the two families, in particular establishing trust between marriage partners, as well as
between them and their new in-laws. KR weddings were different. Cadres, who might have
only known one another in passing, if at all, would be married in group ceremonies.110 These
could be as small as two couples, but could include as many as ten or even twelve couples.111
Some of the grooms were injured in battle and no longer able to engage in combat, making them
eligible for marriage.112 There were no parents or relatives in these ceremonies. The couples
were united under the symbols of Angkar—the sickle and rice—where they promised to love
one another and work hard for their country.113 Most importantly, they were tasked with
procreating, as the CPK estimated it needed to grow the population to maximize rice
production.114
For many families, their daily lives had been entangled with the production and
consumption of rice. Fractured according to the new division of labor, underfed, and deprived
of group-sustaining rituals such as the family meal, or tending to the family plot, the
“revolutionary family” was weakened by denial of its patterned relations with rice.
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Rice and Hunger
Labor under the CPK regime was often undertaken in conditions of severe hunger. Whether
building dams, digging irrigation ditches, or cultivating rice and other produce, most workers
were underfed. Long Tong notes, “every day we had to build dikes for rice cultivation all day
and night. We did not get enough food and work was very laborious.”115 He recalls him and his
colleagues preparing a murky, waterlily soup in order to ﬁll their bellies and allow them to
continue work. Rice, when available, was diluted and portioned to share among his
compatriots.116
In the famine that took hold under CPK rule, rice was a measure to assess levels of
subsistence. It was measured in units of condensed milk cans. The Angkar leadership proposed
the people should receive three cans per day. But many remember their allotment was only one
can each day.117 Much depended on whether one was considered a “base” or “old” person or a
“new” or “April 17” person evacuated from an urban center. The latter were fed less and
worked harder.118 In either case, there was not enough food provided for the back-breaking
work demanded of members of cooperatives. Rice farmers often began work at four a.m.,
received a break between eleven a.m. and one p.m., and then worked from then until seven
p.m.119 To sustain themselves, they found edible items that were not part of their normal diets.
Chruy Chreun, who hailed from Kampong Cham province and was a soldier under the Khmer
Rouge, recalls, “I have eaten everything. I had never eaten ripe toddy palm fruit before, but
then whenever there’s a ripe toddy palm fruit [which] fell down, I would ﬁght for it… despite I
had never even eaten ripe toddy palm, boiled bael fruit, papaya stump, morning glory, rice
mixed with Billygoat Weed. They fed us Billygoat Weed mixed with rice.”120
Ultimately, denial of food under the CPK regime was a denial of humanity. Denise
Affonco echoes Agamben’s analysis of the bare life of the Nazi concentration camps,121 seeing
famine as an orchestrated technique to reduce the human being to a state in which it can simply
be allowed to die:
Do you think we were human beings at all? We weren't. We
were totally dehumanized. We became animals. We were
utterly dehumanized. That's all I have to say today. And let me
tell you again and again, if you want to listen to me, that
famine was organized and programmed. It was a way for the
system to eliminate us while feeling they had washed their
hands of the problem, but they could say, ‘We didn't kill those
people; they died because they've been eating rubbish.’ Is that
not a technique to assassinate somebody without getting your
hands dirty?122
As Randle DeFalco notes, survivors often use the word bong-ot (to starve) rather than
tutaphik (the Khmer word for famine, usually connoting hunger caused by unfavorable weather
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patterns) to capture the human agency that created and perpetuated the famine.123 This
language is important, since the CPK government, if they acknowledged food shortages at all,
claimed natural conditions and traitorous sabotage were the cause of famine in Democratic
Kampuchea rather than leadership policies.124 But, as DeFalco reports, previous periods of poor
growing conditions had never resulted in as sustained or widespread a famine as occurred
during the Democratic Kampuchea era. The CPK leadership was aware that starvation and
under-nourishment were rife, yet persisted with policies, such as forbidding people from
gleaning food from other sources, that exacerbated the famine.125
Famine is often considered solely as a form of physical destruction, but it is also a
culturally destructive event. Through food preparation and consumption our social worlds are
made and remade on a day-to-day basis.126 Genocide interrupted these relations for Khmer and
even changed Cambodian cuisine. It is sometimes considered a simpler cuisine than that on
offer in Vietnam and Thailand, but this is in part because the CPK regime inﬂicted a very basic
cuisine on the communal kitchens, and this was further exacerbated by famine. Other traditions
of eating, including royal court, elite, and even some forms of peasant cuisine were forgotten.127
Famine thus also instigated cultural loss by transforming Khmer relations with rice.
Conclusion: Rice Relations and Genocide
The reorganization of rice production had wide ranging consequences for Khmer people. In the
rapid and forced transition toward massively increased rice exports, a complex of relations that
had historically sustained Khmer was threatened. Rice was imbricated with family life,
spirituality, language, cuisine, art, and so many other aspects of cultural life, that its disruption
had long standing consequences. At stake, however, were not just cultural practices attuned to
symbiogenesis with the rice paddy. Khmer were compelled to reframe their relationship to their
natural world. Farming lost its familial and spiritual dimensions and became an act of war or an
obligation to the new family signiﬁed by Angkar. Symbiogenesis was thus transformed into
human versus nature. The “super great leap forward” entailed a mastery of the natural world.
The CPK exhibited a “high modernist” tendency toward social engineering, particularly in the
belief that nature could be shaped to ﬁt their ideology.128
Our relations with the natural world are always in ﬂux, but when subject to forced and
rapid change, as was implemented by the KR, one can see how the very way that a human
group shapes itself alongside a more-than-human counterpart causes disruptions that rob the
group of the very relationships through which it forms itself as a group. These relationships
represent the possibility of associational vitality. But when they are subject to the social/natural
death of symbiogenetic destruction, the building blocks of collective meaning-making are
thrown into disarray. To this extent, understanding the genocide in Cambodia comes not solely
by tabulating the number of dead or identifying speciﬁc groups within the larger population
who were targeted for elimination, but also by looking at how a complex symbiogenetic web of
social and natural interactions was destroyed in a manner that interrupted vitalizing processes
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of group formation among human and more-than-human beings. By drawing on an ontology
informed by North American Indigenous studies and the new materialism, it is possible to open
genocide study to consideration of heretofore muted and understudied aspects of genocide’s
social/natural death that impact not only the group’s modes of subsistence, but also its
formative relations with the more-than-human entities that inhabit the natural world.
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I’m frustrated by the approaches to genocide and war that have
almost become so sanitized and professional. It’s like its own
economy. There are the people who produce the weapons, the
people who buy the weapons, the people who ﬁre the
weapons, there are the ﬁrst aid responders who respond to
emergency situations…. There’s a whole system that functions
around genocide. I understand, but it’s fucked up. I don’t
know how else to say it…. I’m not trying to devalue the way in
which these things are addressed, but it’s literally become a
business and a profession for organizations and countries and
people and all of it feeds off of each other, and it works for
everybody who is part of this ecosystem for it to continue in
this way. I think art disrupts this.
—Aida Šehović.1

The Venice Art Biennale, often referred to as the “art Olympics” and widely considered the
preeminent international art fair,2 is likely not the very ﬁrst place that comes to mind when one
thinks of genocide and atrocity prevention. Ralph Rugoff, curator of the 58th occurrence of the
Venice Biennale, which was titled “May You Live in Interesting Times” and took place in 2019,
went so far as to proclaim in the opening sentences of his ofﬁcial introduction to the Biennale
that we should “acknowledge at the outset that art does not exercise its forces in the domain of
politics.”3 While this is an extremely debatable claim, and one with which many Biennale artists
would likely take issue, it nonetheless remains true that, for most audiences, the sprawling
Biennale is more likely to be associated with top notch contemporary art and transnational
economies of inﬂuence and access than it is with human rights. Yet, the Auschwitz Institute for
the Prevention of Genocide and Mass Atrocities (Auschwitz Institute),4 one of the leading NGOs
working to prevent future violent conﬂict, chose to curate an art exhibit in 2019 alongside the
Biennale. In the context of genocide and mass atrocity prevention, what is the potential
intervention of an exhibition such as this one? This is linked to a much larger question driving
this article: what is the role of the arts in the prevention of genocide and mass atrocities?

1

Aida Šehović, in conversation with the author, June 2020.

2

Oscar Boyson, dir., “Behind the Biennale: A Short History of the World’s Most Important Art Exhibition,” uploaded
May 3, 2015, Artsy, 00:00:29, accessed June 20, 2020, https://www.artsy.net/article/artsy-editorial-behind-thevenice-biennale-2015-a-short-history-of-the-world-s-most-important-art-exhibition.

3

Ralph Rugoff, “Introduction by Ralph Rugoff: Curator of the 58th International Art Exhibition,” La Biennale di Venezia,
accessed May 1, 2019, https://www.labiennale.org/en/art/2019/introduction-ralph-rugoff.

4

The Auschwitz Institute for Genocide and Mass Atrocity Prevention changed its name in December 2019. The
organization was still using its previous name, the Auschwitz Institute for Peace and Reconciliation, when the
exhibition opened in May 2019.

Kaitlin Murphy. “Art as Atrocity Prevention: The Auschwitz Institute, Artivism, and the 2019 Venice Biennale.” Genocide
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While an exhaustive sweep of all arts initiatives5 is vastly beyond the scope of this
article, I focus here on the Auschwitz Institute’s 2019 Venice Biennale exhibition, titled
“Artivism: The Atrocity Prevention Pavilion,” and draw from fieldwork, interviews, and
extensive secondary research to argue that the arts can in fact make powerful contributions to
the prevention of genocide and mass atrocity. In what follows, I describe my analytic approach
and provide a brief introduction to the Auschwitz Institute, the Venice Biennale, and the
artwork in the Artivism Pavilion. I then turn to scholarship on prevention in order to lay the
groundwork for analysis in the broader context of mitigating risk factors associated with past
and future violent conﬂict. Ultimately, I argue that although largely overlooked in genocide and
atrocity prevention scholarship, the arts have a central role to play in genocide and atrocity
prevention efforts.
Approach
Measuring the preventive capacity of the arts—or anything—is challenging because it relies on
establishing proof of a non-event. In practical terms, it is nearly impossible to prove with any
certainty that atrocity deﬁnitely would have occurred but did not directly because of another
intervening factor. Moreover, in the context of measuring impact, the question of what and how
much art can actually do will almost always eventually arise. In other words, how do we know
when art “worked”—and what does “working” mean? Complicating the question of how the
arts might work in fostering change is the problem of accounting for change itself. Change is
largely nonlinear and unpredictable, occurring over time, and the result of myriad efforts on
multiple fronts. How, then, to determine the impact of the arts in atrocity prevention?
First and foremost, it is critical that analysis be grounded in a fundamental
understanding of the complexity of change. In “The Limits of Nonproﬁt Impact,” authors
Ebrahim and Rangan describe two types of theories of change: a focused theory and a complex
theory.6 A focused theory of change has a linear notion of cause and effect. As Ebrahim and
Rangan explain, in the aftermath of atrocity, many forms of emergency response operate on a
more easily measured, focused theory of change, such as getting food and water to survivors.
While the logistics of such relief efforts are often complicated, the logic—and measurable
outcomes—are fairly straightforward: the food arrived or it didn’t.7 A complex theory of
change, on the other hand, has a less deﬁnitive notion of cause and effect and recognizes that
many causal factors outside of the project’s reach are also at play. The distinction is fairly simple
but incredibly important, especially in the context of atrocity prevention. A fairly
straightforward example of the importance of this distinction in impact measurement is arts
programming for children in refugee camps. Using a focused theory of change, if children who
receive more arts programming are surveyed and shown to be happier than students who do
not, it is a success. A complex theory of change, however, recognizes that there are many other
contributing factors beyond the project’s control. The arts programming may well be an
important factor, but it is not the only factor. The complex, multifaceted work of meaningful
and lasting atrocity prevention necessitates complex theories of change.
This is especially true in the case of any exhibition and especially this one, which
included artworks from a wide range of geographic and cultural contexts. It is important to note

5

My deﬁnition of arts initiative is expansive across medium and method; and includes art such as ﬁlm and
photography, painting and drawing, literature and storytelling, dance, theater and performance, murals, music,
and monuments and memorials, arts education programs, arts festivals, exhibits, and community arts collectives.
While perhaps obvious, it is worth underscoring that not all art is intended to engage in the sociopolitical milieu of
the times or enact change. My focus here is on those artworks, projects, and practices that do.

6

Alnoor Ebrahim and V. Kasturi Rangan, “The Limits of Nonproﬁt Impact: A Contingency Framework for Measuring
Social Performance,” (working paper no. 10-099, Harvard Business School, Cambridge, MA, 2010), 22.

7

Ibid., 19.
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that the exhibition was received quite positively by visitors;8 and research shows that such an
experience can result in increased public awareness, which in turn leads to increased public
engagement, strengthened social movements, and, ultimately, social change.9 However, it is all
but impossible to deﬁnitively prove that a visit to an international art exhibition directly
resulted in atrocity prevention—there are simply too many variables. Thus, while audience
response is useful to a certain extent (and it is indeed meaningful that feedback was positive),
this article takes a different methodological approach and instead analyzes the artworks
themselves through the lens of atrocity prevention.
While the ﬁeld of genocide studies lacks sustained research into the role of the arts in
prevention, I draw here from research into the impact of the arts in society more broadly and
combine it with the thorough research into the risk factors for genocide and atrocity. This
overlay of research ﬁelds, combined with ﬁeldwork and interviews, creates the foundation for
investigation into how different arts initiatives have directly mitigated one or more atrocity risk
factors. These established risk factors emerge from a number of well-known and respected
early-warning systems that have been developed over the last decade and draw from a diverse
range of qualitative and quantitative data to predict the risk for genocide, state-led mass killing,
and/or atrocities. In Confronting Evil: Engaging Our Responsibility to Prevent Genocide (2016),
James Waller writes that these different prevention systems are “developed and used by
national governments, militaries and intelligence services, international and regional
organizations, academics, nongovernmental organizations, civil society, think tanks, and private
enterprises” to analyze a range of early warning signs, such as political instability, state fragility,
and civil unrest.10 Such early warning systems include the Atrocity Forecasting Project at
Australian National University,11 the United Nation’s Framework of Analysis for Atrocity Crimes,12
the University of Maryland’s Minorities at Risk Project,13 the Early Warning Project at the
United States Holocaust Memorial Museum,14 and Barbara Harff’s model of risk factors for
genocide and politicide.15 In Confronting Evil, Waller analyzed the speciﬁc risk factors identiﬁed
across these different early warning systems and produced a list of twenty risk factors that he
divided into four different categories: governance, conﬂict history, economic conditions, and
social fragmentation.16 In what follows, I build from Waller’s comprehensive, comparative

8

I interviewed both Kerry Whigham and Tibi Galis for this article (in May and June 2020, respectively), and they each
shared strong positive feedback received from local and international audiences alike (including an array of state
ofﬁcials and government representatives). This anecdotal feedback was corroborated by my July 2019 ﬁeldwork,
during which I observed visitors’ responses to the exhibit and spoke with exhibition staffers about their
experiences observing visitors make their way through the exhibit.

9

Meg McLagan, “Imagining Impact: Documentary Film and the Production of Political Effects,” in Sensible Politics: The
Visual Culture of Nongovernmental Activism, ed. Meg McLagan and Yates McKee (New York: Zone Books, 2012), 312.

10

James Waller, Confronting Evil: Engaging Our Responsibility to Prevent Genocide (New York: Oxford University Press,
2016), 149.

11

“Atrocity Forecasting Project,” Australian National University, accessed July 10, 2020, https://politicsir.cass.anu.edu.au/
research/projects/atrocity-forecasting.

12

United Nations, Framework of Analysis for Atrocity Crimes: A Tool for Prevention (UN Ofﬁce on Genocide Prevention and
the Responsibility to Protect, 2014).

13

“The Minorities at Risk (MAR) Project,” University of Maryland, accessed June 30, 2020, http://www.mar.umd.edu/.

14

“Early Warning Project,” United States Holocaust Memorial Museum and Dartmouth College, accessed June 1, 2020,
https://earlywarningproject.ushmm.org/.

15

Barbara Harff, “Assessing Risk of Genocide and Politicide,” in Peace and Conﬂict: A Global Survey of Armed Conﬂicts,
Self-Determination Movements, and Democracy, ed. Monty G. Marshall and Ted Robert Gurr (College Park: University
of Maryland Press, 2005), 57–61.

16

Waller, Confronting Evil, 151.
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approach to analyze how arts initiatives can and have successfully mitigated risk factors in
three of the four categories: conﬂict history, social fragmentation, and governance.17
Atrocity Prevention in Venice?
Founded in 2008, and with ofﬁces in Buenos Aires, Kampala, New York, and Oświęcim, the
Auschwitz Institute’s genocide and atrocity prevention work predominantly comprises
comprehensive training, education, and technical assistance intended to help states around the
world strengthen their prevention policies and practices, and cultivate regional and
international support and accountability networks.18 Their approach is grounded in the
understanding that genocides can occur anywhere but do not spontaneously occur—rather,
they are the result of “distinct political and social actions” and “preceded by a steady stream of
warning signs.”19 As such, the Auschwitz Institute has worked to “operationalize the
identiﬁcation of critical risk factors, providing ofﬁcials with concrete frameworks to respond to
these warning signs before they can gain deadly momentum, protecting the fundamental
human rights of their populations.”20 The arts are not a primary programmatic area for the
Auschwitz Institute, but Dr. Tibi Galis, executive director of the Auschwitz Institute, explained
in a June 2020 interview that participation in the Biennale was not as much of a departure as it
ﬁrst may seem.21 Because the majority of the Auschwitz Institute’s work tends to occur behind
the scenes, their participation in cultural projects is not always visible, but the organization has
engaged in a number of culturally-focused projects as part of its broader body of prevention
work. This includes ongoing support and technical assistance to the Kenyan National
Committee for Genocide Prevention toward the establishment of the Never Again Memorial in
Nairobi and co-organization of various artistic programs related to memorialization and
atrocity prevention in Kigali, Rwanda (2017), Oświęcim, Poland (2017), and Buenos Aires,
Argentina (2018).22
Periodic attendance at the Biennale over the years had left Galis with the sense of an
untapped opportunity to build connections between the art world and the Auschwitz Institute’s
work in atrocity prevention. Since its inception in 1895, the Venice Biennale has grown to be one
of, if not the most important international contemporary art exhibition and encompasses

17

Due to space limitations, it is beyond the scope of this article to include all four categories, but there has been
substantial research into economic conditions and the impact of the arts. For example, the National Endowment for
the Arts’ Ofﬁce of Research & Analysis and the U.S. Commerce Department’s Bureau of Economic Analysis jointly
produce the U.S. Arts and Cultural Production Satellite Account, which analyzes the size of the arts and cultural
sector and its contributions to the U.S. economy, the number of workers employed by those industries and their
compensation ﬁgures, consumer expenditures on arts and culture, and import/export activity. See “Arts Data
Proﬁle Series,” National Endowment for the Arts, accessed April 24, 2021, https://www.arts.gov/impact/
research/arts-data-proﬁle-series. There is also a plethora of sustainable creative economy development initiatives
across the globe that are aimed at increasing ﬁnancial self-sufﬁciency through arts and craft—the Intuthuko
Embroidery Project in South Africa is a perfect example.

18

The Auschwitz Institute advocates for regional solutions to regional challenges and works to develop effective,
regionally speciﬁc, multidimensional approaches to its work.

19

Deeply rooted in the memory and legacy of Auschwitz, one of the main pillars of the Auschwitz Institute’s work is its
landmark training program, the Raphaël Lemkin Seminar for Genocide Prevention. Held on site at AuschwitzBirkenau, the former Nazi concentration and extermination camp, now memorial and museum, the Seminar draws
from the power of place and lessons from the past to create powerful learning opportunities for participants and to
promote their ongoing commitment to atrocity prevention. See “Lemkin Seminar, Global Edition,” Auschwitz
Institute for the Prevention of Genocide and Mass Atrocities, accessed April 23, 2021, https://
www.auschwitzinstitute.org/what-we-do/global-programs/.

20

Auschwitz Institute for Peace and Reconciliation, Artivism: The Atrocity Prevention Pavilion, 2019 (pamphlet), 2.

21

Tibi Galis, in discussion with the author, June 2020.

22

Ibid.
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multiple exhibitions and events that collectively draw over 500,000 visitors each year.23 The core
art exhibition is curated by that year’s curator and displayed throughout two main exhibition
spaces: a large exhibition hall known as the Giardini, and the Arsenale, a sprawling cluster of
renovated shipyards, warehouses, and sheds adapted to be exhibition spaces. These exhibitions
are accompanied by country pavilions24 and a range of ofﬁcially and unofﬁcially afﬁliated
collateral exhibitions and events. Galis explained that even though the inclusive nature of the
large Biennale did not lend to a coherent focus on human rights, the signiﬁcant amount of
politically-engaged art at the Biennale suggested its potential as a space for the Auschwitz
Institute to reach a wider general audience for their message. At the same time, it presented an
opportunity for the Auschwitz Institute to develop a large public facing project that would
generate exposure for the Institute’s work while also serving as a model for how ministries of
culture could use their access to the arts circuit for atrocity prevention goals. Conversations
with senior Biennale staff were quite positive, and the Auschwitz Institute team began
developing their proposal. Rugoff’s troublingly apolitical proclamation further underscored the
importance of the Auschwitz Institute’s intervention but also raised concerns that such a curator
might not be receptive to an exhibition entirely about the relationship between art and politics.
These concerns proved valid, and the Auschwitz Institute’s proposal for an ofﬁcially afﬁliated
exhibition was rejected. Undeterred, the Auschwitz Institute decided to proceed with an
unafﬁliated collateral exhibition.25
The Auschwitz Institute’s project lead for the exhibition, Dr. Kerry Whigham, worked to
develop an exhibition that highlighted an array of distinctive ways artists and activists have
used creativity to respond to large-scale identity-based violence and mass atrocity in varying
conﬂict contexts and geographic regions across the globe.26 In a May 2020 interview, Whigham
recalled, “a lot of people asked why we hadn’t used the Holocaust as a case study, especially
since we’re the Auschwitz Institute. But the exhibition was taking place in Europe, and there’s
already so much awareness and action around the Holocaust in Europe. It felt important to
choose cases that are less well-known.”27 The exhibition ultimately included works from artists
and activist collectives from six countries, each from a different global region: Argentina, Bosnia
and Herzegovina/US, Canada, Indonesia/Belgium, Iraq, and South Africa. Aptly named
“Artivism,” a portmanteau term combining art and activism that identiﬁes artistic initiatives
and practices using art to impact social change,28 and housed in the Palazzo Dandolo Paulucci,
an opulent old building mere steps from the Grand Canal in the heart of Venice, the Auschwitz

23

The art exhibition typically takes place in odd-numbered years and the architecture, cinema, dance, music, and
theater-focused exhibitions in even-numbered years. Due to the 2020 coronavirus pandemic, the 2020 architecture
exhibition was postponed until 2021, and the art exhibition will also be delayed a year, to 2022. It is unclear if this
is a temporary or permanent shift in schedule.

24

Although all countries that wish to curate an exhibition may do so, the countries with permanent pavilions are
strikingly reﬂective of the international politics of the 1930s and the Cold War. All other countries are assigned
temporary space, for which they pay per square foot.

25

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)’s proposal was similarly rejected, and they also
chose to do an unafﬁliated collateral exhibition.

26

Two Italian curators, Luca Berta and Francesco Giubilei, who together run VeniceArtFactory, a local Venetian
curatorial and exhibition production business, helped with the practical aspects of designing and installing the
exhibition. They were also supported by Auschwitz Institute staff and local ﬁxers in Venice.

27

Kerry Whigham, in discussion with the author, May 2020.

28

The term artivism has been in circulation since at least 1997 when, following a gathering of Chicano artists from East
Los Angeles and the Zapatistas in Chiapas, Mexico, the terms artivist and artivism were used by East LA artists
Quetzal, Ozomatli, and Mujeres de Maiz, among others, to describe various events, actions, and artworks. The
term is now commonly used in and by protest movements and in some academic writing to encompass a fairly
wide range of artistic initiatives aimed at impacting social change (see, for example, Chela Sandoval’s scholarship
on Chicano/a art activism and M. K. Asante Jr.’s on Black art activism). Chela Sandoval and Guisela Latorre,
“Chicana/o Artivism: Judy Baca’s Digital Work with Youth of Color,” in Learning Race and Ethnicity ed. Anna
Everett (Boston: MIT Press, 2007), M. K. Asante Jr., It’s Bigger Than Hip Hop (London: St. Martin’s Press, 2009).
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Institute’s exhibit ofﬁcially opened to the public on May 9, 2019.29 In what follows, I offer a brief
overview of the exhibit, then turn to scholarship on mitigating risk factors related to atrocity in
order to further develop my analysis of art’s role in prevention.

Image 1. Artivism entrance, courtesy of the author.

Artivism: The Atrocity Prevention Pavilion
The ﬁrst room of Artivism, and the one through which visitors entered, was designed to
resemble a cold, bureaucratic waiting room, reminiscent of those so often faced by genocide
survivors and asylum seekers. This drab grey room was small and cramped, with hard plastic
and metal chairs lined against two walls, a ticket dispenser, and a sign directly across from the
entryway that read:
You have entered the waiting room.
Take a number from the machine.
Have a seat.
Wait for your number to be called to enter the exhibition.
This art experience starts here.
As ticket numbers appeared on a screen on the wall above the chairs, so too did the
numbers often associated with genocide: “Holocaust: 6,000,000;” “Srebrenica: 8,373;” “Rwanda:
800,000.” The room conveyed a sense of powerlessness, control, and selection. By asking visitors
to watch for their entrance numbers amidst genocide death rates, curators placed visitors
directly alongside the dead, thus reminding viewers that they are no different—they, too, could
be a victim of genocide—and highlighting the dehumanizing nature of framing humans, and
their deaths, in vacant statistical terms.

29

It closed on November 24, 2019 when the Biennale ended.
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Image 2. Artivism "Waiting Room," courtesy of the author.

Image 3. The Artivism artists speak, courtesy of the author.

From the waiting room, visitors progressed to another small room; this one, dark with
several chairs arranged to face three large screens. In direct contrast with the previous room,
this room emphasized the individual human experience. A twenty-three-minute-long video
installation played across the three screens, with the artists featured in the exhibition positioned
sitting facing the camera against a black backdrop. Although each artist was interviewed alone,
the video installation was edited so as to give the impression that the artists were in dialogue
with each other as they gave historical background, outlined the atrocities experienced in their
respective countries, and described how they used their art to impact change. Whigham said
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that it was important that visitors encountered the artists ﬁrst—met them, heard their stories,
and heard them talk about their art, without necessarily knowing what their art was explaining:
We wanted visitors to understand that these artists were
normal people who used the tools that they have, which is art,
to do something to transform their society. Everyone has a
responsibility and the capacity to contribute to responding to
past violence and responding to future violence from whatever
position they have, whatever skills they have.30
The artworks were displayed throughout rooms, the smaller of which was accessible
through a side doorway from the video installation. This room held just one artwork, ŠTO TE
NEMA [translated: “Why are you not here?”], a memorial for the 8,373 Bosnian Muslims
murdered in the Srebrenica genocide of July 1995 created by Bosnian artist Aida Šehović.

Image 4. STO TE NEMA as displayed in Artivism, courtesy of the author.

30

Kerry Whigham, in discussion with the author, May 2020.
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The rest of the artwork was displayed in a large room overlooking the canal. Upon
entering, visitors ﬁrst encountered a small selection of testimonial artworks and objects on loan
from the Canadian National Centre for Truth and Reconciliation archives.31 These were
displayed alongside embroidered tapestries from the Intuthuko Embroidery Project, a women’s
community empowerment collective in Daveyton, South Africa, that uses embroidery to engage
social issues and communicate about the traumas experienced and still carried in the aftermath
of the long Apartheid regime in South Africa.32

Image 5. Objects from the Canadian TRC archives as displayed in Artivism, courtesy of
the author.
31

Canada’s truth commission is the ﬁrst and only commission to date to accept art as part of their testimonial process.

32

South Africa’s oppressive authoritarian system of institutionalized racial segregation, known as Apartheid, lasted
from 1948 until the early 1990s.
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Image 6. The Intuthuko Embroidery Project tapestries as displayed in Artivism, courtesy
of the author.

Yazidi Masks, an art installation made by Iraqi artist Rebin Chalak Ismael in response to
the ongoing violence against the Yazidis, a small ethnic-religious group in Northern Iraq against
whom the terrorist group known as ISIS33 has been committing genocide since 2014, was
displayed by the windows. Located along the opposite wall were two pieces by Elisabeth Ida
Mulyani, an Indonesian artist based in Belgium whose work addresses how the 1965 mass
killings of roughly 1.5 million people, due to their alleged ties to communism, continues to
impact Indonesian life both in country and in the refugee diaspora.

33

ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria) started as an al Qaeda splinter group and is also known as ISIL (Islamic State in
Iraq and the Levant) and IS (Islamic State).
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Image 7. Yazidi Masks as displayed in Artivism, courtesy of the author.

Image 8. Oleh-oleh, courtesy of the author.

The remaining contribution was by the Argentinian Grupo de Arte Callejero (GAC/
Street Artist group). When democratic governance was reestablished following Argentina’s
horriﬁcally violent 1976–1983 military dictatorship, a number of laws and policies were swiftly
passed granting impunity to guilty military leaders. In response, GAC began creating fake signs
they then posted throughout the city in order to mark the homes of still-unpunished
perpetrators, make visible the kidnapping, torture, and murder that had occurred, and
denounce the crimes against humanity. Several of these signs were featured in Artivism,
alongside photos, a video documentary, and a map installation.
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Image 10. Final room, courtesy of the author.
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Artivism culminated in a room intended to encourage visitors to reﬂect on their own
role in mass atrocity prevention and the protection of human rights and to explore different
ways they could take action. Different organizations and individuals taking an array of
approaches to atrocity prevention were proﬁled on the walls, and visitors were presented with
concrete steps they could take to become more involved. These steps were divided into three
categories based on time commitment: sixty seconds, sixty minutes, or sixty days. These actions
ranged from taking a minute to reﬂect on a time the visitor had been discriminated against due
to their identity and a time when they had discriminated against someone else because of their
identity, taking one hour before the next election to research what each candidate has proposed
to do to protect the rights of a vulnerable identity group where the visitor lived, and researching
and volunteering for an organization that actively protects the rights of a vulnerable group for
sixty days. Having previously introduced visitors to the lived realities of mass atrocity and
shown how artists and activists have used art to respond to widespread violence and help
prevent its recurrence, this emphasis on the importance of collective action functioned as a
powerful culminating message.
Taken as a whole, Artivism conveyed a strikingly coherent message about the
quintessential role of the arts in the prevention of systematic violence and provided an array of
diverse examples of how art may be used as a grassroots tool for addressing political violence
and human rights abuses—and for advancing peacebuilding, transitional justice efforts, and
prevention efforts. In what follows, I explore how the arts can and have successfully mitigated
risk factors in three of the four categories outlined by Waller: conﬂict history, social
fragmentation, and governance.
Conﬂict History
A history of genocide and atrocity is one of the more notably important indicators for future
atrocity. Unfortunately, it’s also one that can never be entirely eliminated—the past cannot be
undone. Identity-related tensions and legacies of vengeance or group grievances often continue
to exist after the conﬂict has ended, resulting in deep cultural cleavages that are kept alive and
passed down through generations. Waller writes that group grievances grow out of the “painful
legacies of groups that have been denied autonomy, self-determination, or political
independence; subjected to institutionalized persecution, repression, oppression, or political
exclusion; and victimized by nationalist political rhetoric or scapegoating.”34 These tensions can
also be further exacerbated by a past record of serious violations of human rights and laws that
has not been adequately or transparently addressed. These experiences leave the “aggrieved
groups feeling as the ‘other,’ outside of the nation, voiceless and powerless in the face of their
imposed marginalization.”35 These tensions and legacies are perpetuated by what John Paul
Lederach has identiﬁed as the “either-or” categories that are often a deﬁning characteristic after
conﬂict: “We are right. They are wrong. We were violated. They are the violators. We are the
liberators. They are oppressors. Our intentions are good. Theirs are bad… You are with us or
against us.”36 These tensions and legacies continue to feed into the ongoing fermentation of
cultural trauma. While individual trauma focuses on the impact on a singular person of an
event or series of events, cultural trauma refers to those injurious events that impact entire
communities (even as the speciﬁc details of experience may vary across individual). Sociologist
Jeffrey Alexander writes that “cultural trauma occurs when members of a collectivity feel they
have been subjected to a horrendous event that leaves indelible marks upon their group
consciousness, marking their memories forever and changing their future identity in
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fundamental and irrevocable ways.”37 Such cultural trauma can pass along unhealed
psychological and social wounds that impact the formation of individual and group identities
for generations, leaving recovering societies especially vulnerable to future iterations of
atrocity.38 Without meaningful reparations and rebuilding efforts, these legacies of conﬂict,
grievance, and trauma put a country at risk for future cycles of violence. The impact of the
Canadian Indian Residential School System and its corollary cultural trauma provides
testament to the importance of this risk category.
For over a hundred years and across multiple generations of families, Canada
implemented a residential boarding school system intended to, in the words of Duncan
Campbell Scott, the top Indian Agent in Canada when the school system was implemented,
“take the Indian out of the child.”39 Started in the 1880s, funded by the Canadian government’s
Indian Affairs and Northern Development, and run by Christian churches, at least 150,000
indigenous children were forcibly taken from their families and placed into residential religious
assimilation schools, where they were forbidden from using their own names, speaking their
own languages, wearing their own clothing, or maintaining cultural practices, religions, and
relationships. Residential school survivors began implementing legal campaigns to force the
government and churches to acknowledge the devastating harm and provide reparations in the
1980s, and the program was ﬁnally phased out in the 1990s (the last residential school closed in
1996).40
When it ended, its devastating toll on Canada’s indigenous peoples was almost beyond
comprehension. In response to ongoing calls for redress, the federal government ﬁnally issued a
Statement of Reconciliation that acknowledged the abuse and created the multi-million-dollar
Aboriginal Healing Foundation in 1998, and an out-of-court mechanism for determining
compensation called the Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) process began in 2003. The
Indian Residential Schools Settlement Agreement (IRSSA)—notably, it is the largest class action
settlement in Canadian history to date—was reached in 2007. It formally recognized the harm
done to Indigenous peoples by the residential schools and established a multi-billion-dollar
fund to intended help survivors in their recovery. $60 million of these funds were set aside for a
ﬁve-year truth and reconciliation commission intended to provide an opportunity for survivors
to give testimony, raise public awareness, and create a “comprehensive historical record” on the
residential schools.41
When Linda Young, a Plains Cree Indian from Saskatchewan and fourth generation
survivor and ward of Saint Anthony’s Indian residential school, located in Onion Lake,
Saskatchewan, was preparing for her ADR hearing in October 2006, she did not want to forget
anything. The process was known to be very difﬁcult and hostile, and she had heard that people
were being challenged on everything they said. She decided to type out her testimony and read
so she could not be thrown off in the moment. Her testimony was 83 pages long. In it, she
described the “sanitizing” process she endured upon arrival. She described her name being
discarded and being known only as a number—number 47—for many years. She described how
the children were forced into constant prayer and spent so much time on their knees that they

37

Jeffrey C. Alexander, “Toward a Theory of Cultural Trauma,” in Cultural Trauma and Collective Identity, ed. Jeffrey C.
Alexander et al. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004), 1.

38

Waller, Confronting Evil, 168.

39

Paul Barnsley, “ADR Process Launched,” Windspeaker Publication 21, no. 9 (2003), 11, accessed June 10, 2020, https://
www.ammsa.com/publications/windspeaker/adr-process-launched.

40

The Roman Catholic Church was responsible for 60% of schools, the Anglican Church for 25%, and the United and
Presbyterian Churches for 15%. See J. R. Miller, “Residential Schools in Canada,” The Canadian Encyclopedia,
accessed June 10, 2020, https://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/residential-schools.

41

Tabitha Marshall, “Indian Residential Schools Settlement Agreement,” The Canadian Encyclopedia, accessed June 10,
2020, https://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/indian-residential-schools-settlement-agreement.

© 2021

Genocide Studies and Prevention 15, no. 1 https://doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.15.1.1796.

82

Murphy

developed thick, white calluses—recognized and referred to as “residential school knees.” Her
hearing lasted twelve hours.42
After the ADR process, Young wanted to place her story in a safe and respectful place.
She gathered cloth bags that had been given to her by her mother and bags belonging to her
children and cut them into small squares. She printed her ADR testimony on onion skin paper,
then tore the pages into strips. Young took the crushed strips of story and, along with one sage
leaf each, nestled them into the cut cloth squares to make little bundles, akin to the many
tobacco ties she had made over the years. Young made ties until she ran out of story. She used
the seams leftover from the cloth bags to tie the bundles, then dipped the ties into wax to seal
them and cauterize the emotions within. Young reﬂected: “Each tie was a small bundle that
wrapped painful memories in love, prayer and song.”43 She then took the long string of ties,
totaling 250, to form a traditional Cree baby swing, called a wêwêpison. She explained:
Metaphorically speaking, the wêwêpison represents a
nurturing environment where culture and language was
practiced in the care and raising of a baby—for example, the
structure of the swing created a secure and safe environment.
The swinging/swaying of the baby swing represents the
unborn swinging and swaying in the amniotic ﬂuid (water of
life) in the womb. Baby swings were common in First Nations
homes; songs/lullabies were sung in our language as we swing
the babies to sleep. When we attended the residential schools,
we were taken out of the safety of the baby swing, stripped of
our culture, our language that guided us and helped us
negotiate our nehiyaw environment, our nehiyaw pimatisiwin
—our Cree life, and our nehiyaw wiyasiwewina—our Cree
laws and teachings. The swing represents giving back the
teachings to the little ones who were taken from their mothers,
aunties, grandmothers.44

Image 11. Linda Young's wêwêpison and quilt, image courtesy of the author.
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Image 12. The wêwêpison ties, image courtesy of the author.

Young’s swing was empty to represent the babies taken from families and placed in the
residential schools. Because the wêwêpison also requires a blanket, Young used onion skin
paper to make a blanket that hung on the wall behind the swing. The blanket was a patchwork
of two poems, one written by Young about her experience being in the residential schools and
the other by her daughter Nahanni about being the child of a survivor. This piece—the
wêwêpison and blanket—became Young’s testimonial submission to the Canadian TRC
hearings process.45 When Young granted her permission for it to be included in the Artivism
Biennale, it was ﬁrst time the piece had left the National Centre for Truth and Reconciliation
archives.46
In many ways, this piece highlights the complex and multifaceted role art can play in
the atrocity prevention process. Meaningful and effective reconciliation necessitates the
acknowledgment of injustices and wrongdoings, the addressal of the root causes of the conﬂict,
a recognition of suffering, spaces for healing, and the rewriting of narratives to acknowledge the
truths of the past.47 In the aftermath of conﬂict and atrocity, art making can function as a
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powerful practice of healing, reﬂecting, and cultivating of personal and communal narratives.48
For Young, the making of the art aided in the healing of her cultural trauma related to decades
of devastating, systematic violence inﬂicted upon her, her family, and her community. She
described her art’s creation as a reparative act, stating, “I cannot underestimate or forget the
deadly impact residential school education has had on my sisters, brothers, aunties, uncles, my
mother, my father and step-father, my grandparents and great-grandparents.” She continued, “I
view my art as medicine. Art helps us heal… I visit a fractured time in history and through art
tell a story through the application and handling of the medium. In doing so I am helping heal
the generations affected by this incident.”49
The process of sharing art can also be reparative. Waller writes that an important aspect
of prevention is for societies to “have in place functioning, open, transparent dispute resolution
or transitional justice mechanisms to address legacies of vengeance and grievance” and to
encourage remembrance, teaching, and understanding.50 The Canadian TRC provided an open
forum through which survivors could address grievances and share their testimony, including
artistically if so desired, creating a space for art to do what Clara Ramirez-Barat has called the
necessary work of “bridging the gap between justice processes and the societies in which they
take place.”51 Such work can assist in the addressal of legacies of violent conﬂict and encourage
collective preventive processes of remembrance and healing. Young’s art was a means through
which to powerfully and effectively convey the deeply painful loss of family, language, culture,
ceremony, and identity and to speak directly to the multigenerational legacy of trauma. The
public sharing of art also provided an opportunity to engage in the shared processes of
remembrance, learning, and grieving that are so essential to reconciliation and prevention. In
our June 2020 conversation, Young described how impressed she was with people’s bravery and
honesty and how open other survivors were with such painful raw stories and memories. Even
though she wanted to leave, she was inspired to honor their honesty and bravery with her
own.52 Such opportunities to share stories and hear the stories of others can facilitate a collective
reﬂection on the impact of past violence, the breaking down of cultural barriers, and the shared
imagining of new futures. Michelle LeBaron writes: “Cultures are like underground rivers that
run through our lives and relationships, giving us messages that shape our perceptions,
attributions, judgements and ideas of self and other.”53 As such, and as scholars have argued,
dialogue is a necessary component of long-term peacebuilding processes because it enables
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people to come together to listen to each other and facilitates the shifting of potentially
damaging cultural perceptions, judgments, and ideas.54
This experience of healing through art making and sharing expanded even further
when Young’s piece was displayed in the Auschwitz Institute’s Artivism Pavilion. Young found
the experience extremely powerful, reﬂecting: “Seeing people be moved by all of the stories of
atrocity, it felt very important. That we were working collectively to share a story that is
important for the world to hear.”55 She went on to describe a powerful conversation she had at
the exhibit’s opening. The Ambassador of Canada to Italy came to the event, and when she met
Young, she shared that she had not known much about the Indian Residential Schools until she
saw Young’s work in the exhibit.56 This point of connection—of learning and listening across
difference—is incredibly valuable. As seen here and elsewhere, art making and sharing can
function as a reparative form of processing and healing cultural trauma related to
institutionalized persecution, repression, oppression, and it is also a mechanism of
remembrance and educating about past atrocities that ﬁnds purchase on multiple levels:
personal, community-based, national, and international. In this capacity, it educates about past
atrocities, correcting the public narrative and creating bridges between survivors and the public.
As Waller writes: “[C]onﬂict history in a state or region is a nonmodiﬁable risk factor for the
onset of future genocide—if it happened, it cannot be unhappened. What can be modiﬁed,
however, are the ways in which that history is remembered, taught, processed, and
understood.”57 Violence interrupts the telling of the story and rips apart social fabric. Art can
function as thread to begin to stitch it back together.
Social Fragmentation
The arts can also help mitigate risk factors related to what Waller refers to as social
fragmentation, or when societies split into different identity groups that have little or almost no
interaction or association with each other. Waller writes: “Where social cohesion can unite a
people and strengthen a society, social fragmentation splinters a people, reduces the resiliency
of a society, and places it at increased risk for violent or genocidal conﬂict.”58 These identitybased social divisions can be especially corrosive, and they are easily susceptible to escalation.
Hate speech, for example, can promote the progressive dehumanization of, and then violence
toward, another identity group. As Elazar Barkan notes: “[C]onﬂict between groups is often
transgenerational, and the historical animosity remains if it is not addressed. Fear and desire for
revenge often linger and inform the policies of the groups involved and are prone to be
awakened by nationalists and fundamentalists as carriers of xenophobia.”59 Political instability,
demographic pressures and unequal access to basic goods and services between identity groups
(even just the perception of differing treatment and access) can all be strong drivers of conﬂict
related to social fragmentation. In order to effectively mitigate risk factors associated with social
fragmentation, Waller argues that states have a responsibility to constructively acknowledge
and meaningfully accept and support diverse social identities in such a manner that also
cultivates a more inclusive superordinate social identiﬁcation as an “us” rather than many small
separate “thems” that mistrust and compete with each other.60
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The arts have a critical role in this process. In the most extensive and comprehensive
research to date into the impact of the arts, Americans for the Arts (AFTA) found that, across a
wide range of arts projects and programs, participation helped reduce isolation, encourage
cooperation, and build community networks. Nine out of ten participants said the arts had
increased their sense of connection to community; nine out of ten arts participants also
described meeting new people and making new friends through their arts experiences. Finally,
the AFTA research data also showed that arts participation helped to resolve conﬂicts and
increase tolerance and cross-cultural understanding.61 AFTA’s research is focused on the arts in
the United States, but its breadth and depth makes it an invaluable resource, all the more so
because similar research on a broad international or transnational scale does not yet exist.62
Furthermore, it is important to note that AFTA’s research results, which highlight the positive
effect of arts participation on social cohesion, increased partnerships and intercultural
understanding, and reduced fear, are corroborated across numerous, albeit more localized
international projects.63 Taken as a whole, these studies and projects emphasize the essential
role of the arts in encouraging social cohesion and positive intercultural community dialogue,
which are essential to atrocity prevention.
In the Artivism exhibit, this was powerfully exempliﬁed by Bosnian artist Aida
Šehović’s nomadic memorial, ŠTO TE NEMA, which directly engages with the ongoing legacies
of conﬂict history and social fragmentation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and highlights the
ability of the arts to address risk factors associated with atrocity and social fragmentation. After
Bosnia and Herzegovina declared independence from Yugoslavia in 1992,64 increasing ethno61
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national divisions soon led the new country into war, with violence predominantly occurring
between the three principal identity groups of Bosnia and Herzegovina: Bosnian Muslims
(Bosniaks), Bosnian Serbs, and Croats. In July 1995, escalating violence and unrest forced
thousands of Bosniaks to ﬂee to the United Nations Safe Area for protection. Bosnian Serbs then
attacked the Safe Area, and, after relocating most women and girls away from the Safe Area,
proceeded to murder the remaining 8,373 men and boys there seeking refuge.65 This massacre
was ofﬁcially ruled genocide by the International Court of Justice in 2006, but the Bosnia and
Herzegovina of today remains deeply segregated, with Bosnian Muslims, Bosnian Serbs, and
Croats tending to live, work, and learn only with those from within their own ethnic group.66
Each group has their own education system, and while they have similar math and science
curricula, they learn different versions of history, each positioning itself as the victim of the
other groups. Because there is no consensus among the major ethnic groups about the violence
of the 1990s, and Bosnian Serb leaders continue to deny the genocide, these ethnic divisions and
tensions continue to be reinforced today.67
Seen in Artivism in a dormant state, ŠTO TE NEMA is a nomadic memorial that honors
the memory of the 8,372 Bosnian Muslims murdered in the Srebrenica genocide. In the exhibit,
visitors encountered large metal shelves stacked with thousands of the small porcelain cups
traditionally used for coffee service, an important cultural ritual in Bosnia and Herzegovina—
but one day each year, ŠTO TE NEMA is brought to life in the public square of a new city
around the world. Every July 11, the anniversary of the genocide, Šehović invites passersby in
the square to ﬁll the cups with coffee and place them with the other accumulating cups,
collectively contributing to the building of the memorial.68 As they pour, volunteers educate
participants about the genocide, raising awareness and expanding communities of knowledge.
The coffee remains undrunk, in memory of the victims.
When Šehović lays the empty cups down in an urban square and invites others to ﬁll
them, she invites them to participate in a shared process of learning, remembering, mourning,
and healing. As survivors gift cups to her memorial, it expands to include the voices and
memories of thousands. When Šehović ﬁrst did the performance in 2006, she had 932 cups,
given to her by the members of the Women of Srebrenica Association from local families in the
region. Today, almost 15 years later, she has 7,714 cups, with the eventual goal of collecting
8,373 cups, one for each victim. Šehović explained the importance of the cups in a June 2020
interview, stating:
I wanted you to feel overwhelmed and to somehow bring the
idea of a number closer to you, because we talk about these
numbers, and it’s like we forget we’re talking about human
lives. We say 127 or 3,056—but we are talking about human
lives. And it drives me crazy when people say ‘over 8,000
people’… I know why they say that—because we don’t know
the precise numbers. We think it’s 8,273, but we’re not positive.
But it can’t be ‘over 8,000’—it’s not apples. It’s humans. So, let’s
use the numbers.69
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Stacked as they were in Artivism exhibit, on metal shelves reminiscent of those used to
hold bones and other objects awaiting forensic analysis, the cups really did seem to represent
the dead. Non-distinct from a distance, when viewers stepped closer the cups were
recognizably individual, possessed of their own unique characteristics: a splash of delicate
blush-colored ﬂowers, ﬁne vertical lines, trimmed in gold, polka dots, vibrant blue with an
etched white design. Each one of these cups represents an individual person, a person who
could have been sharing coffee with family and friends but was instead killed. With the cups
serving as reminders of individual lives lost in Herzegovina and the poured—but not drunk—
coffee of the ongoing felt presence of their absence, ŠTO TE NEMA is a powerful reminder that
such genocidal loss is comprised of many individual stories and lost loved ones whose memory
must continue to be recognized and honored.

Image 13. STO TE NEMA, image courtesy of the author

The telling, listening to, and revising of stories is essential to the restoration of fractured
relationships and the development of more peaceful communities. As Cynthia Cohen writes,
telling and listening to stories is essential to the peacebuilding process because it is through the
sharing of stories that “former enemies come to understand each other’s experiences, the
meaning each community attaches to historical events, and their moral sensibilities.”70 This
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shared work of telling and listening is “critical to coexistence work because collective narratives
are closely linked with social identities. To change identities, we must revise our stories, and
revising stories can create social, emotional and intellectual spaces for more nuanced
understandings of identity.”71 This is further corroborated by another AFTA study that found
that participation in arts activities markedly increases tolerance. For example, in a study of US
high schoolers, AFTA found that students who participated in the arts were forty percent more
likely to have friends from different racial groups and twenty-nine percent less likely to think it
was acceptable to make racist remarks. The research also emphasized the crucial role of the arts
in bringing together children from immigrant and resident populations and found that arts
programming created a common bridge that promoted friendship, empathy and mutual trust.72
Again, while this research was not done through the lens of genocide prevention, these results
nonetheless have powerful implications for mitigating risk factors associated with genocide and
mass atrocity because they emphasize the power of the arts to encourage people to literally and
ﬁguratively come together to listen and be listened to, to engage side by side in shared
activities, and to cultivate community, self-reﬂection, and empathy for others—all of which are
necessary to the diminution of social fragmentation and growth of social cohesion. Along
similar lines, Rachel Kerr argues that “it is precisely the idea that the engagement is openended, and not predetermined, that is valuable. The arts can accommodate difference, not seek
a single didactic ‘truth.’”73 This ability to create a pathway to meaningful dialogue and learning
across difference is essential to prevention.
Ending cycles of violence—whether it is recovering from previous conﬂict or
preventing future conﬂict—necessitates functioning relations grounded in connection and
support—both felt and practiced—between those in governance and society and between the
identity groups of which society is comprised. ŠTO TE NEMA, exhibited in Artivism in
dormant format, is a reminder that reconciliation and prevention are intricately linked,
multifaceted processes that rely upon increased and shared understanding, trust, and respect to
effectively dismantle entrenched grievances and social fragmentation. As Sarah Madison writes,
reconciliation is both process and goal and requires “a change of values, a willingness to
venture beyond the promotion of rigid identities that result in war and cultivate a new attitude
towards others.” This is the basis from which to address the “major material and structural
challenges that so often cause post-conﬂict societies to slide back into war…”74 This is akin to
what John Lederach has called the “moral imagination”—the ability to be grounded in the
realities of the present while imagining and working toward a different world.75 Artistic
interventions like ŠTO TE NEMA can play a critical role in this process because they encourage
people to stop, listen, learn, and connect. In our conversation, Šehović reﬂected: “Art can be the
way toward preventing violence. For people who feel safe and comfortable, whose life is safe
and comfortable, it’s really, really hard for them to understand, without disrupting their comfort
and safety, to understand, even in a small form, what it means to not be safe, what it means to
be hurt.”76 However, she believes that artistic interventions like ŠTO TE NEMA have a very
unique role in making that violence accessible. Šehović explained:
If you are someone who has never felt unsafe, has never felt
that your identity has been threatened, if you hold that cup in
your hand, you are connected forever. You can never tell me
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you don’t know. Your understanding of Srebrenica and
hopefully all genocide and atrocities changes, because here you
were holding a cup that represents one human who was killed
because of who they were.77
This intimate connection to the past, this ability to hold it in one’s hands and to
understand it as an individual life lost, can create shared spaces of remembering and mourning,
listening and learning, and envisioning and committing to more peaceful futures. As Rachel
Kerr argues, effective reconciliation requires the “ongoing processes of building relationships
and mutual respect that are crucial to social repair.”78 And while the arts are and should not be
considered a replacement for more formal policy-based processes, “the arts can provide a
‘creative pathway’ to reconciliation, breaking silences, transforming relationships,
communicating across cultural divides and providing a means of dealing with trauma and
restoring human dignity.”79 Effective atrocity prevention requires the meaningful
encouragement and development of social cohesion, aided by efforts to imagine and cultivate
different sets of relationships and ways of thinking and being in community. This is a goal and
process to which arts initiatives can make a profound contribution.
Governance
The ﬁnal category of risk factors for violent or genocidal conﬂict addressed here is that of
governance. Waller broadly deﬁnes governance as how authority is exercised, inclusive of how
governments are selected, monitored, and replaced, their capacity to develop and implement
policy, and the degree to which citizens trust and respect the state and its representing
institutions.80 The ﬁve risk factors Waller outlines—regime type, legitimacy deﬁcit, weakness of
state structures, identity-based polar factionalism, and systematic acts of discrimination—have
far reaching impact. Without strong and functioning structures, states cannot provide basic
services and uphold the law. People will not trust the state if it is not seen as functional,
legitimate, law-abiding, and impartial. Governmental factionalism and discrimination against
identity groups, including through such actions as the removal of civil liberties, arbitrary
detention or imprisonment, or unequal access to education is deeply corrosive to efﬁcacy, trust,
and public safety.
Obviously, arts initiatives are unlikely to instantly transform a dictatorship into a
democracy, but they are remarkably powerful in calling attention to corruption and impunity
and inﬂuencing public opinion about the state and ofﬁcial processes.81 As Whigham writes:
Although it may be true that the most visible and widely
discussed aspects of dealing with the past—from truth
commissions to criminal prosecution to reparations to
institutional reform—require the participation of governmental
actors, the fact remains that most of these processes initiate
through a movement from the grassroots that begins long
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before the state opts to assume responsibility for these
projects.82
Put simply, those who implement oppressive, violent power systems are unlikely to
press for their own accountability, just as those who directly beneﬁt from those systems are
unlikely to lead the charge for their change. But arts initiatives, especially at the grassroots level,
can be an invaluable and powerful means of calling out atrocity and human rights abuses,
activating dialogue, educating others, and demanding change. In Canada, Young’s artwork
conveys the damages done to generations of indigenous communities through systematic stateled discrimination and takes part in a public reckoning and healing process. Meanwhile, GAC,
in Argentina, is an excellent example of the role artistic activists can play in repudiating statesupported impunity and demanding change. Their creative efforts, along with that of other
activist groups, strengthened Argentina’s then-young democracy and helped bring about
change in Argentina, which eventually revoked the impunity laws and reopened perpetrator
trials. The Trial of the Juntas was the ﬁrst largescale trial by a democratic government against a
former military dictatorial government of the same country in all of Latin America.83
Mulyani’s artwork addresses the ongoing need for reparations in Indonesia, where the
genocide has yet to be formally acknowledged by the Indonesian government, nor have there
been formal reparations efforts. Of her two pieces in Artivism, the ﬁrst, “Oleh-oleh” [Souvenir],
is a sculptural and sound installation comprised of a row of thirteen ears displayed on the wall
to commemorate thirteen activists who were kidnapped in the 1990s for dissent against the
dictatorial regime that began in 1965.84 Her second piece, “Supervivere,” is a photography series
depicting the lives of a number of Indonesian exiles currently living in Belgium, Sweden, and
the Netherlands after their citizenship was revoked and they were made stateless by the
Indonesian government in 1965. Works such as these call powerful attention to ongoing silences
and erasures and point to the pervasive impact still experienced throughout the Indonesian
diaspora decades after the genocide.
Art initiatives can also bring attention to ongoing human rights abuses that have been
insufﬁciently addressed by the national and international community. For example, Chalak’s
face castings address the ongoing ISIS violence against the Yazidi people in Iraq (including
forced conversion to Islam or murder, the kidnapping of Yazidi boys to be ISIS ﬁghters, and the
kidnapping, rape, and nonconsensual marriage of Yazidi women and girls). Wanting to share
the women’s stories and raise international awareness and condemnation of this ongoing
genocide but worried that identifying the women would put them women at further risk,
Chalak began casting masks of their faces as a form of representation without identiﬁcation. He
takes these masks around the world, creating opportunities for people to try on the masks
themselves, giving powerful new meaning to the concept of putting yourself in someone else’s
shoes. Chalak has created 23 masks to date, all of which were displayed in Artivism woven
through and beyond a metal cage reminiscent of those in which many Yazidi women have been
held. Across these different examples, the artworks exhibited in Artivism highlight arts’ role in
demanding governmental accountability and an end to corruption, contributing to helping
rebuild society’s trust, and strengthening transition, justice, and prevention processes.
Conclusion
Art is not a panacea for violent conﬂict, and atrocity prevention is complex, ongoing work.
Indeed, and as scholars have noted, there is no guarantee that art will necessarily lead to
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decreased violence and increased cohesion.85 Art is adiaphorous; it can have positive and
negative effects (there are examples throughout history of when the arts have been used in
service of the perpetuation of violence and not its cessation); it can also have no effect.86 As
Cohen writes: “Whether intentionally or not, creative initiatives can… reinforce power
inequities, retraumatize communities, perpetuate harmful stereotypes, trivialize suffering,
reactivate hostilities and demean sacred cultural forms.”87 But, she continues, “when care is
taken to minimize risks of harm…. artistic and cultural processes can be crafted to engage
individuals and communities in transforming consciousness, building relationships and
reimagining the future.”88 The Artivism exhibit, in its collection and range, provides a canvasing
of multiple and directed creative interventions that allow for a kind of understanding of atrocity
as a global problem. It isn’t limited to region, issue, language, or religion; conﬂict impacts across
multiple generations; and without meaningful prevention efforts, genocide and atrocity will
continue to remain a very real risk. However, Artivism effectively created a space for audiences
to bear witness89 to survival and engage in what has in scholarship at times been called “ethical
spectatorship,”90 “seeing for,”91 “empathic vision,”92 “ethical imagination,”93 and “ethical
vision,”94 and then consider their own role in prevention. As noted earlier, the importance of
this should not be underestimated: increased public awareness leads to increased support and
calls for change, followed by action and actual change. Furthermore, it modeled for
governments how they might learn from, engage with, and support different arts-based
prevention efforts in their own countries. It also highlighted our collective responsibility to
actively participate in prevention efforts. This lesson seemed especially powerful in the context
of the Venice Biennale networks of power and prestige, and it brought to mind what Michael
Rothberg has called the implicated subject. Rothberg writes:
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Implicated subjects occupy positions aligned with power and
privilege without being themselves direct agents of harm; they
contribute to, inhabit, inherit, or beneﬁt from regimes of
domination but do not originate or control such regimes. An
implicated subject is neither a victim nor a perpetrator, but
rather a participant in histories and social formations that
generate the positions of victim and perpetrator, and yet in
which most people do not occupy such clear-cut roles.95
Implicated subjects are not perpetrators, but they beneﬁt from and participate in
structures of inequality. By not just asking audiences to take seriously the question of how they
might actively contribute to prevention efforts, but also giving them concrete examples of how
they could contribute from and within their own communities in just sixty seconds, sixty
minutes, or sixty days, the Artivism exhibit underscored that, just as we are all participants in
intersecting and overlocking histories and social formations, we all have a shared responsibility
to actively participate in the prevention of genocide and mass atrocity.
Given the sheer numbers of international visitors to the Biennale, this message was
especially important. The exhibit asks visitors to not look away—from the art and the speciﬁc
conﬂict contexts from which each piece originated, but most importantly from the urgency of
the call for a shared commitment in prevention. Artivism brings prevention work to audiences
who may have had very little prior contact with the ﬁeld and asks visitors to take the work
home with them. It extends the reach of the artworks displayed therein, ﬁnding for them new
audiences and broader cross-cultural awareness. But Artivism does not just display powerful
examples of atrocity prevention, the exhibit also actively contributes to prevention by arguing
that meaningful genocide and atrocity prevention will take each and every one of us and asking
for a commitment to supporting and cultivating prevention efforts all across the globe. The
power and reach of this ask are profound.
Across this study, there are a number of important takeaways. First, the arts have a
critical role to play in mitigating risk factors associated with genocide and mass atrocities. This
includes through healing to break cycles of violence and trauma, educating to promote a
collective story and cultivate moral imagination, sharing to generate bridges between estranged
groups and identities, and awareness-raising to address governmental weakness and inaction.
Second, this has important ramiﬁcations for future prevention efforts because it highlights the
importance of meaningful integration and support for the arts as prevention. This includes, but
is not limited to the following: The arts should be incorporated into reconciliation and
community building and strengthening projects that engage all different aspects of a
community. Collaborations between artists, state actors, and civil society should be encouraged
and supported. Programs and spaces should be created to enable artists as well as their state
and community collaborators to exchange ideas and best practices and build relationships and
networks of accountability and support. Funding and grants programs to support artistic
residencies, collaborations, and the creation of new works should be prioritized, as well as
increased investment in infrastructure for the arts, such as community centers, theaters,
galleries, and other public spaces. Finally, further study is required. Advancing the impact of
the arts in atrocity prevention requires more targeted arts programming, closely documented
case studies, appropriate models of evaluation and assessment, and scholarly attention. I have
sketched out a framework for arts-based prevention analysis and employed it in analysis of a
series of arts initiatives from differing regional and conﬂict contexts. Deeper exploration into
different art forms and projects or conﬂicts and their corollary preventive efforts is beyond the
scope of this essay. My hope is that this will serve as an intervention into an ongoing scholarly
conversation and, as called for by Šehović in the opening epigraph, animate powerful new
possibilities for the study and practice of arts-based genocide and atrocity prevention.
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Introduction
When genocidal violence began in Rwanda in April of 1994, Aurore, a pregnant mother of two,
stayed close to home. She heard news of killing groups targeting Tutsi throughout the country,
and soon, terriﬁed Tutsi arrived in her village to seek refuge where violence had not yet begun.
When several of these individuals asked her for help, Aurore knew what she and her family had
to do. Even though it was incredibly risky for Hutu to try to save Tutsi, she hid a young boy and
his mother (among others) in her home and—when needed—pretended the child was her
nephew.1
When asked about the rescue years later, Aurore explained: “No, I was not afraid. If I
die, I will die, but people should understand that blood is blood…we should respect each other.
But, I was not afraid of this.”2 Aurore began identifying as a Seventh-day Adventist when she
was 15 years old, and she was convinced that her actions to rescue people were exactly what
God had wanted her to do. Reﬂecting back, she shared: “Maybe it was God who protected those
people [I rescued], along the way until they got to our house.” Further, Aurore believed her
collective acts with her husband and children were worth the risk of death. In her words: “We
are human. I believe that if you are mortal—and every man is mortal—you may die today, but I
will die tomorrow, and it is better to protect each other from this.”3
Unlike Aurore, the majority of Hutu decided not to rescue Tutsi during the genocide.
Previous scholarship on rescue has emphasized the seemingly uncommon psychological
characteristics of those who rescue, with many scholars arguing that they possess what has
become known as an “altruistic personality.”4 Although psychological traits are undoubtedly
important for explaining these prosocial behaviors, research also suggests that social factors
impact the dynamics of rescue, such as who rescues and how they do so.5 This article focuses on
the role of one particular social factor—religion—during rescue efforts. Speciﬁcally, we ask: how
did religious beliefs, practices, and social networks shape rescue efforts during the 1994
genocide in Rwanda?
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Relying on 45 in-depth interviews with individuals who rescued Tutsi in Rwanda, we
demonstrate that religion is tied to rescue efforts in at least three ways: 1) through the creation
of cognitive safety nets that enabled high-risk actions; 2) through religious practices that
isolated individuals from the social networks of those committing the violence; and 3) through
religious social networks where individuals encountered opportunities and accessed resources
to rescue. As such, we emphasize the social dimensions of religion and thus depart from
existing literature on religion and rescue, which examines the religious denominations of those
who rescued as well as the stated religious justiﬁcations underpinning rescue efforts.
More broadly, the case of rescue in Rwanda provides important insights about religion
and resisting violence. It illustrates how religious socialization and beliefs can support high-risk
collective action, how religious practices may buffer individuals from recruitment to violent
social movements, and how religious social networks and spaces can connect individuals in
ways that enable them to save lives during extreme political violence. It is consequently vital to
better understand the religious dynamics underpinning attempts to save persecuted
individuals.
We begin by examining existing research on religion and rescue efforts. We then address
literature on decision-making and high-risk behavior in order to situate how religiosity6 shapes
actions and situational contexts. Next, we describe our interview data, followed by our ﬁndings
on how religious practices, spaces, and social networks impacted acts of rescue in Rwanda.
Broadly, we illustrate how each of these factors shaped rescue efforts, illuminating how religion
mattered in previously undocumented ways.
Religion and Rescue Efforts
Studies about individuals who have engaged in rescue during genocide are often cited in a
wider body of literature that seeks to understand the social and psychological characteristics of
“heroes” and “moral exemplars.”7 Among these characteristics, scholars have devoted
signiﬁcant attention to understanding the possible connection between religion and rescue. This
scholarship has generally centered on two interrelated questions: 1) What are the religious
denominations and the levels of religiosity among those who rescue? and 2) Did religion
motivate these individuals to rescue?
Regarding the ﬁrst question, some previous scholarship has suggested that individuals
who adhere to minority religions may be particularly inclined to rescue due to the empathy that
accompanies identiﬁcation with a minority group.8 More recent work has likewise argued that
individuals belonging to minority religions may be more likely to rescue, while emphasizing
the collective aspects tied to their minority status. For instance, Braun9 suggests that a religious
community’s desire and ability to resist genocide depends on how it is situated relative to the
religious majority, making minority communities more inclined to protect persecuted groups.
For Braun, religious social networks are particularly important for understanding minority
rescue efforts, as he argues that minority social networks are better able to recruit and retain
individuals who rescue.10
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However, others have frequently noted the diversity of people who rescue, based on
both religious afﬁliation and level of religiosity.11 In one of the largest comparative studies of
Christian individuals who rescued during the Holocaust and those who did not, Oliner and
Oliner12 found that the majority of both groups were afﬁliated with religious institutions, and
shared similar levels of personal and parental religiosity. This evidence suggests that religiosity
and ties to religious institutions (whether majority or minority) may not strongly differentiate
people who rescue from those who do not. Indeed, those who rescue are often heterogeneous in
terms of religiosity, with levels ranging from non-religious to very devout.13
Researchers have also addressed religious motivations for rescue, with mixed results. In
the same study referenced above, Oliner and Oliner14 found that only 15 percent of participants
cited religion, God, or Christianity as signiﬁcant motivators in their decisions to rescue. Varese
and Yaish15 even found that the less religious respondents in their study were actually more
likely to rescue. However, other studies have cited religion as a more prominent motivating
factor for rescue, though this motivation is more likely among those who identify as highly
religious.16
A signiﬁcant number of qualitative studies also provide examples of individuals citing
religion, God, or biblical teachings as motivations for their rescue efforts.17 For instance, in the
case of Nazi Germany, scholars have argued that some Christians who rescued Jews did so in
part because they saw them as the “chosen people of God.”18 Some people who rescued during
the Holocaust have also stated that general religious teachings encouraged their efforts.19
Similarly, others have cited biblical texts, which call on believers to be compassionate and assist
people in need, as their inspiration to rescue.20 These studies demonstrate how some
individuals tie their decision to rescue to moral religious lessons.
Taken together, existing scholarship on rescue and religion has thus generated mixed
results. This body of work suggests that religious people are not necessarily more inclined to
rescue than non-religious people, with some scholarship indicating that religious minorities
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may be an exception, perhaps due to greater empathy or well-established, insular social
networks in these communities. Scholars have also demonstrated that people who rescue cite
religion, God, and biblical teachings as motivating factors in a relatively small percentage of
cases but that such motivations may be particularly strong among the highly religious.
However, researchers have yet to assess other dimensions of religion—beyond
denomination, level of religiosity, and motivation—which may impact rescue efforts.
Consequently, we sought to understand how religious beliefs, practices, and social networks
may impact rescue, speciﬁcally, exploring how religious beliefs may enable particularly high-risk
rescue actions.21 We likewise address how religious practices may insulate those who rescue
from mobilization to violence. Finally, we analyze how religious social networks—apart from
minority social networks—shape rescue efforts, including who gets rescued, where they are
rescued, and how rescues takes place. To inform our inquiry, we looked beyond existing
literature on religion and rescue to ascertain how religion shapes action in broader social
circumstances with an emphasis on religion, decision-making, and high-risk action.
Religion, Decision-making, and High-Risk Action
Scholars have long tied religious beliefs to decision-making. For instance, scholars have found
that religion inﬂuences a variety of life decisions,22 including choices relating to family size,
23occupation,24 education,25 and voting.26 Important for this study, much previous research has
addressed how religion impacts helping and prosocial behaviors, such as volunteerism and
charitable giving.27 Such studies on religion and decision-making have analyzed a range of
behaviors, from low-risk, everyday practices to high-stakes action.
Particularly relevant to high-stakes action like rescue, a subset of scholarship on religion
seeks to understand how religious beliefs shape peoples’ perceptions of and feelings about
death, shedding light on why some religious individuals may take life-threatening risks. To be
clear, such beliefs are not the motivating factors behind taking such risks but may instead
inform peoples’ decision-making processes. Speciﬁcally, scholars have argued that religious
convictions reduce some fears about death,28 which can help explain religious individuals’
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decisions to participate in high-risk action. For instance, Harding and colleagues29 found that
parishioners who had high theological religiosity—meaning they had a strong belief in God’s
existence and in an afterlife—also had low death anxiety. In turn, when individuals hold
religious beliefs that facilitate low death anxiety, they may take extraordinary risks aligning
with their religious convictions, as their beliefs may minimize the perceived consequences of
high-risk actions.
Some of this scholarly work also addresses how religious beliefs inﬂuence individuals’
decisions not to engage in high-risk actions, particularly those actions religious teachings label
as deviant or wrong. For instance, researchers have argued that religious beliefs often deter
drug and alcohol use,30 gambling,31 cheating behavior,32 and crime.33 Important to this study,
religiosity at the macro and meso levels—such as the rates of religious adherence and the civic
engagement of religious adherents—can shape the frequency and intensity of racial violence.34
Further, community-level religiosity has been found to impact rates of violent crime and youth
delinquency.35 Speciﬁcally, religious institutions signiﬁcantly buffer “…the effects of
neighborhood disorder on crime and, in particular, serious crime.”36
Observing these relationships, scholars have thus sought to theorize possible
underlying mechanisms mediating the relationship between religion and high-risk behavior. In
some cases, such deterrence from high-risk behavior can be explained by Durkheim’s “moral
community thesis,”37 which proposes that a group’s level of religiosity impacts the behaviors of
individual group members. Adherence to religious beliefs, as well as ties within social
networks, can deter individuals from behaviors condemned by religious scripture and social
networks adhering to the scripture. For instance, studies have shown that lower rates of HIV
risk behavior, such as engaging in pre-marital and extra-marital sex, can be partially explained
by religious community membership and indoctrination across dominations.38
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Beyond explaining deterrence from high-risk behaviors, religious social networks can
also help explain participation in collective action and social movements in general.39 Such lowrisk collective action, centering on religious identity and partnership across religious
institutions, is illustrated by the recent “Save Darfur Coalition”—which advocated for U.S.
intervention in Sudan.40 In another example, Catholic women who spearheaded the movement
for New York’s welfare state at the turn of the 20th century drew on their Catholic social
networks to mobilize state resources for the poor.41 Likewise, US civil rights activists
participating in the 1964 Freedom Summer mobilized with civil rights activists in the North,
including white Jews, to participate in Southern voter registration drives, with many sacriﬁcing
their personal safety and, for some, their lives.42 As these examples illustrate, various religious
movements throughout history have utilized their social networks to mobilize collective action
of various risk levels, often championing their religious values.
Given this literature on religion, decision-making, and high-risk action, we address how
religious beliefs, practices, and social networks impact rescue. Again, we do so because existing
literature on religion and rescue has mostly examined religious adherence and religious
motivations, rather than these other social factors. Here, we expand to address other
mechanisms through which religion may impact rescue via a case study of rescue in Rwanda.
Case Background and Methods
Religion and Rescue Efforts in Rwanda
On April 6, 1994, unknown assailants shot down Rwandan President Juvénal Habyarimana’s
airplane. His assassination followed decades of tension between Rwanda’s two main ethnic
groups, the Hutu and the Tutsi, culminating in civil war, economic recession, and volatile social
unrest. Targeted killings began a few hours after the plane crash, and radio broadcasters and
local leaders urged all Hutu to kill Tutsi. Many answered these calls inciting violence, including
army ofﬁcials, political leaders, and thousands of civilians.43 Several months later, up to one
million Tutsi and moderate Hutu were dead, and millions were displaced.
When the genocide began, Rwanda was one of the most Christian countries in Africa.
Approximately 90 percent of Rwandans were members of Catholic or Protestant churches, and
most families attended religious services on a regular basis.44 Yet, religious institutions had a
complicated relationship with the violence. Well before 1994, churches were engaged in ethnic
politics and discrimination, and some priests wrote histories to help justify ethnic exclusion.45
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During the genocide itself, much of the killing occurred in churches, where Tutsi civilians
sought refuge.46
While some priests and other religious leaders engaged in violence, other individuals
tried to stop the violence and save others.47 Here, we focus on how religion shaped such rescue
attempts. In doing so, we follow Burnet’s deﬁnition of individuals involved in rescue efforts as
“…those who protected or evacuated Tutsi, or made other efforts to save them and who did not
participate in the genocide whether by killing, raping, destroying property, or looting…They
required not only the impulse to help but also the persistence to make the decision both to
rescue and not to participate [in the genocide] repeatedly over time.”48 To be clear, scholars have
documented that people engage in dynamic actions during genocide, with some individuals
killing on certain days and rescuing on others.49 Nevertheless, we restrict our analyses to those
who rescued, but who did not kill, in order to leverage the connection between religion and
rescue. By having a sample of solely those who rescued, we can better identify how religion
impacted rescue rather than how killing and religion may have affected rescue, which would be
difﬁcult to disentangle.50
Our Sample and In-Depth Interviews
We rely upon 45 in-depth interviews with people who participated in rescue efforts in Rwanda
between April–July 1994. Working with translators, the ﬁrst two authors conducted most of
these interviews over several ﬁeldwork trips between 2012 and 2019.51 Three Rwandans,
including the third author, also conducted interviews, as further explained below.
We identiﬁed interviewees through Ibuka, a nongovernmental organization that
provides services to genocide survivors throughout the country. Speciﬁcally, Ibuka recorded the
testimonies of people who rescued as part of a 2009 research project. Ibuka researchers
randomly selected two sectors (small regions) within each of the country’s 30 districts. They
then chose the two cells (a smaller geographic unit) with the largest populations of genocide
survivors and the two cells with the smallest populations of survivors within these sectors. In
each of the cells, Ibuka researchers worked with researchers from the National University of
Rwanda to conduct focus groups with survivors, people who committed violence, community
leaders, judges in the post-genocide court system (i.e., gacaca), teachers, religious ofﬁcials, and
others. The main goal of the focus groups was to create lists of people who rescued. The
researchers then vetted all individuals whose names appeared on the lists, ensuring both that
they rescued and that they did not participate in the genocide by talking with other community
members and, if possible, the people they rescued.
We obtained Ibuka’s cumulative list of 273 vetted individuals who rescued and worked
through local Ibuka representatives to secure their contact information. We then contacted
people on the list and asked if they would be willing to participate in an interview on their
rescue experience. We began by contacting people close to a central location (Kigali, Rwanda’s
capital). We also called potential respondents in each of Rwanda’s ﬁve provinces, resulting in
46
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interviews across the country. Speciﬁcally, respondents resided (both in 1994 and at the time of
the interview) in the present-day districts of Bugesera, Gasabo, Gisagara, Karongi, Kicukiro,
Muhanga, Musanze, Nyamagabe, Nyanza, and Ruhango—totaling one-third of the districts of
Rwanda. No individual we asked declined to be interviewed, but several individuals on Ibuka’s
list had since passed away or moved.
Thirty-two of the 45 respondents were men, while 13 (29 percent) were women. Though
we cannot speak to the broader gender distribution of people who rescued, 18.6 percent of those
in the full Ibuka dataset were women.52 Furthermore, the average age of people interviewed
was approximately 35 at the time of the genocide, aligning with the average age of 40 in the full
Ibuka dataset. 31 of the 45 respondents were farmers at the time of the genocide, and others
worked as traders, soldiers, mechanics, local leaders, nurses, traders, or business people.
Notably, three respondents were religious leaders (pastors or priests). Finally, 20 were Catholic,
11 were Seventh-day Adventists, eight were Pentecostal, four were Protestant, and two were
Muslim at the time of the rescue.53
We offered to conduct interviews wherever respondents chose, which in most cases was
at their homes. Respondents used the language they felt most comfortable with during
interviews—including English, Kinyarwanda, French, or a combination. The ﬁrst two authors
worked with a translator when interviewing respondents who preferred Kinyarwanda. The
third author and two other Rwandan research assistants conducted other interviews directly in
Kinyarwanda, and the third author also served as a translator. We compared the transcripts of
interviews conducted by American and Rwandan interviewers and found no signiﬁcant
differences relevant to the ﬁndings presented in this article. However, we recognize that some
participants may have decided to share, or not share, certain aspects of their rescue story or
religious identity depending on who they were speaking to (Rwandan interviewer vs. American
interviewer), given the current political climate in Rwanda in which the government
signiﬁcantly constrains both research and speech.54
Interviews lasted between one to three hours and followed a semi-structured format.
We asked respondents about the people they rescued, the situational context of their rescue
efforts, and their reasons for rescuing. We also asked targeted questions about respondents’
religiosity and the role religion played in their rescue efforts. However, respondents often also
referenced religion spontaneously in their answers to questions unrelated to religion.
Upon transcription of interviews, we analyzed the transcripts using Atlas.ti, a computer
software program that facilitates the organization of quotes by codes created by the users. We
use pseudonyms in all quotations to protect respondents’ identities, modifying quotations only
slightly to correct grammatical errors. We did not alter the meaning of any responses with our
minor edits.
Finally, a reader familiar with the Rwandan case may be concerned about the research
climate in the country and its impact on the present study. Other scholars have written about
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state control regarding the narratives of the genocide.55 However, as our interviews focused on
narratives the state generally frames as heroic, fear did not seem to be pervasive amongst
respondents. We also spent considerable time developing rapport with respondents before
conducting interviews, and we took care to clarify that we were not working with Ibuka and
that Ibuka would not learn who did or did not participate. Further, the two non-Rwandan
interviewers had spent years in the country during previous ﬁeldwork trips, enabling them to
better understand the cultural nuances and norms apparent in interviews.
Findings: How Religion Shapes Dynamics of Rescue
Our analysis revealed that religion inﬂuenced several factors that in turn shaped rescue efforts
among Rwandans. Speciﬁcally, we identify: 1) religious beliefs that produced cognitive safety
nets enabling high-risk action, 2) religious practices that created a social buffer shielding
individuals from the targeted recruitment of killing groups, and 3) religious social networks that
led to and assisted in rescue efforts. In sum, cognitive safety nets impacted decisions to rescue,
while social buffers afforded people (speciﬁcally men, as we address below) the space and
opportunity to rescue successfully. Finally, religious social networks impacted where rescue
took place, how rescue was enacted, and who was rescued.
Religious Beliefs as a Cognitive Safety Net for High-Risk Action
Most of the people we interviewed described facing the possibility of death while engaging in
rescue efforts. Killing groups often threatened respondents with death or injury, and some
participants witnessed the death of friends and family members. For instance, a killing group
cut off the leg and ﬁnger of one man we interviewed, while another killing group slaughtered a
participant’s livestock. Yet, despite these high personal risks, respondents repeatedly told us
that they were not deterred from rescuing—a phenomenon they linked to religious beliefs.
Claude, who saved several older adults when he was only 22 years old, explained: “My
concern was about helping people. I was very religious, and I was only committed to rescuing
people…I was worried, I thought death was coming. But I was bold and waited for it.”56
Christine, a devout Catholic who saved four young children, also told us how she remained
staunch in her efforts to rescue, even when her life was in danger: “I was committed; I could die
with them. I was not better than them. I put everything in God’s hands.”57 Likewise, Ahmed, a
Muslim who saved four people from his mosque by covering them in a ditch in his backyard,
echoed Christine’s perspective by saying, “I was scared that rescuing could put me in danger,
but I placed everything in God’s hands. God is able to do everything.”58
Many others told us similar stories. For instance, Marie, who saved an infant girl, was
threatened by people who tried to purchase and kill the Tutsi baby she was taking care of. Marie
explained that her faith in God gave her the strength to refuse, noting, “God gave me this child,
so I cannot sell her.”59 Alodie, who saved 11 people days after the genocide began, similarly told
us:
Getting killed while saving them was not a concern to me.
They [Tutsi] also had life and wanted to live like any of us. We
were not special, and at the end of the day all of us will die.
Therefore, it is better dying while saving life. The Bible also
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Pseudonym, Male, Age 22 at the time of rescue, Seventh-day Adventist, 2016, Rwanda.
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Pseudonym, Female, Age 39 at the time of rescue, Catholic, 2016, Rwanda.
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Pseudonym, Male, Age 34 at the time of rescue, Muslim, 2019, Rwanda.
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Pseudonym, Female, Age 42 at the time of rescue, Seventh-day Adventist, 2012, Rwanda.
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says that lucky are those who die for Christ. If I will die, then
dying saving life is honorable.60
Gatera also felt able to risk his life for rescue, sharing that, “[p]eople used to say that I
am fearless...I know that if God wants you to live and when your time to die is up, you die.
Therefore, I had nothing to fear.”61 Likewise, Damascene, a pastor who hid over 300 people in
his backyard church explained: “When it reached the end, I was conﬁdent that what I was doing
was right. I was even sure that if I died, I would die doing the right thing.”62 Damascene also
believed he had a better place awaiting him, noting, “I knew I would go to Heaven.”63
Thus, these respondents and many others attributed the strength they felt when their
lives were at risk to their knowledge that God would protect them. For instance, the teachings
of the Koran provided a cognitive safety net for Bashir, who attempted to save four women and
three children while also working as a medical practitioner during the genocide. Bashir
explained how the promise of an afterlife made him feel safe in his decision to take high risks:
In the Koran, there is a verse which says that when you kill one
person, you have killed the entire world...killing that one
person is like killing the entire world...saving one person is
saving every person that will descend from that
person...respecting what the Koran says is a blessing, and God
cannot abandon you if you are doing well. Even if he does, he
pays in life after death.64
Echoing this notion, William, a Pentecostal who with his parents rescued approximately
100 people, shared that, “[p]eople make different choices whereby they take different routes.
Some take the right and others take the wrong route. If you believe in God, you even believe in
doing good things. I was conﬁdent that God was on our side and even if it meant dying, I was
ready to die.”65 Murenzi’s conﬁdence in God’s protection also enabled his actions. He
explained, “I did not feel scared; my hope was that whenever you do something good after
praying to God, nothing wrong can happen to you.”66 Matilda, a Catholic who saved a young
girl, expressed: “I became bold whenever I heard that killers were approaching. I was
determined not to abandon her because I knew God could not let such an innocent child get
killed...God was on our side.”67
Those who rescued reported that in their near-death experiences, they knew God would
protect them, either preventing them from death or securing their afterlives. In other words,
their religious beliefs enabled respondents to experience very low death anxiety in situations
where it would be reasonable to experience high death anxiety. As such, religious beliefs in
God’s protection and in an afterlife provided those who rescued with a cognitive safety net that
facilitated their high-risk actions. Religious respondents, who believed risking one’s life to save
another was part of God’s plan or doing right by God, consequently perceived rescue efforts as
lower risk, believing they would be rewarded for either successfully saving a life or dying
trying and going to the afterlife.
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Pseudonym, Female, Age 50 at the time of rescue, Catholic, 2019, Rwanda.
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Pseudonym, Male, Age 43 at the time of rescue, Protestant, 2019, Rwanda.
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Pseudonym, Male, Age 38 at the time of rescue, Pentecostal, 2012, Rwanda.
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Pseudonym, Male, Age 24 at the time of rescue, Muslim, 2019, Rwanda.
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Pseudonym, Male, Age 24 at the time of rescue, Pentecostal, 2019, Rwanda.
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Pseudonym, Male, Age 41 at the time of rescue, Catholic, 2019, Rwanda.
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Pseudonym, Female, Age 31 at the time of rescue, Catholic, 2016, Rwanda.
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Religious Practices as a Social Buffer against Recruitment and Discovery
Religious practices also shaped rescue efforts by providing a social buffer. By social buffer, we
mean practices that insulate a person socially from particular social groups or social situations.
Speciﬁcally, religious practices tied to abstaining from drinking alcohol or immoral behaviors
helped keep people from being recruited to participate in genocidal violence and from being
discovered by killing groups. Notably, however, we ﬁnd such social practices were only a social
buffer for men, which we address below and in our discussion.
To prepare and recruit for killing sprees, those committing the violence often gathered
to consume alcohol.68 Consequently, individuals who were known non-drinkers due to religious
convictions were often insulated from some of the most common recruitment methods. As
Pascal, a Seventh-day Adventist who rescued a family of ﬁve, explained: “We were not
supposed to eat meat, use sugar, take beers, and many other things. This helped me to distance
myself from all people who did that.”69 Augustine, another Seventh-day Adventist who rescued
several families, including his neighbor’s children, similarly explained: “There are people who
join religions when they are not converted. For us, we were. We were true Christians. I have
never taken alcohol in my life.”70 Neither men were recruited for participation in the genocidal
violence.
Pascal, Augustine, and others who did not drink alcohol may have avoided recruitment
to killing groups because they were not in the bars where recruitment took place. They were
also likely able to avoid targeted recruitment in other settings since killing group members
assumed they would refuse to drink—a prerequisite in some killing groups for new recruits.71
Pascal and Augustine thus highlight how religious practices—especially pertaining to alcohol
use among Seventh-day Adventists, Muslims, and others who abstained from drinking—
created a social buffer from others who killed. In turn, this social buffer provides insight into the
circumstances surrounding rescue.
While abstinence from alcohol did not necessarily impact the decision to rescue, it likely
affected the ability to rescue and the probability of successful rescue. Because Pascal and
Augustine were not heavily recruited to participate in the genocide, they did not have to openly
defy those who were recruiting for killing groups. This lack of confrontation may have bought
them time and space from killing groups, who would search the homes of those who refused to
participate in the violence. In this sense, their religious social practices likely impacted the
assumptions members of killing groups made.
While religious minorities at the time of the genocide (speciﬁcally Muslims and
Seventh- day Adventists) possessed a social buffer due to their abstinence from alcohol, some
members of the religious majority (Catholics) also experienced a degree of insulation due to
their general religious practices and typical abstention from perceived immoral behavior.
Charles, a Catholic who worked with his family to save a mother and child, shared:
I rarely interacted with such people [perpetrators] because I
was working at the Catholic priest’s canteen. I could not get
time to interact with such guys...I kept moving coming from
church, coming home to gather information on where people at
home were safe, going back to church, helping people at
church, cooking food, serving them with food. Those killers
would just tell me that I could also be killed one day, because I
helped those people that were being targeted, but no one
approached me telling me to join the killing…they thought we
were fools because we are not interested in looting, killing people and
68
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taking their property…no one approached me to mobilize me to
participate in killing.72
Like Charles, people knew Chase as a very religious man, and he believed this
reputation kept some people from trying to recruit him. In his words:
[Perpetrators] kept on coming, but again, they thought we are
Christians, and that is why we are not participating in the
killing. I remember they communicated to us that, ‘[i]f you are
caught hiding someone, your family will also get killed, and
you will also get killed. You will be ordered to kill that person,
and then you will also get killed.’ But, I even met the
burgomaster [commune leader], and I told him, you are
suspecting that we are hiding people. We do not have anyone
in our house, come and search it…but they thought we are
Christians…They could say: ‘They are fools, do not care about
them, they are Christians. That is why they are not
participating.’ The trust that people had in us helped. They
never thought that we were hiding people in our houses.73
Thus, because Charles’s family was considered to be particularly pious, people
engaging in violence believed him when he said that he was not hiding people since they
considered him to be too religious to lie. Because lying, killing, and stealing were deemed sins,
those who knew Charles believed he could not participate in either and, for the most part, left
him alone when genocidal violence swept through his village, ultimately enabling him to save
the lives of six people.
Noticeably, the respondents who discussed religion as a social buffer were either
religious minorities (Muslims or Seventh-day Adventists) or highly-religious Catholics, and all
of them were men. No women in our sample discussed religion as a social buffer, but women
also seldom mentioned being recruited to participate in the violence. In fact, killing groups
rarely recruited women given that killing transgressed gendered norms,74 nor would it have
been typical for women to leave their families to drink in bars. For women in this study, gender
norms, roles, and socialization likely served as non-religious social buffers, affording women
protection from recruitment in ways that allowed for a range of socially-acceptable and
plausible excuses to not participate in the violence, given their roles as wives, mothers, or
expectant mothers. Religious practices thus functioned as a social buffer largely for men.
Religious Social Networks Providing Opportunities and Resources
Religious social networks also inﬂuenced rescue efforts in signiﬁcant ways. Speciﬁcally,
religious social networks impacted rescue by shaping where rescue took place (e.g., among
congregations and in their homes), how rescue was enacted (e.g., through religious community
resources), and who was rescued (e.g., fellow church or mosque members).
Often, religious social networks facilitated the acquisition of or access to necessary
resources. For instance, church members sometimes used religious spaces for rescue efforts.
Gloria hid Tutsi in her local church. She explained: “I also had other people that I hid at the
church; they were one child and a maid… Then two other women…also came. They had many
wounds; they were cut from machetes around their faces. I put all of them in the church.”75
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Thus, while churches were a common site for massacres,76 many acts of rescue also took
place in religious spaces. Damascene,77 a pastor, hid people in the church located in his
backyard. Bashir78 rescued Muslims from his religious community by hiding them in the local
mosque. Echoing these patterns, Mutabazi, a Seventh-day Adventist, explained rescue efforts
facilitated by religious social networks: “We agreed as a church to organize and come to church
for their [Tutsi’s] safety when attacks began...People … brought them to the church…church
leaders could always come to check on us and support us morally and by providing food.”79
Similarly, John used church resources to undertake rescue efforts. As a pastor of a large
congregation, John was able to hide hundreds of people in his church, as well as inside the deep
holes used as toilets on the church property. Militias repeatedly threatened him as he performed
these rescues. However, he continued helping others with the assistance of his family and
fellow church members, ultimately saving over 300 lives.80 Notably, John and Damascene, both
pastors, felt the most at ease using church spaces for rescue, likely due to their position as
religious leaders. Yet, as Gloria, Bashir, and Mutabazi illustrate, one did not need to be a
religious leader to effectively use religious spaces to hide others.
Respondents’ reliance on fellow church members illustrates another mechanism
through which religious social networks aided, and in some instances likely increased the
success of, rescue efforts. Speciﬁcally, religious communities provided a network of helpers to
assist with rescue endeavors. Forms of assistance included warning when militias were nearby,
providing food, water, or shelter, or moving Tutsi from house-to-house in order to avoid
discovery.
For instance, those who rescued described knowing which congregants they could call
upon for help while rescuing. Seth recalled calling on a fellow congregant, explaining: “He was
also a Seventh-day Adventist. I called him and asked if two of those children [whom Seth was
rescuing] could go to his house… He took the two.”81 Gloria asked a woman from her church to
assist her, when she was worried that she was going to be discovered rescuing a little boy. In her
words: “I had requested a woman from my church to take him to her home for protection.”82 In
this case and others, the success of rescues was at least partially attributed to the religious social
networks of those who coordinated their actions to collectively save others.
For Eugene, his religious social network even helped save his own life. Eugene was
rescuing three young girls and a young man when militias burst into his house. They
threatened to kill the people he was protecting, and when Eugene intervened, a member of the
militia cut off his leg and left him to bleed to death. Although he was in tremendous pain,
Eugene remembered a church night watchman whom he trusted. He sent one of the young girls
to the watchman to buy medicine that saved his life. Knowing that they could rely on their
religious communities to help them if they were threatened or hurt likely made it easier for
people like Eugene to engage in high-risk rescue efforts.83
Finally, many respondents explained that the people they rescued were part of their
religious social networks, indicating that pre-existing religious ties shaped rescue. For instance,
Gloria shared that the people she rescued were from her religious community: “We shared the
same religious denomination. We prayed together ... We could exchange invitations for different
ceremonies.”84 Pascal also saved people from his church, explaining: “We belonged to the same
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church. We were friends and shared everything.”85 Dido hid people he knew from the church he
had been attending since he was a child, including the head choir leader, a pastor, and child
parishioners whom he called his “brothers in Christ.”86 Charles and his family hid a woman
and a child they knew through church, while Ahmed hid people he knew from the local
mosque. Social networks, and speciﬁcally religious social networks, were consequently
important for shaping several aspects of rescue during the genocide.
Discussion and Conclusion
While prior studies have focused on the religious denominations and motivations of those who
rescue during genocide, we have illustrated additional pathways through which religion shapes
rescue efforts. Speciﬁcally, we emphasize the role of religious beliefs, practices, and social
networks in shaping these efforts.
Religious beliefs were often a precursor to individuals’ decisions to rescue, when their
lives were at risk. The belief that they were doing right by God assured them that if they died
while saving others, they would be rewarded in the afterlife, thus providing a cognitive safety
net. Previous studies of high-risk actions have demonstrated the correlation between religious
beliefs in an afterlife and low death anxiety.87 We argue that respondents in this study who
rescued were enabled in part by a low death anxiety. Generally, they believed that the high risks
they took to save others were part of God’s plan, and if they died saving others, they would go
to heaven. As such, these beliefs diminished the perception of risk; if the choice was between
betraying God by doing nothing or dying while doing right by God, these religious individuals
considered the latter to be the less risky of the two choices and acted accordingly. Future studies
would beneﬁt from comparing the death anxiety of those who solely rescued with the death
anxiety among those who killed and also rescued.
Religious practices also served as social buffers from intense recruitment to genocidal
violence and from being discovered once they were hiding people. Again, we illustrate how this
speciﬁc factor was highly gendered, and future studies should address whether religion
provided a social buffer for women who rescued. Better understanding how religious practices
create social buffers enabling individuals to rescue others may also be beneﬁcial in developing
strategies for violence mitigation efforts.
Finally, religious social networks also shaped rescue efforts, including where these efforts
took place, how they unfolded, and who they impacted. Scholars have previously documented
that religious social networks provide exchanges of resources and care,88 and we extend this line
of work to the context of rescue. For instance, many of our respondents hid Tutsi in churches
and mosques, illustrating the importance of the resources provided by religious social networks
for rescue efforts. Furthermore, our respondents relied on fellow congregants within their
religious social networks to assist them in their efforts to save friends, family, and even
strangers. We also saw some evidence that religious social networks facilitated who was
rescued, as respondents discussed rescuing people they knew from their churches and mosques.
To be clear, religious beliefs, practices, and social networks are not mutually exclusive
factors and certainly impact one another. These pathways may have also affected rescue efforts
in ways we could not demonstrate here. For instance, in addition to beliefs, religious social
networks may have impacted decisions to rescue. It is plausible that simply knowing that one
has a strong religious social network might make rescue feel more achievable, or observing
others in one’s religious community rescuing might inﬂuence one’s decision to engage in such
efforts. While it is difﬁcult to ascertain the factors that impacted individuals’ initial decisions to
rescue with retrospective data, we have focused on the key factors that emerged from our
interviews.
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In this case, religious beliefs about God’s plan and the afterlife created cognitive safety
nets to enable high-risk action; religious practices socially buffered individuals who rescued
from those committing violence, helping them escape recruitment and discovery; and religious
social networks supplied shelter, exchanges of information, medical care, and food to keep
families, children, and congregants alive. Hundreds of people are alive today because of the
actions of these 45 respondents. These respondents teach us that religion—through beliefs,
practices, and social networks—has the power to make high-risk actions feel possible, to buffer
against violence, and to facilitate coordinated collective action that saves lives.
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Introduction1
World Wars are, without question, deﬁned traumatic events that change the course of history
and leave a legacy that persists not only in the lives of individuals and their descendants but
also on the geopolitical instability we see around the world today.2 Genocides are in some ways
more complex than wars. They are rarely isolated events; taking place within centuries-old
fomenting hatred and rivalry, they involve not only systematic killing but also the distortion
and destruction of cultures.3 Beyond the killings are the more insidious traumatic collective
experiences which are difﬁcult to describe, let alone deﬁne.
We can understand these experiences more clearly when we consider the systematic
and institutionalized destruction of First Nations people through geographical and cultural
dispossession, and continuing disempowerment and discrimination. The process of cultural
dispossession that occurs with colonization over generations can be subtle, but its long-term
impact may be nothing less than genocidal; indeed, it can be viewed as genocide in slowmotion.4
In many circumstances, these slow and gradual forms of collective trauma are both
historical and continuing. It does not make sense to talk about healing in such situations but
rather of repairing wounds from an historical event. There must also be accompanying efforts to
expose and bring to an end a process of continuing assault and injury. Efforts to formulate a
theory on the healing of historical collective trauma is complex; it is complicated further by a
lack of agreement over the deﬁnition of trauma, and uncertainty as to how knowledge about
individual psychology can be applied to collectives.
This paper is in three parts. It begins by clarifying key concepts such as trauma,
collective experience and shared consciousness. Next, it proposes a framework for considering
the healing of historical collective trauma and discuss a range of relevant ideas and concepts, in
particular the psychology of trauma. Finally, it discusses cultural trauma, a particular type of
collective trauma.
Historical collective trauma is a multidimensional, multifaceted problem that cannot be
addressed by a single perspective or discipline; many disciplines have indeed contributed to
making sense of it. What is needed is the integration of some of these insights from different
perspectives. This paper is an attempt to do that from the vantage point of a practitioner with a
psychoanalytic background who has, over the past twenty years, worked with individuals and
groups (including communities and societies) who have tried to make sense of their own
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experience of a particular historical collective trauma. They included the Aboriginals5 from
the deserts of central Australia,6 survivors (and transgenerational survivors) of the Holocaust,7
Cambodian genocides, Northern Ireland, and a multidisciplinary group senior academics and
practitioners in Japan who are trying to address the transgenerational legacy of their role in the
Second World War.8
Clariﬁcation of Key Concepts
In this section, I will explore ways to understand some of the key concepts involved in collective
trauma and healing. Conceptual clariﬁcations such as these are essential in analyzing the root
causes and effects of trauma and can also create space for exploring healing in a holistic way.
The Collective
According to The Shorter Oxford Dictionary, the word “collective” is an adjective “denoting or
representing a number of individuals or items.”9 There are many different approaches to
understanding a collective, each reﬂecting particular presuppositions, underpinning concepts
and frameworks. For instance, sociological perspectives focus on describable social networks,
structures and processes10 while psychological approaches consider behaviors and possible
underlying dynamics, some of which are observable in the conscious realm, and some operating
in the unconscious.11 Despite these differences, there is general agreement that a collective has
some form of shared consciousness, whether it is conceptualized as “social history,” shared
memory or, a group or collective mind.
Social science tends to focus on describing what can be seen and considered as being a
collective from the perspective of the individual; it views a collective as made up of individuals
and construes what is observed as no more than the sum of the individuals. The idea of the
group as a single “whole” entity does not sit easily within this perspective. The view adopted in
this paper assumes the existence of a group or collective mind whose characteristics are distinct
from and more than the sum of its constituting individual minds.
The year 2020 marks one hundred years since the publication of The Group Mind by
William McDougall.12 Its conceptualization of a collective consciousness was anticipated by
studies into the psychology of the crowd, most notably in the work of Le Bon.13 The idea that a
collective has a singular consciousness was employed by Freud14 and more recently, by large
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numbers of writers on different areas of collective life, including politics,15 the arts,16 and
culture.17 Unlike within social science, there appears to be an implicit assumption, without
debate or elaboration, in the vast psychoanalytic literature that the collective life consists of a
singular consciousness. It might be argued that because so many writers have adopted this
notion of a singular consciousness in collective life, and that their writing makes sense to a
growing readership, this offers some validation of this view.
I wish to highlight, however, that there is usually a complex interplay between the
individual and the collective mind; it would be an oversimpliﬁcation to insist that only one of
these is in operation. For the purposes of this paper, I focus mainly on the collective mind.
Trauma
It might surprise the reader that there is no universal agreement on the deﬁnition of trauma
despite its widespread usage. The current popular understanding of trauma as injury and
damage, has its roots in the Greek word, trauma, which means wound. Emmanouil Pikoulis et
al. noted that in ancient Greek medicine, the term was used to refer to a wound, and the earliest
recorded use of trauma in the English language was in Steven Blankart’s “Physical Dictionary,”
published in 1684, where it referred to “… a Wound from an external Cause.”18 Hence the
specialty of traumatology and establishment of specialized trauma centers for life-threatening
bodily injuries from motor vehicle accidents, shootings, natural disasters, etcetera. MacCabe
and Yanacek noted:
Once a relatively straightforward term, trauma, with its
broadened psychological sense, has been contested and
intensely politicized over the past decades. Like, Victim, the
word has been used by individuals and groups to make the
extent of their suffering known and to advocate particular
political agendas. Trauma has become so generalized that
almost any negative experience may now qualify as trauma.19
Notwithstanding this trend, the ﬁeld of psychiatry, as a specialty of medicine, has
attempted to maintain a more narrowly deﬁned understanding of psychological trauma as that
which emerged from the concept of shell-shock during the First World War and is now
understood as post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).
There is, however, another line of development in the conceptualization of trauma, in
reaction to the narrow medical deﬁnition of PTSD. As Sonya Andermahr noted:
The ﬁeld of trauma studies emerged in the early 1990s as an
attempt to construct an ethical response to forms of human
suffering and their cultural and artistic representation. Born out
of a conﬂuence between deconstructive and psychoanalytic
criticism and the study of Holocaust literature, from its outset
trauma theory’s mission was to bear witness to traumatic
15
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histories in such a way as to attend to the suffering of the
other.20
Participants at this meeting expressed concern with the universalism and
homogenization of PTSD which considers trauma from a Euro-American western framework,
noting that “decolonizing trauma studies is not just about expanding the scope, broadening the
focus, but also about critically examining and revising dominant conceptions of trauma and
recovery.”21 Accordingly, this ﬁeld has not offered a deﬁnition of trauma but highlights the
importance of context within respective assumed paradigms.
I have highlighted the politics of deﬁning trauma because of the contested nature of this
ﬁeld, and attempts to pretend otherwise, assuming a dominant view at the expense of others, is,
of course, the very nature of colonization and, as I propose later in this article, the essence of
cultural trauma. I return to this issue of a deﬁnition of trauma once I have explained the
importance of culture and the signiﬁcance of cultural trauma. I propose a broader notion of
trauma in that light. I depart from individual psychology and PTSD by ﬁrst introducing the
concept of collective trauma, and the possibility of shared traumatic experience.
Collective Trauma
If we assume an experience beyond that of a single individual, i.e. by two or more people, to be
collective in nature, then their shared traumatic experience may be described as a collective
trauma. However, on closer examination, for an experience to be considered collective implies
that there is a degree of sameness in the subjectivity of that experience. I refer to “a degree of
sameness” because it is not possible, by deﬁnition, for two individuals to possess identical
subjectivity. Similarly, we can speak of shared experience but not shared subjectivity. In the case
of collective trauma, we can consider some degree of sameness in their wound.
Can we assume the 6 million Jews who perished during the Holocaust, and the many
millions more who survived it, had similar subjective experiences? While the total experience of
each of those people cannot be identical, they would have included a certain degree of shared
experience based on their commonality of geography or, more generally, in their identiﬁcation as
Jewish. The traumatic experience of a collective encompasses components of both collective or
shared trauma and personal, individual trauma.
One might distinguish a shared experience of trauma grounded in geographical
commonality as collective trauma (e.g. where everyone from a single village is interned, tortured,
and killed together), while the shared experience of trauma based on one’s identity, ethnicity, or
culture is, I propose, one of cultural trauma.
I now turn to the main focus of this paper, which is collective trauma, or more
speciﬁcally, historical collective trauma. Cultural trauma is a subset and unique form of
collective trauma which I return to in the last part of this article.
Historical Collective Trauma
A (Brief) Psychology of Historical Collective Trauma
Much of what follows has its roots in the individual psychology of trauma. Historically,
proposals for a collective psychology had their origins in individual psychology. For instance,
Freud’s analysis of the church and the army in terms of group psychology rested heavily on his
formulation of individual psychology with regard to unconscious motivations such as libidinal
ties, symptom formation, and defenses.22 The notion of a social defense against anxiety
proposed by Elliott Jaques and Isabel Menzies had its origin in theories of ego defense

20
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mechanisms and object relations, developed from considerations of the mind of the
individual.23 It is common nowadays for writers to explore collective psychology using the
language and concepts of individual psychology as if they were interchangeable.24
There is no doubt, however, among those who work with large groups and populations,
that collective psychology is quite different from individual psychology. There are not yet
sufﬁcient conceptual frameworks in the ﬁeld of collective psychology for it to stand alone;
hence the need to borrow from and extend the use of our understanding of the individual to the
collective mind. While it might be argued that individual psychology cannot be applied directly
to a consideration of groups and populations, it does not follow that its language and concepts
may not be utilized for tentative preliminary formulations, out of which a more elaborate
collective psychology may be established. It is, in my view, possible to use the framework of
individual psychology as long as we are mindful of these caveats.
Some might wonder: why are we discussing the psychology of trauma when an event is
historical? It will be apparent in the ensuing sections that when one is triggered into a traumatic
mental space there is a sense of timelessness; what was an historical event is now very present
and the individual and the collective mind operates in a particular way. I will discuss these
psychological processes in the subsequent pages thematically.
Trauma is Timeless
It would be inaccurate to describe the trauma suffered by the Aboriginals in Australia as
“historical” even though it began over 200 years ago. Colonization is one of the more
devastating forms of cultural trauma; it is a continuous, insidious process of undermining and
destroying the culture of the colonized. This contrasts with the form of cultural trauma outlined
by Jeffrey Alexander, where deﬁned events, such as speciﬁc incidences of massacres, can be
identiﬁed within the context of history. While these events are deemed historical with regard to
the linear dimension of time, they are indeed timeless psychologically.
The traumatic wound is not bound by time. When an individual mind ﬁnds itself in a
mental space where it re-encounters a traumatic event from years ago, it does not re-experience
it as an historical event of the past but as something that is occurring very much in the present
and it responds to that experience accordingly.25
We can observe the so-called timelessness of collective traumatic experiences when a
population responds to a present-day crisis as if it takes them back to a critical event in the past. I
am using the phrase “takes them back” rather than reminding because it is not a matter of
memory but one of re-experiencing the present as if the past was occurring in totality.
Emotional Disassociation
One of the ﬁrst things that happen during an overwhelming traumatic experience is the
disassociation of the emotional response associated with it. The individual mind feels numb.
Collectively, it is experienced as a gathering of people devoid of emotionality—there is either an

23
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eerie silence or a sense of frozenness; or the situation may be ﬁlled with frantic activity, perhaps
even noisy, but devoid of meaningful emotional interactions and exchanges.
Some of the main emotions the traumatized mind (both individual and collective) seeks
to isolate and avoid are shame and humiliation; these emotions seem to be an integral part of a
traumatic experience. It is understandable that we are prone to feeling ashamed and humiliated
when we are traumatized, because such overwhelming experiences expose our deepest
vulnerability.26
Encapsulation of Trauma
Next, the mind tries to protect itself by separating the traumatic wound from the rest of it so
that it can continue to function. Technically, the mind is said to repress or dissociate the trauma;
commonly, we speak of forgetting. This process is usually spoken of as encapsulation, a
wrapping up of the wound and hiding it from consciousness.27
One of the more consistent observations of massive trauma such as genocides is the
collective unwillingness or inability to talk about it in its aftermath; there is often a collusive
silence in the generation that had direct experience of that trauma.28 This has been seen in the
large population of Holocaust survivors who migrated to Melbourne in the aftermath of the
Second World War, and also in survivors of the Armenian and Cambodian genocides.29 Such
denial is not exclusive to survivors of genocides; the same occurs in the context of major
disasters and war, for example, the Japanese response to the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake
and Tsunami, and Second World War.30 Denial and the avoidance of triggers (which takes us back
to the traumatic situation) are understandable behaviors when one considers how painful it is
to talk about catastrophic losses and emotionally overwhelming experiences.
Triggering
The mind is said to be triggered when it becomes re-exposed to a trauma and the previously
successful encapsulation breaks down.31 The emotional silence that would otherwise be present,
now broken, is overcome with emotional outpourings; that eerie silence, in retrospect, would
have been like the calm before the storm, or the receding sea before the tsunami.
Individuals who have been triggered are emotionally overwhelmed and often report
symptoms consistent with PTSD, namely ﬂashbacks, withdrawal, and numbing of emotionality.
Collectively, there may be an initial intense emotionality in the group associated with periodic
outbursts of violence. The mind tries to re-package or re-encapsulate the trauma—if it is
successful, there is a return to emotional detachment; if unsuccessful, regression will follow.
Regression
The mind “falls back” (just as an overwhelmed army retreats) to preserve itself; we refer to this
as regression. Psychologically, regression refers to the process whereby the mind operates at an
earlier form of itself; a form deemed to be psychically more economical.32 I have previously
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reported on my observations of collective regression in the traumatized Aboriginal communities
in the Central Desert of Australia which noted at least four levels of regression.33
Firstly, the mind regresses to a more basic form of thinking; retreating from a complex
thinking mode to binary thinking. When a mind can only think in binary terms, there are only
two possibilities; black/white, good/bad, present/absent—it is unable to consider the
possibilities of grey or a third option. President George Bush Jr. famously declared in the
aftermath of the Twin Towers terrorist attacks of September 11 (in the binary thinking mode):
“Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorist.”34 In this situation, there was only “us” or
there were enemies. There was no possibility of neutrality. Collectively, binary thinking
expresses itself as an extreme polarization or split in a population.
I propose there is another mode of thinking that is even more basic than binary, i.e.
unitary thinking. In this form of thinking, which is hardly thinking at all, there is only I/us, and
no Other. I wonder if this form of thinking occurs during genocides, where the Other is not even
allowed to exist as an enemy, but must be obliterated, and only I/us can conceivably exist.
Secondly, if the ﬁrst level of regression fails, the mind regresses further to the next level,
with a heightened concern about threat to its “sense of identity and boundary.” Individuals try
to shore up their physical boundaries by isolating themselves into conﬁned spaces (e.g. afraid to
leave their home) or build taller fences or become preoccupied about how they are different
from others (symbolic boundaries), which might present as a concern about identity. Often,
their “preoccupation of difference” from Others deteriorates into a “fear of Others,” manifesting
as a greater concern about the enemy, or presenting, for instance, deceptively as benign racism.
Thirdly, the regression becomes characterized by fragmentation. In the individual, the
mind is no longer able to think (it can only react) and there is a lack of a cohesive sense of self.
This is characterized by a paralyzing ambivalence and conﬂict within, and an experience of the
unbearable anxiety of falling apart. Fragmentation is more easily apparent in the collective. In
the most severely traumatized Aboriginal communities, there is no longer a “community” in the
sense of having a subjective sense of being a collective among themselves, nor is there common
identiﬁcation as one. In that situation, there is no collective voice and a collective decision is
almost impossible to reach. Structurally and functionally, the so-called community is
fragmented into kinship groups, and sometimes even that level of organization barely holds; the
fragmentation deteriorates from extended kinship “families” into core families.
Fourthly, in this ﬁnal level of regression, the mind is no longer concerned about the
Other; threat is therefore no longer about identity (or boundaries), and they are no longer
concerned about external enemies. The threat is experienced as coming from within and the
focus is wholly existential: will they continue to exist? The leaders and elders from some of the
severely traumatized Aboriginal communities I worked with expressed great concern about
their continuing existence, especially in terms of the loss of their culture and the future of their
offspring. In some of these communities, there was a sense of implosion and disintegration.
With an understanding of the psychology of historical collective trauma, as outlined
above, I next proceed with a proposal for a working model for its healing.
A Framework for Healing Collective Trauma
Some might judge the collective trauma of the Aboriginals in Australia to be a descent down the
spiral of regression to a place of irretrievable despair. I have observed, however, that in some
instances they have courageously confronted their unbearably painful situation and climbed
out of the darkest places. Although they have undertaken this work to heal from their cultural
trauma collectively, many have also found the need to heal as individuals from their personal
losses and grief, and the trauma from violence.
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There are many dimensions to the trauma experienced by a group of people: 1) there is
the personal trauma of the individuals that make up the collective, 2) there are the shared
traumatic experiences amongst groups of individuals within the collective, and 3) there is the
traumatic wound of the collective as a singular whole entity.35 Usually, each of these aspects
may involve a particular focus, and require a different approach to healing. Sometimes,
however, an opportunity arises where a gathering of people might encounter healing at all three
levels: as a personal experience, as a shared experience with others, and as a collective whole.
When we speak of collective healing, we usually have in mind, “healing together,”
consisting of some aspects of the personal and the shared. We might not be thinking of the
healing of the collective as a single entity. However, when we focus on healing as a collective, it
is likely there will also be healing, to varying degrees, from personal and shared trauma. I will
focus from this point on the healing of shared trauma and that of the collective whole,
beginning with some of the key aspects of what such a healing would entail.
Safe and Supportive Environment
In my experience as a psychotherapist, one of the ﬁrst and most basic requirements for the
healing of traumatic wounds is a safe and supportive space. In order for a traumatic wound to
heal, it needs to be exposed. However, when we approach such exposure, we may anticipate as
overwhelming, the possible humiliation from revealing our most vulnerable self, and that it is
“too much” to overcome alone. The greater part of therapy is primarily the creation of an
“emotionally” safe and supportive environment where such pain can be overcome with the
help of a trusted Other.
It is a much more difﬁcult task to create such an environment for hundreds or
thousands of people, and perhaps almost impossible, for a whole nation consisting of millions,
with varied social identiﬁers across a broad geography. Safety in these contexts involves more
than an absence from physical threats; it includes political and cultural safety. A politically safe
environment allows differences of identity, opinion and values. It is also underpinned by the
principles of respect, fairness and justice. Some would add that such a space should be free from
prejudice and discrimination. It might be possible to create such a space framed by these
principles in a self-selected gathering of a few hundred; it is much more difﬁcult to imagine a
situation largely free of prejudice and discrimination in the “real world” of a community
meeting or other non-selective, heterogenous, gathering.
A “culturally safe space” is framed by an understanding that while there is a shared
and common culture within a collective, there may also be signiﬁcant cultural differences
among the members of the gathering, and these differences are valued and respected. The
creation of a culturally safe space is relatively easy in a homogenous collective without
signiﬁcant differences among its members. It is particularly challenging in a heterogenous,
multi-cultural collective where a balance must be found between supporting the common
cultural elements while embracing differences at the same time. The emphasis on common or
shared culture is particularly important from the perspective of healing collective trauma. It is
critical, however, to be mindful that excessive emphasis of commonality risks extinguishing
individuality and differences.
Shared Experiences and Collective Healing
There is a common assumption that the process of healing a collective trauma is necessarily
“collective” in approach, and the experience should be one that is shared.36 The rationale for
this widespread assumption is not clear, but there are three possibilities. The ﬁrst is a belief that
the woundedness of individuals within a collective is so great that its healing cannot be
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undertaken alone but needs the empathetic support of others within the collective who have
had similar experiences, or preferably, shared some of their experiences, as illustrated by the
effectiveness of survivor support groups. Often these groups are successful because they help
individuals to overcome their tendency to avoid the painful exposure of their traumatic wound.
In other words, the presence of collective forces is needed to draw the traumatized individuals
from their state of withdrawal. Finally, the idea of a shared wound invites the notion of a
common wound that requires common healing. This idea involves an imagined, singular
collective wound that can only be healed through a process of the simultaneous healing of its
affected members.37
The healing of a collective trauma can be compared to the process of mending a
shattered picture; its pieces are like those of a jigsaw puzzle, needing to be brought together to
form a whole image again. However, unlike the pieces of a jigsaw puzzle that are neatly cut and
can be brought together perfectly, the pieces of a picture shattered or ripped apart by trauma are
torn at their edges. The repair of these pieces with their jagged edges requires the presence of
the adjoining pieces to deﬁne the gaps to be ﬁlled; the adjoining pieces may serve as a mold for
each other to hold the ﬁller binding them together. These adjoining pieces may be made up of
supporting people who were not affected by that collective trauma. This process of repair may
indeed serve as a metaphor for an aspect of the healing of historical collective trauma.
Collective Memory, Contested History and Remembering
There is a popular, but erroneous, belief that healing is marked by forgetting.38 However, the
guilt of forgetting can lead one to cling to a distorted and ﬁxed memory of what happened,
where one becomes preoccupied by certain purported facts and loses sight of the whole picture.
There is little room remaining for the emotionality of the events and for how one feels about it.
From the perspective of healing, this is not remembering, but rather being stuck in a certain
past. Furthermore, as I have outlined in the section on the psychology of trauma, the
timelessness of trauma makes it difﬁcult to distinguish the present from the past. Remembering
in the context of healing, is different from the mere recollection of facts. It is a complex process
of recalling what happened, being aware of how one felt about what happened then, and now,
and appreciating the signiﬁcance of what happened; a process that consists of aspects of
working-through and making-sense, on which I will elaborate later.
The narrative of a collective traumatic event, especially an historically shared trauma,
cannot accurately be recalled or recreated by one person. At best, it would be incomplete, and at
worst, at risk of being biased. It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss the complex issues
around historiography and the numerous, relevant, critical points from the ﬁeld of memory
studies.39 If healing were to be considered from the psychoanalytic sense of “working through”
the experience of a past event (see below), it follows that how that past is remembered is critical.
In terms of individual psychology, the subjective past is what matters, notwithstanding the
possibility that what we recall may be distorted by the trauma itself and the formative
experiences that preceded it. However, when we come to collective psychology, the notions of
memory and subjectivity are more complex.
There are personal differences between individuals in a collective as to what and how
they remember a particular event and everyone’s subjective experience will be unique. There
are, however, some experiences in one person that approximate, but are not identical to, that of
another in the collective. There might be sufﬁcient similarity in the experiences of the two for
them to be considered common or shared.
When we speak of shared grief over the loss of a particular person or ideal, we are not
required to have the same experience of grief; indeed, it is impossible for each of us to have the
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same subjective experience. The notion of shared grief involves two or more people having
similar, but not identical, experiences of loss. Signiﬁcantly, what is similar is not their personal
experience or subjectivity but their shared interest in the object. For instance, collective
mourning at a funeral is not about everyone being involved in a hypothetical (but impossible)
merged, subjective experience of grief; it is about the commonality of what they have all lost.
When we speak of collective memory, we are referring both to the commonality of what
we remember together as well as that which each person remembers individually. The notion of
collective memory is indeed a vast and complex subject, much more than can be considered
here. For the purposes of the healing of historical collective trauma, there must be room for both
what we remember together and what we remember as individuals. The process of
remembering together is challenging as it requires us to negotiate personal differences in
recollections; a process that involves listening to each other to create a common narrative while
allowing for unique personal memory. This is very much the essence of a collective workingthrough as I will discuss next. Remembering together is a difﬁcult and demanding task. Often,
we ﬁnd it easier to delegate that task to an appointed or self-appointed historian, while arguing
instead about contested issues in historiography.
Working Through and Making Sense
An inﬂuential psychological concept which is of the greatest relevance to healing is the idea that
experiences need to be processed in order for them to be resolved to the extent that they cease to
affect us. Freud described this process as “working through,” a process of psychological work
that involves remembering what has happened, reconnecting with the emotional response to
that experience and making sense of what that experience meant to oneself.40 As I have outlined
earlier in this paper, the mind acts to protect itself from trauma by encapsulating overwhelming
experiences and detaching the associated emotional response to them, pushing both elements
out of conscious awareness, leading to forgetting. The process of working through is the
reverse; it begins with remembering and proceeds to reattach our emotional response to an
experience, thereby re-creating the original situation for us to make sense of what it meant.
If collective healing were to consist of the processing of shared experiences, what would
a collective working-through involve? Taking the lead from Freud, it would begin with
remembering together and encompass a sharing of stories; each story by itself resembles an
isolated broken piece from a shattered picture, waiting to be reassembled with other pieces to
recreate the original whole image. There will be some similarities in the stories being shared.
There are likely to be subtle differences even among what might appear to be similar in the ﬁrst
instance—differences that reﬂect individual subjectivity and personal background. If these
moments of sharing stories consist only of the telling of factual elements of an event,
unaccompanied by a sharing of associated emotions, they will not be of sufﬁcient depth to
possess the qualities of working through. The broken pieces may be assembled but considerable
gaps will remain between them. A vital aspect of working through is the emotional response to
what is remembered; the sharing of feelings about a common experience can be likened to the
glue that holds the broken pieces together.
In recreating the shattered image, the collective now has the opportunity to look at the
whole image, and make sense of it together, asking the questions: “What happened, and why
did it happen?” This second question often takes them into a quest for meaning, into the realm
of the spiritual and the transcendental. The search for answers to both these questions
necessarily begins within a cultural context. As outlined earlier, culture provides the reference
points for us to orientate ourselves, and the basic materials for each of us to create stories. When
a group of us remember together and share our stories together, this process takes place within
a cultural milieu that possesses commonalities and differences. The higher the proportion of
shared cultural elements among members of a group, the closer the knit of their woven fabric of
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stories. On the other hand, the greater the proportion of different cultural strands, the richer the
woven image. This metaphoric description demonstrates the way culture inﬂuences the stories
we tell and the narratives we create, how we make sense of what happened in the past, and
why it happened.
In practical terms, the process of memorialization creates the opportunity and space for
a collective working-through.41 In his insightful observation of the process of building the
United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, and his part in it, Gould highlighted the
opportunity for people with shared trauma and loss to gather together to mourn while working
constructively on the project. He noted, however, that the process was “a two-edged sword”
with the inevitability of re-traumatization while also creating an opportunity to work through.42
He is, however, not the only person who holds the view that re-traumatization is a necessary
part of the process of working through.43 While re-traumatization is usually carefully managed
and supported in individual therapy, the challenge for those who promote a collective working
through of trauma is the creation of a safe and supportive environment for hundreds and
thousands who engage with public memorialization.
Acknowledgement by Others
There also seems to be a need for the reality of what happened to be acknowledged by Others in
order for healing to take place. Recognition and validation by Others are particularly critical
since many who experience traumatic events struggle to grasp the reality of what happened
themselves; in many instances of genocides, the scale and depth of human cruelty is indeed
beyond comprehension. Somehow, the acknowledgment of the reality of what happened by
bystanders helps one to digest what is otherwise unthinkable.
The acknowledgement by those who carried out the atrocities brings added
signiﬁcance. There are a number of reasons for this. Firstly, in many instances, they are the only
witnesses to what happened, and the only other who can know fully, what happened. Secondly,
there is a need for at least one party to be responsible for what happened. In terms of individual
psychology, when the person who carried out an assault refuses to accept responsibility for
what happened, the burden of responsibility for what happened often falls on those assaulted.
It is a well-recognized phenomenon that those who have suffered sexual assault often blame
themselves for the incident. Thirdly, the issue of responsibility is keenly followed by the
question of recompense for the hurt and injury caused, the absence of which is often
accompanied by a painful resentment.44
The tripartite acknowledgment of what happened—by those who suffered, those who
caused it and those bystanders who recognized it for what it was (cf. victim, perpetrator, and
witness)—usually emerges out of their distinct respective cultural contexts; each comes to
understand what happened from their own cultural perspective. While the acceptance of these
differences in perspectives is often necessary for healing to proceed, there is also a need for
some shared understanding of what happened in order for the acknowledgment to be
meaningful. For this reason, I think, the effort towards establishing a collective memory should,
wherever possible, be a tripartite effort, encompassing the combined contributions of those who
suffered, those who inﬂicted the injury and those who witnessed it.
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Acknowledgement of Emotional Impact
In practice, the purportedly factual acknowledgement of what happened, even when it is
achieved through a tripartite, collaborative process, may not be sufﬁcient. Traumatized
individuals and collectives I have worked with over the years have needed acknowledgment by
Others of how they felt about what happened. Such an acknowledgement also helps them to come
to terms with how they have been affected emotionally. Historical discourses of collective
traumatic events are often dispassionate—disassociated from the emotional response that might
be expected to accompany such incidences; thus maintaining the emotional detachment
described earlier.
The open exploration of how one party feels about what had happened to them is,
however, fraught. It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss the relative success and utility
of Truth and Reconciliation Commissions, except to note that while they have created space for
expressing much emotional pain of loss and suffering, and the airing of grievances, it is unclear
if they have led to what is generally understood as healing.45 As this process is usually
conducted in the presence of Others, the exposure of woundedness and vulnerability also risks
further humiliation, compounding the original trauma. The possibility of sharing how one felt
about their experience of certain atrocities, in the presence of those who have committed them,
is perhaps far too fraught, and perhaps even unthinkable.
However, when an emotionally safe and supportive space can be created, and the pain
of a traumatic experience can be shared by those who have suffered it, and if this is understood
by those who inﬂicted the harm and witnessed by Others, a profound healing can take place.
Cultures that encourage the sharing of emotional experiences and have in place social processes
that regulate painful emotions such as shame and guilt are more likely to support such a
collective acknowledgement of the emotional impact of a traumatic event.
Making Sense of What Happened
After the questions: (1) What happened? and (2) How does one feel about what happened?,
what usually follows is: (3) Why did it happen? This question is an attempt to make sense of
what had happened and one’s emotional response to it.
One perspective on the need to make sense of trauma is the instinctual search for
meaning, as suggested by Viktor Frankl. Another view is the need to orientate ourselves within
a certain philosophy as part of our continuing efforts to ﬁnd our place in this world. In ancient
Greece, the cradle of modern Western civilization, everyday tragedies were contextualized
within mythology. Vast proportions of the people in the world today still make sense of their life
and suffering within the framework of their religious beliefs.46
When trauma occurs at the hands of another, or in the broader context of conﬂict, many
in the modern world still return to basic notions of good and evil. Such simple, binary world
views enable a person to locate themselves; at the very least, and most commonly, they lead
them to see themselves as good. If we cannot locate ourselves within an adopted framework on
an ordinary day, we will be left bewildered and adrift, lost and anxious when we are challenged
by adversity; we will be completely overwhelmed by a major traumatic experience.47
The Aboriginals in Australia try to make sense of their traumatic experiences within the
context of their Culture and Law, which includes the narratives of Dreamtime stories and the
order of the natural world according to their kinship systems. As outlined earlier, their culture
has been distorted and destroyed by dispossession and the continuing pernicious effects of
colonization. In my work with some communities, they were ﬁrst encouraged to reclaim certain
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elements of their culture that were lost in order to reframe their trauma—the utility of their
Dreamtime stories in helping them to understand their present-day predicament soon became
apparent. One elder exclaimed, “we now understand that this terrible situation, this suffering, is
not about our failures, our weaknesses (so say the colonizers) but what has happened to us,
what we have lost, what has been done to us; we are right to feel sad, not shame.”48
Cultural Trauma
Relationship between Collective and Cultural Trauma
The traumatic event of the terrorist attack on the World Trade Centre on September 11
highlights the important difference between collective trauma and cultural trauma. All 2,977
individuals who died that day had the shared traumatic experience of being present at that time
and place when that event unfolded, and it could be said that they shared a collective trauma.49
The same could be said of those who were in close proximity to that place and the hundreds of
ﬁreﬁghters and rescue workers who attended. Many millions more, in the United States and
worldwide, who watched the repeated screening of the airplanes crashing into the towers on
television may have shared a collective vicarious trauma. For the Americans, however, it was
arguably also a cultural trauma, as the Twin Towers of the World Trade Centre were a cultural
icon for enterprise and national pride. It may also be construed as a cultural trauma for many in
other commercial centers around the world, thousands of miles away, who looked upon the
World Trade Centre as a symbol of the free market, trade, and capitalism, even though they may
not have experienced any direct trauma either as individuals or as a collective.
Collective trauma and cultural trauma are overlapping concepts. As illustrated above,
not all aspects of a collective trauma are cultural trauma and not all aspects of cultural trauma
are experienced collectively. For example, a refugee or migrant may experience cultural trauma
in their new host country; in this case, it might be a personal individual experience, or one
shared with their family or others with a similar sense of cultural identity. This distinction
between collective and cultural trauma is important when we consider potential approaches to
healing.
In the context of this article—with its focus on the collective—cultural trauma is a
subset of collective trauma, notwithstanding the exception of that experienced by individuals,
as noted above.
A Model of Culture
Any conceptualization of cultural trauma is underpinned by the assumptions we make about
the deﬁnition and nature of culture. While it is beyond the scope of this article to discuss the
complex nature of culture and the confusion with regard to its deﬁnition, it is relevant that I
present my understanding of culture. I offer below a brief outline of the relevant concepts for
the purpose of our discussion here.
I take the meaning of the word culture from its Latin origin, cultura; its earliest use was
found in the writings of the Roman statesman, historian, and philosopher, Cicero.50 He
considered culture from the perspective of an agricultural metaphor: it is the soil that holds and
nourishes us. When we speak of culture as that which inﬂuences our way of being in the world, we
can begin to imagine how the constituents of soil may affect the character and growth of a plant
and the fruit that it bears. The soil also holds the plant ﬁrmly in the ground and supports it to
withstand the forces of wind and storm. In the language of psychology, culture holds and
nurtures our sense of place in the world, our identity, and guides and regulates our
relationships with each other. It supports our sense of conﬁdence and security by providing a
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system of symbolic reference that help us make sense of our everyday experience and adverse
events.
So much of what we often consider as culture, including customs, rituals, arts,
language, and culinary delights are those aspects which are within our awareness. I refer to
these elements of culture as cultural products. There are, however, aspects of culture that are not
so apparent; I call them cultural substrates. These more basic forms of culture are transformed
through cultural instruments (e.g. social institutions and their processes) into more elaborate
forms and, if they are accepted by the vast majority of a collective, they become their cultural
products.
Consider how Martin Luther King became an icon of American culture, or more
speciﬁcally, a symbol of its civil rights movement. I proposed that his life, work, and death were
a cultural substrate which, on its own, was not sufﬁcient for him to become an icon or symbol,
i.e. a cultural product. Rather, a series of cultural instruments turned the life, work, and death of
a person into something that could be embraced by a collective. It might be argued that it was
the mass shared experience of the life, work, and death of Martin Luther King that initiated the
process of cultural transformation, the collective response to shared experience.
The national anthem of a country, the folk songs of an ethnic tradition and the Songlines
of the Australian Aboriginals are all cultural products that have emerged from the collective
responses of shared experiences. These sophisticated cultural products were developed and
expressed through the established musical lexicon and symbolic language of each group and
were themselves products that emerged from the shared experiences of their everyday life and
historical events. Rituals and customs are formed through an evolution of the collective
response to an experience of common situations and crises endured. The elaborate kinship
system of many ancient cultures, including those of Australian Aboriginals, would have
developed through a collective’s experience of what was required to regulate relationships that
ensured genetic diversity and peaceful communal life. This regulatory aspect of culture plays an
important role in guiding our sense of place in the world.
When we say that we are held and nourished by our culture, this involves not only the
customs, language, and arts of that culture, but also the poorly deﬁned cultural substrates that
have arisen from our shared collective responses and the cultural instruments that transform
them into these recognizable cultural products.
Two Types of Cultural trauma
There are two models of cultural trauma. The ﬁrst considers the traumatic experience in terms
of deﬁned events, and the second focuses on trauma as a continuous process. They reﬂect the
two approaches in psychoanalytic thinking. Classical psychoanalysis focuses on how the mind
responds to what it experiences, in particular to threats and psychically painful experiences,
with a system of protective mechanisms, the most central of which, according to Freud is
repression.51 It considers trauma in terms of speciﬁc external events that become embedded in
the psyche; the mind reacts to them by repression and employs a host of defenses to keep the
repressed from consciousness. The second approach, highlighted by work of Bion, focuses on
the operation of the mind itself, how it thinks (e.g. the process of symbolization) and what
inﬂuences its capacity to think.52 It considers trauma in terms of its overall impact on the
development and functioning of the mind.
Jeffrey Alexander and his colleagues have proposed a model according to the ﬁrst
approach:
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Cultural trauma occurs when members of a collectivity feel
they have been subjected to a horrendous event that leaves
indelible marks upon their group consciousness, marking their
memories forever and changing their future identity in
fundamental and irrevocable ways.53
This psychoanalytically informed sociological approach highlights the social processes
by which a shared experience is collectively recognized as traumatic and how its impact is
continually mediated through collective memory and representation. Ron Eyerman has applied
this approach to his consideration of North Atlantic Slavery.54
In my opinion, it is insufﬁcient to consider the cultural trauma of the slavery from the
North Atlantic Slave Trade only as a deﬁned event; the legacy of cultural dispossession and the
forced adoption of the culture of those who had stripped enslaved people of their humanity
have not received enough attention.
I have proposed a model called “complex cultural trauma;” it gives greater emphasis to
the continuous experience of trauma and its impact on the function of the collective mind.55 I
have suggested that cultural trauma occurs when the apparatus or system through which a
collective makes sense of its experience is corrupted, distorted, compromised or destroyed. The
“thinking” apparatus or system of the collective mind, as we have earlier discussed, is its
culture.
If we were to adopt the model of culture as outlined above, complex cultural trauma
could begin with the corruption of cultural substrates; for example, by the overvaluing of some
collective experiences over others or by censoring the response to particular shared experiences.
The privileging of certain cultural processes while devaluing others will also distort the
formation of cultural products. In some instances, such as colonization, slavery, and genocide,
the whole cultural apparatus is compromised or destroyed. In many instances, cultural trauma
involves a pervasive distortion or destruction of its substrates, instruments, and products as
well as superimposed, deﬁned events. Signiﬁcantly, a destruction of a collective’s thinking
apparatus—its culture—will severely compromise its ability to make sense of deﬁnable adverse
events.
Healing Single, Deﬁned-Event Cultural Trauma
If cultural trauma is, as Jeffrey Alexander and colleagues have deﬁned it, “a horrendous event
that leaves indelible marks upon their group consciousness...,”56 then the healing would involve
a processing of that collective experience, with many of the elements described earlier in this
paper.
The healing of cultural trauma involves collective remembering, which is a process of
remembering together. It is a shared process of recalling what happened, the acknowledgement
of how we all felt then and are feeling about it now, and an acknowledgment of its signiﬁcance.
How we remember together will be determined by the components of the culture we share—its
substrates, processes, and products. Our common culture is laden with the assumptions we
have consciously and unconsciously adopted. The colonized often assume their culture is
inferior to that of the colonizer; they are deprived of certain components of their culture that
could have given them a more authentic apprehension of their traumas. They would be creating
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a narrative of their traumatic history without their own language, writing their story in
someone else’s language.
From the perspective of a cultural trauma, the Holocaust has, I think, entrenched
forever, for many Jews, a deep sense of persecution, which is not only embedded in their
identity but their whole way of life. Safety cannot be assumed and there is ever a vigilance for
hatred. As I have highlighted earlier, when an individual or collective regresses under traumatic
stress, their tendency towards binary thinking—that “if you are not for us, you are against us”
—will inﬂuence their interaction with the rest of the world. These basic assumptions, being the
substrates of their culture, will inﬂuence the creation of their cultural products, which include
the writing of their history and the development of public policies.
The healing of the Holocaust trauma would require—more than the afﬁrmation of
collective memories—full and accurate representations of that traumatic experience and the
process of working-through. It requires the most difﬁcult task of re-examining, and sometimes
undoing, basic assumptions relating to their fundamental sense of security and trust.57
Healing Complex Cultural Trauma
Complex cultural trauma often involves single-event trauma (which may be multiple)
superimposed on a pervasive and continuous distortion and destruction of culture. The healing
of those superimposing single-event traumas is limited by what has become of the underlying
culture. It might be said that in many instances, progress in the healing of single-event trauma
may not be possible without some healing of the underlying cultural apparatus.
One of the ﬁrst steps in the healing of a collective’s complex cultural trauma is its critical reexamination of relevant cultural substrates—their values and assumptions, and other more
basic elements of the culture which are beyond everyday awareness.
The contributions of memory studies and critical cultural theories, especially from the
post-colonial perspective, are therefore vital in ensuring that we have the most authentic
collective thinking apparatus (our culture) possible to (re)frame what has happened, factually
and emotionally, and make sense of it. This, I think, also applies to the healing of the Holocaust.
It is, however, a most difﬁcult task as attempts by the Jewish people to re-examine the basic
assumptions of their own culture—under the cloud of “if you are not for us, you are against
us,” could quickly arouse accusations of betrayal. Sadly, if the cultural distortion caused by the
Holocaust is not undone, the collective healing of this single, deﬁned-event trauma will be
limited, and the effects of this horrendous event will persist and pervade over many more
generations to come.
For the Australian Aboriginals, colonized and dispossessed, and those affected by
slavery, however, this will necessarily include a reclamation of their culture of origin. If that
which has been lost, cannot be found, they will need to create new elements of culture, ones that
are authentically theirs. It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss further what this might
involve, in particular, the complex process of decolonization.
Conclusion
Historical collective trauma is embedded in the shared consciousness of a collective, which this
paper considers to be its culture. Its healing is a most complex and challenging task. At the core
of it, is a collective process of working through painful, overwhelming experiences, a process
that, at one level, involves remembering and making sense of deﬁned events. This process is,
however, dependent on the possession of a capable and authentic collective thinking apparatus,
or culture. In many instances, the healing of single, deﬁned traumatic events is limited by a
pervasive, insidious and continuing distortion of, and damage to its underlying culture; a
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complex form of cultural trauma that needs to be addressed in order for the healing of historical
collective trauma to be accomplished fully.
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The volume Remembrance and Forgiveness: Global and Interdisciplinary Perspectives on
Genocide and Mass Violence, edited by Ajlina Karamehić-Muratović and Laura Kromják, takes a
reader on an intellectual and cultural journey across the sixteen chapters and six continents,
exploring the social remnants of the post-Holocaust genocides and endeavours to reconcile. At
the outset, the editors strongly anchor their stance in the moral imperative to remember, thus
framing the two overarching themes of the volume by asking what is the relationship between
remembrance and forgiveness; and how the notions of these two central concepts change and differ
over time, across the cultures and contexts of genocide.
The book gives primacy to the local and cultural—rather than legal and general
considerations of the genocides discussed—evident in the judicious and variegated selection of
the chapter material that ranges from the studies of vernacular memorialisation initiatives to the
semiotic analyses of the short ﬁlms, newspaper articles, and literary representations of violence.
Effectively, the volume bridges the dichotomic gap posed by the platitudinous question of
whether it is easier to forgive or forget, through incisive analysis of the inextricable
interdependency between the two; further solidifying the notion that “memory is a prerequisite
to forgiving.”1 The book, as much as the post-conﬂict communities deemed, seeks reconciliation
in different contexts, by different means and methods, where the notion of forgiveness is seen as
a gatekeeper and affectively hardest to achieve. In a sense, the book portrays the post-genocidal
memory space as a liminal stage between the precarity of post-conﬂict anomie and aspired
social harmony that unravels with the reconciliation. In the liminal stage, the wounded
communities don’t necessarily wait for healing to come, but engage in the collective efforts to
assemble the consensual narrative of the past sufferings that might convince the gatekeeper in
their readiness to move on.
Contributing works in this book usher the reader into different political, historical, and
socio-cultural contexts, detailing the merits and shortcomings of the variegated transitional
processes that communities come up with in their quest for peace and concord. Based on the
premise that “there is no forgiveness without truth just as there is no reconciliation without
justice,”2 an ample number of chapters explore the implications and effects of the transitional
justice processes in seeking forgiveness—particularly the works of the truth and reconciliation
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commissions (TRC) and the cases of bottom-up resistance to close the impunity gap. For
example, these are explicated in the studies of transitional processes in Guatemala and El
Salvador by Joshua Snyder; by Heribert and Kanya Adam in their analysis of the TRC pioneer
in South Africa; and later on in the Suranjan Weeraratne’s reﬂection on the collaborative truthseeking initiative by the former belligerents in Timor-Leste and Indonesia.
The violence sponsored by the communist regimes dominates the book, testifying to the
fact that genocides and protracted social reluctance to forgive might be more characteristic of
collectivist societies. By contrast, the ﬁrst chapter written by the late Colin Tatz, reﬂecting upon
the Australian process of coming to terms with the dark history through acknowledgment of the
colonial massacre of Aborigines—as well as Kerri J. Malloy’s account of the redemption through
joint memorialisation of the genocide over the Native Americans in Northern California—
represent the rare examples in the volume where both sides have made a step towards the
forgiveness.
Yet, my attention, presumably guided by my current research interests, has been drawn
to the two ancillary themes that recurred throughout the book. These are the salience of
multivocality of narratives and the local/cultural contextualisation of the genocides in the
forgiveness-seeking processes; and the notion of gendered remembrance, notably the advocacy of
greater involvement of women in the memorialisation of genocide and structural community
healing. For example, Mery Kolimon, in the chapter on Indonesian Tragedy and protracted
torture imputed by the totalitarian memory regime, advocates for the commemorative culture
underpinned by the vernacular and polysemic memory narratives. Natalia Paula Crocco
focuses on exploring the bridge between the state and people—the written media—and their
role in the construction of Argentine cultural memory. Additionally, the importance of a locally
and culturally tailored approach to teaching forgiveness is discussed in Ilham Nasser’s and
Mohammed Abu-Nimer’s study of the Middle-Eastern schools and Alfred Sebit Lokuji’s
chapter on challenges of parochialism in the multi-ethnic South Sudan. Sterling Recker offers a
particularly novel reﬂection on the Rwandan experimental approach to reconciliation—
envisioned through village-based participation in the national economic development plan. All
these chapters, in their own ways, exemplify the need for a more inclusive, multivocal, and
culturally-contextualised approach to forgiveness and reconciliation in post-genocide milieus.
Similarly, in their comparative study of post-genocide memorialisation in Cambodia
and Guatemala, JoAnn DiGeorgio-Lutz and Martha C. Galvan Mandujano poignantly critique
the overwhelming essentialization of the women and their linking to the universal tropes of
passive mourning mothers and helpless raped victims of the genocide, thus advocating for the
greater inclusion of women both in representation and construction of the genocide memorials
and commemorations. Likewise, Suranjan Weeraratne raised the issue of an overly
masculinised portrayal of Timor Leste’s violent history in TRC reports that engender an
inadequate genocide memorialisation. Moreover, both Kolimon in the Indonesian example and
Yuval Benziman in the Israeli-Palestinian context reﬂect upon women in action; the former
illustrating mobilisation of female survivors’ counter-narratives in the post-genocide
rehabilitation, and the latter featuring the work of Israeli feminist anti-militarist NGO
documenting the mistreatment of the Palestinians. All these authors insist on shifting the focus
to women’s agency and salience in post-conﬂict community recovery, memorialisation, and
cultivation of forgiveness.
The afterword by David Pettigrew eruditely rounds off the whole volume by
exemplifying the contemporary memory subversion and the social mutation of genocide denial
in Bosnia into the whole new stage of “triumphalism”3 whereby perpetrators humiliate the
victims, celebrate their crimes, and glorify the war criminals, only further sabotaging any
chance of forgiveness and interethnic reconciliation.
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The teleological editing of the volume generates an interdisciplinary discourse on the
subject matter, whereby the chapters concatenate in conversation by comparing and contrasting
different perspectives and actions on the politics of memory and forgiveness in the aftermath of
genocide. Arguably, the book does not mention nor praise a single case of fully achieved
reconciliation, that prompts one to question whether true rapprochement is even possible; or
rather, whether its precursor—the forgiveness—is ever anywhere fully attainable?
Contributions to this volume offer a timely reminder and testament that the current
transitional and international justice mechanisms have not yet found a panacea for the postgenocide reconstruction, nor did their previous works in the post-war contexts lived up to the
world’s promise of never again that had been set in motion since the Holocaust—that upon
editors’ early notice takes a leave of absence from this book. The end result of the edited volume
is an eclectic, well-balanced, and incisive exploration of the theoretically intricate and politically
contested subject matter: the mobilisation of memory in seeking truth, justice, and forgiveness.
Remembrance and Forgiveness is a deeply informative and comprehensive read, particularly
useful for those who are interested in the interdisciplinary approach to post-conﬂict memory
and genocide studies, transitional justice, and reconciliation. It is well-suited for upperundergraduate and graduate students, and may serve as a compendious overview of the
current situation within the context of post-Holocaust genocides.
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There is a vast literature focused on the puzzle of why similar institutions, norms, or
laws are adopted in different countries. The topics that have been studied include human rights
(e.g., same-sex marriage rights, voting rights), judicial reforms (e.g., constitutional courts,
criminal procedure codes), and laws that criminalize behavior (e.g., domestic violence, female
genital cutting, or the trafﬁcking of persons). But to my knowledge Mark S. Berlin is the ﬁrst
scholar who has studied the diffusion of laws that criminalize atrocity crimes.
Atrocity law is a particularly puzzling category of law for states to incorporate as part
of their own domestic law. A term coined by David J. Scheffer, atrocity law encompasses the
crimes of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.1 Thus, not only the domestication
of these crimes constitutes the implementation of norms ﬁrst adopted in international treaties,
but their incorporation into domestic criminal law increases the chances of future prosecutions
against state agents in domestic jurisdictions.2 Also puzzling, Berlin notes, is that most states
adopted atrocity laws before the international human rights movement prioritized individual
criminal accountability for human rights violations in the 1990s.3 So lacking pressure from
below, why would states introduce laws that could increase the risk of their own agents to face
trial for committing atrocities? In his book, Criminalizing Atrocity: The Global Spread of Criminal
Laws against International Crimes, Berlin answers this question following a carefully crafted
mixed-method research design that required extensive archival research, interviews, and the
construction of two impressive datasets with cross-country data on national atrocity laws and
criminal code reforms.
To understand why atrocity law has been introduced in domestic criminal law, Berlin
argues, we must understand how states have done so.4 A closer look at the processes through
which criminal law is created reveals that new offenses may be adopted through two different
“pathways” that involve different actors with different motivations. First, through “targeted
legislation” governments can pass a new statute or amend an existing one just to incorporate a
new crime.5 Adoption of atrocity laws through targeted legislation is explained by what Berlin
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calls the “rational expression thesis.” In these instances the legislation is the product of
government leaders’ preferences and initiatives. 6 Democracies, thus, are more likely than
non-democracies to introduce atrocity laws through targeted legislation, although some may
take longer than non-democracies to do so.7 Also, “false negatives” are expected, i.e.,
democracies that have not criminalized atrocities. The reason that democracies either take
longer or do not criminalize atrocity laws, Berlin argues, is that these type of laws are a low
priority for governments or they are perceived as unnecessary if the country has a monist legal
system.8
The second pathway is large-scale reform, when governments decide to rewrite and
replace their national criminal codes.9 Berlin found that most atrocity laws around the world
have been introduced as part of major criminal code reforms, not through targeted legislation.10
Berlin argues that atrocity crimes are more likely to be incorporated through major reforms
because drafting a new penal code requires technical expertise. Thus, the drafting is delegated
to technocratic criminal law experts,11 which depoliticizes the legislative review and approval of
the code, as the draft itself is both perceived and framed as a technical modernization of the law.
12This second pathway, Berlin argues, increases the likelihood that states adopt atrocity laws
because technocratic experts are motivated to draft a “modern” code, which prompts them to
seek out ideas/codes which they tend to borrow, a process he names as the “technocratic legal
borrowing thesis.” Berlin argues that borrowing happens through an emulation mechanism,
when drafters use codes adopted in other states as models, and/or through a
professionalization mechanism, when drafters are inspired by ideas promoted by transnational
professional networks.”13
There are many things to like about this book (some of which I mention below), but I
want to highlight two features that in my opinion make this book unique. First, with this book
Berlin has made an incredible empirical contribution. Before this book there was no crosscountry data on criminal code reforms or on atrocity laws. Thanks to these datasets we now
know, for instance, that criminal code reform is more common than one might assume. Berlin
found that “121 states have done so at least once between 1945 and 2018, totaling 170 new codes
or an average of 2.3 new criminal codes adopted per year.14 The number of states that have
incorporated atrocity laws in their penal law since World War II is also quite surprising. Berlin
found that “by the end of 2018, 133 states had criminal laws against genocide, 131 against war
crimes, and 90 against crimes against humanity,”15 and as noted earlier, most of these crimes
were introduced through criminal code reform. Thus, with these datasets Berlin brings to light a
global phenomenon that was previously unknown in its scope.
And, second, the book is of great pedagogical and methodological value for social
scientists. The reading of this book is interesting, enjoyable, and refreshing in great part because
Berlin’s writing is clear and explicit on how the methodologies he used allowed him to test and
support his argument using both quantitative and qualitative data. The way Berlin threads
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theory, methodology, and empirics throughout the chapters make this book a great model for
both students and teachers of research design, qualitative methods, and mixed methods. In
particular, I highly recommend the book as an example of qualitative case selection and process
tracing in the social sciences.
The book is organized in seven chapters. The ﬁrst three chapters introduce the reader to
the topic and provide necessary background. In the introductory chapter, Berlin describes the
puzzle, provides a summary of the argument, and his mixed-method research design. In the
second chapter, Berlin draws on the human rights and norm diffusion literatures to build his
theoretical framework, and he details the different expectations derived from the “rational
expression” and “technocratic borrowing” theses. As thorough as this chapter is in detailing the
theory, the puzzle ultimately speaks to the larger question of why a particular behavior or
offense is criminalized in domestic statutes, so I was surprised that Berlin did not engage with
the literature focused on explaining criminalization of human behavior. I also would have also
appreciated a brief explanation of how the diffusion mechanisms proposed here are different to
the diffusion mechanisms normally highlighted in the literature (for instance, it is not clear how
the “professionalization mechanism” is different from “socialization”). In chapter 3, Berlin
offers a fascinating historical journey to trace the origins of the idea of including atrocity crimes
in domestic criminal law. Berlin found that this idea originated within a group of inﬂuential
European criminal law scholars, who through a professional association, the International
Association of Penal Law (Association Internationale de Droit Pénal or AIDP), played a key role in
spreading the idea as an important feature of a “modern” code.16 Similar to past research that
has stressed the key role of experts in norm diffusion, Berlin found that over time the idea
spread among criminal law scholars through professionalization and/or emulation
mechanisms.
The empirical support to his arguments can be found in chapters 4 to 6. In chapter 4,
Berlin uses an event history model to test determinants of domestic atrocity laws. The results
provide overall support to his two theses, showing that from 1950 until 2013 democratic states
were more likely to pass targeted legislation, and states with criminal code reform were more
likely to include atrocity crimes when more regional legal peers had already done so and the
state had criminal law scholars linked with AIDP.17 Quite surprisingly, an important number of
countries that incorporated atrocity laws did so during the Cold War and many of those were
autocracies at the time.18 These reforms, Berlin asserts, would later ease the path for future
human rights prosecutions in those countries.19 The results of the chapter are compelling and
interesting. I was left only wondering why, if one potential explanation for “false negatives” is
the type of legal system (monist vs. dualist),20 this variable was not included in the models.
I found chapters 5 and 6 the most interesting, where the reader will ﬁnd a great
example of how to verify, through careful case selection and process tracing, the causal
mechanisms of an argument. In chapter 5 Guatemala was selected as a “pathway case,”21 i.e., an
example of a country that, against the odds, in the middle of a civil war enacted a new criminal
code that introduced atrocity crimes in 1973. Through careful process tracing Berlin shows how
drafters borrowed provisions from other codes in the region (through emulation) and from
ideas supported by the AIDP (through professionalization), and because the drafting process
was perceived as technical, the legislative review and approval was depoliticized. In Chapter 6
Berlin demonstrates the methodological advantage of looking at three “negative cases,” i.e.,
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cases that did not lead to atrocity criminalization against theoretical expectations, to identify the
scope conditions of his thesis. In Colombia and Poland, Berlin found that sometimes, even with
a criminal code reform, legislators may fear the potential implications of including atrocity
provisions and decide not to include these in the ﬁnal draft. In the Maldives, at the time of
reform the country lacked domestic technical expertise, so the government instead hired foreign
experts to draft the code. In this case atrocity crimes were not considered because the drafters
did not look for models containing atrocity crimes nor they had links to the AIDP.22 And ﬁnally,
in his last chapter, Berlin summarizes the book’s ﬁndings and provides some implications for
research on human rights accountability and international law.
In summary, this is a fantastic book. Political scientists will ﬁnd that Berlin’s research
joins the recent wave of pathbreaking scholarship that has emerged within political science that
focuses on the study of legal institutions outside constitutional courts and constitutional law.
Diffusion scholars may like this complex yet elegant diffusion theory that looks into different
pathways to explain different diffusion mechanisms. And human rights and legal scholars will
likely enjoy the history of domestication of atrocity laws and may rethink how domestic laws
impact human rights prosecutions. I am conﬁdent that Criminalizing Atrocity by Mark S. Berlin
will be a welcomed addition to many bookshelves.
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The contributors of Collective & State Violence in Turkey: The Construction of a National
Identity from Empire to Nation-State1 shed analytical light on some of the lesser known episodes
of mass political violence in the Anatolia region from the times of the Ottoman Empire to
contemporary Republican Turkey. These essays are set against the backdrop of the most
notorious instance of state violence in the region, the Armenian Genocide. As a result, this
edited volume effectively demonstrates that the degree of organization, mobilization, and
violence marshalled by the Committee for Union and Progress (CUP) to prosecute the
Armenian Genocide was not a historical aberration, but rather, part of a larger tapestry of
collective and state violence endemic to the region that continues to this day.
While many of these episodes of violence did not reach the intensity or scope of the
Armenian Genocide, they nevertheless demonstrate a historical continuity in which the
ideologies, institutions, and social relations designed to facilitate ethnoreligious homogeneity in
the region remains durable over time. Both Astourian and Korkmaz point out in their respective
chapters, the CUP engineered the Armenian Genocide by inheriting the structures and
precedents of anti-Armenian violence established by the preceding Hamidian regime.2
Furthermore, violence against the Armenians did not end with the fall of the Ottoman Empire
or the CUP, as Kévorkian, Suciyan, and Törne each document the systematic campaigns of the
ethnic cleansing of survivors, erasure of identity, and genocide denial by the subsequent
Kemalist and Republican Turkey governments.3
Although none of the chapters directly focus on the events of the Armenian Genocide as
a central point of analysis, one of the most important contributions this volume makes to the
scholarship on the Armenian Genocide is its focus on the various other groups that have also
fallen victim to mass collective and state violence throughout this time period that have been
left out of the mainstream discourse. Gaunt’s chapter brings light to the long history of
genocidal violence against the Assyrians;4 Shrinian explores the continuity of anti-Greek violence
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through Hamidian, Unionist, and Kemalist regimes;5 Bali brings to light the latent anti-Semitism
and tenuous social position Jews held in Anatolia and deconstructs the “model minority”
myth;6 Yeğen examines the undulating terrain of Turkish-Kurdish relationships and the
sustained violence Kurdish movements experience in modern Turkey;7 Dressler discusses both
physical and non-physical forms of violence endured by the Alevis under a rubric of TurkishMuslim hegemony;8 ﬁnally, Schneider traces the long history of persecution faced by the Yazidis
at the hands of both the Ottoman and Persian Empires, all the way to the visceral events of the
Sinjar Massacre perpetrated by the Islamic State in 2014.9
By compiling these vignettes of violence and persecution against a multitude of
minority groups in Anatolia, the editors of Collective & State Violence in Turkey remind the
readers of two crucial interlocking features of mass state violence and genocide. The ﬁrst is that
the state embarks on an objective towards the creation of an ideal-typically homogenous society
that is impossible to achieve. As such, while the state often distinguishes one group as the target
for extermination, it will inevitably expand its agenda to other groups that do not ﬁt within this
particular ideal-type vision. In the case of Anatolia, it was not only the Armenians that were
deemed to be threats to this particularist state-building project, but other Christian and nonMuslim groups as well, such as the Assyrians, Greeks, and Jews. This is not an exclusive
phenomenon to Ottoman and Turkish state violence, but is evident in the Holocaust, the
Cambodian Genocide, the Rwandan Genocide, and elsewhere.
The second and related feature that is important for scholars of genocide and mass
political violence to recognize is that identities are always ﬂuid and dynamic, and that it is
impossible to draw clear and hard boundaries between the intersectionality of multiple
identities. Yeğen, for instance, demonstrate that despite adoption of Sunni Islam and recruited
as allies by the Ottomans to cleanse Anatolia of Christians, Kurdish tribes were still not granted
the ability to hold on to their unique cultural identity and were either subject to mass
Turkiﬁcation or face violent reprisal.10 Similarly, Dressler unpacks the complexities of Alevi
identity and shows that despite being ethnically Turkish and Muslim, the particularities of
Alevism still “others” them from the hegemonic Turkish-Muslim social order.11 As such, the
ﬂuidity of identity means that not only is a homogeneous state-building project impossible to
achieve, but the impact of violence that different groups experience will vary across time and
space, contingent on their positionality within the dominant ideological and social hierarchy.
Therefore, while there is a centralized structure of violence imposed at the political centers, the
impacts and manifestations of violence at the local and communal levels will be highly varied
and contingent. This explains the differential, and often divergent, experiences of the different
minority communities throughout the course of the Armenian Genocide, and beyond.
In this way, the contributors of Collective & State Violence in Turkey also remind readers
to assign agency to the target groups of genocidal and mass state violence. Because of their
differential experiences of violence at the hands of the state, their responses are also just as
varied. Suciyan and Törne, for instance, each respectively outlined the different strategies
adopted by the Armenian diaspora to survive in post-genocide Turkey.12 Similarly, on the
experiences of minority groups such as the Jews, Kurds, Alevis, and Yazidis, the respective
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authors highlight that the variance between how state violence impacted these groups are
directly related to their different levels of integration within the dominant Turkish-Muslim
social structure. Furthermore, the contributors showed that targeted groups consciously and
actively deploy a wide-spectrum of survival tactics from armed resistance to assimilation, and
they did not simply resign to becoming hapless victims of history. Given the structures of
constraints of violence from which they operated, the subaltern groups exercised resiliency and
agency.
Through the collection of these historical and analytical accounts of collective and state
violence in the Anatolia region, the editors also demonstrate that the use violence itself is
multidimensional. Although it is easy to take genocidal violence at face value as a means to the
end of creating a homogenous nation-state, several contributors to this volume ask readers to
consider alternative forms and logics of violence that serve a variety of purposes. Güven’s
account of the anti-Christian riots on September 6–7, 1955 in Pera showed how the state
sponsors civil society organizations to decentralize violence on their behalf,13 while Kieser
argues that the mass participation of private citizens and civil society in these instances of a
public display of violence is essentially a process of socialization for individuals to identify with
a particular group.14 As such, violence can be both a means to an end and an end in itself. On
the other hand, contributors such as Derin, Dressler, and Copeaux, argue that violence does not
even have to be physical, but it can be discursive, cultural, and epistemic, conducted through
genocide denial, systemic discrimination and marginalization, and the promotion of ethnic
chauvinism.15 Regardless of the form and nature of violence, Bozarslan emphasizes that
violence can only occur on this scale because of an existing structure that both enables and
incentivizes it.16 By establishing the proximate conditions, agents of violence become less
restrained to act. Seen as both means as well as ends, this volume calls upon the readers to
examine violence both from rational-instrumental, as well as constitutive perspectives.
The central themes of this volume, through highlighting historical continuity and
episodic violence against various communities in a multitude of ways, have two important
implications for the study of genocide and mass political violence. First and foremost, it is
critical to recognize that none of the episodes of violence documented are inevitable. That is to
say, by tracing the historical lineages and continuities, the contributors show the different
junctures where a different pathway and outcome could have been possible. This places the role
of agency back into focus such that albeit agents do not act under conditions of their choosing,
they can make their own history and shape those structures and history for posterity.
The second, and related, implication is that by understanding the historical continuities
of the structures of violence, the culpability and responsibilities of the perpetrator groups
should also be brought to the forefront of the discussion. Just as the victims have the agency to
resist, the perpetrators also have the agency to choose from a range of possible courses of action
that does not lead to genocidal outcomes. Furthermore, regime change does not exonerate and
absolve the state from the role it plays in the creation and maintenance of the structures of
violence, especially when it inherits the legacies of their predecessors. As such, it begs the
reader to question the roles and responsibility that the contemporary Turkish state has towards
reconciliation and restitution.
By taking an interdisciplinary and multivariate approach to the study of violent
episodes, both historical and contemporary, in Anatolia, the editors and contributors of
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Collective & State Violence in Turkey make signiﬁcant contributions to not only the literatures of
the Armenian Genocide and Turkish state violence, but the scholarship on genocide and mass
political violence as a whole. The human experience with political violence is never even across
time and space, and by snapshotting those different experiences, the contributors of this volume
paint a cohesive narrative that capture both the nuances as well as broad patterns of the
different cases and themes examined. The approaches taken in this book represents a
microcosm in the broader array of genocide and mass political violence case studies, and as
such, is essential reading for any audience, whether academic or practitioner, vested in
understanding how genocidal violence occurs and the potential for its prevention and
mitigation.
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